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On July 28, 1915» American marines and bluejackets
from the armored cruiser Washington were landed in Port-
au-Prince, Haiti, for the purpose of "preventing further
rioting and for the protection of foreigners* lives and
property and to preserve order." Thus began a military
occupation of nearly twenty years duration. The events
leading to the intervention, the extraordinary measures
taken to conclude the treaty which "legalized" the occu-
pation, the structure and operation of the treaty regime,
and, finally, the sequent steps taken to effect with-
drawal, are recounted in some detail in the pages that
follow.
A chronological approach has been selected as the
one most suitable for what is essentially historical
narrative. Wherever possible descriptive passages are
based upon eye witness or first hand accounts gleaned
from the record. Archival material from the State and
Navy Departments provided the principal sources used in
preparation of this work. Other useful and informative
sources examined included the Admiral William B. Caperton
papers in the Library of Congress, and an unpublished
manuscript by Captain Edward L. Beach, Sr., loaned to the
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writer by Captain Edward L. Beach, Jr. A selected bib-
liography follows the text.
Both impressive and Instructive are the roles played
by extragovernmental individuals and groups in the shaping
of American foreign policy as it pertained to Haiti.
Missionaries, civil libertarians, businessmen, Journalists,
out-of-office politicians, bankers and philosophers, at
home and abroad, all made their influence felt in, through,
and sometimes over the head of the State Department. Prior
to the intervention, Haiti most certainly ranked with later
day Czechoslovakia, in that it was "a far away land of which
we knew little." After the intervention, however, self-
declared experts were suddenly everywhere, offering strident
criticism and advice to those harassed officials who bore
the responsibility for formulating and carrying out American
policy in the Black Republic. Some of the criticism was
undoubtedly warranted, and some of the advice was sound,
but a distressingly large part of what was being said and
written about Haiti during the intervention was gratuitous
and not well founded on fact.
Haiti during the decade of the twenties became a
political issue sans pareil , in part because of the American
swing toward isolationism and a between-the-wars distrust
of the military, but more particularly because of the racial
issues involved. America was not yet prepared to grant its
own large negro population an equal place in the sun, but
neither was it in a mood to tolerate supposed white injustice

toward the blacks of Haiti. Yellow journalism flourished,
and isolated instances of wrongdoing by the occupation
forces were seized upon and presented as illustrating a
general policy of repression and brutality enforced by
"the bayonets and machine guns of American marines."
Needless to say, such charges found quick echoes in the
radical press of Latin America and Europe, and even as
far away as China. Haiti became a convenient stick with
which to publicly thrash the United States.
Each successive American administration undoubtedly
recognized the dissension at home and the damage to American
prestige abroad caused by the continued occupation of Haiti.
Withdrawal, however, posed serious questions of conscience
and at least a threat that having failed to effect needed
reforms, a second intervention might be required in the
future. Responsible American officials were loath to
recommend precipitate retreat in the face of explicit and
violent opposition threats to the persons and property of
those Haitians who had cooperated with the intervention.
There appeared to be no honorable way out, and in the light
Df Haitian history since the withdrawal of the American
Occupation, one is tempted to conclude that there was in
Tact no exit without a clear admission of failure.
Writing in the fall of the year 1971. it is virtually
.mpossible to resist the temptation to compare the American
ntervention in Haiti with the infinitely more costly and
••ragic American intervention in Vietnam. In neither country,
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it now appears, was there a clearly defined American
national interest at stake. In neither country were
there significant American Investments, nor large American
resident populations. The strategic considerations often
cited as reasons for the interventions were most probably
defunct when the interventions occurred. The subject of
Caribbean naval bases and coaling stations was virtually
a dead issue by 1915 as a result of changes wrought by
the Spanish American War and the then current cataclysm
in Europe. The domino theory in Southeast Asia and the
Dulles strategy of containment were largely discredited
by 1965 in view of the breakup of monolithic communism
and the new alignment of world powers. In both Haiti and
Vietnam, high moral principles were invoked to justify
intervention. America must save Haiti from the chaos and
anarchy of its constant revolutions, America must ensure
that the free people of Vietnam have the right to choose
their own form of government. In both countries America
has signally failed, as of this writing, to nurture the
free democratic institutions it emplanted in those unhappy
lands at such great and thankless expense.
Why? A frequently voiced complaint concerning both
interventions was that America had simply "backed the
wrong horses." Haitian and Vietnamese governments supported
by the United States during the interventions have been
attacked for their corruption, ineptness, stubborness, and
unwillingness to conform to the American way. More often
vil

forgotten than remembered in the years since 1915 when he
first voiced them, are Woodrow Wilson's thoughts on the
subject! "... only an honest and efficient government
deserves support. The Government of the United States
could not justify the expenditure of money or the sacri-
fice of American lives in support of any other kind of
government." It seems probable, however, that the root
causes of the American failures in Haiti and in Vietnam
are more fundamental to the human condition than mere
errors in political judgement.
A study of history appears to support the thesis that
political freedom, progress and evolution are seldom, if
ever, successfully imposed from without. This is the con-
clusion drawn by the writer from his study of the American
intervention in Haiti. This is what he sadly expects to
see confirmed when the final chapters are written con-
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Haiti Prior to the Intervention
"What is past is prologue. Study the past."
- Pedestal inscriptions, north entrance,




I. From Columbus to the Revolution.
So lovable, so tractable, so peaceable are these
people that I swear to your Majesties there is not
In the world a better nation nor a better land.
- Columbus, to Ferdinand and Isabella.
However it is approached - by sea, by air, or overland
along impossible roads from the Dominican Republic - Haiti's
outstanding feature is its mountains. The name "Haiti"
itself is of Indian origin, probably meaning "the high place."
Other than a few stone artifacts, it remains almost the
sole reminder of the Ciboneys, Arawaks, and Caribs who once
lived there.
Hammond's World Atlas credits Haiti with 10,714 square
miles of territory, some 80 per cent of which is mountainous.
The Cordillera Central or Cibao Mountains extend through the
northern peninsula raising peaks as high as 8,000 feet above
sea level. In the southeastern region of the country the
La Selle range, and in the southern peninsula the La Hotte,
form the backbones of Haiti's two other mountain groups.
Seen from afar they are not unlike some parts of the great
Appalachian range in the southeastern part of the United
States
.
There are three principal rivers and three lowlands.
The largest of the rivers, the Artibonite, flows into the
sea near Gonaives on the west coast, after passing through
a wedge-shaped valley of the same name. The second river,
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La Grande Anse, drains a part of the rugged southern
peninsula and has its mouth near Jgremie. The third,
Trois Rivieres, empties into the sea on the north coast
near Port de Paix. Between the mountains and the sea in
the north lies the Plaine du Nord, the most fertile region
in the country. Between the central and southern ranges,
extending from the capital, Port-au-Prince, into the
Dominican Republic, is the great semi-arid plain known as
the Cul de Sac. The climate is tropical, but the island,
particularly in the north, is cooled by prevailing sea
breezes
.
It is not, of course, altogether correct to call it
an island. The Haitians are heir to only roughly one-third
of an island. Except for relatively brief periods in the
nineteenth century when it was conqueror of the whole, Haiti
has been the uneasy bedfellow of the Dominican Republic,
occupier of the eastern two-thirds of the island of Santo
Domingo (or Hispaniola). The island they share, however,
has one of the most strategic locations in the Western Hemi-
sphere. From the southeast it commands the entrance to the
Gulf of Mexico. More Important still, the two great ocean
highways linking North America and Europe to the Panamanian
isthmus - the Mona Passage on the east and the Windward
Passage on the west - stream by its coasts, a fact not
unnoticed by naval strategists from Morgan to Mahan . The
island's nearest neighbors in the chain of the Greater
Antilles are Cuba to the northwest and Puerto Rico to the
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southeast. New York lies some I3OO miles north.
Little is known of the original inhabitants of the
island. They left no monuments, no written records.
Those who welcomed Columbus called themselves Tafnos
(the Good People) and it is thought that they were of
Arawak stock. The story of how and when they and the
other island tribes came to Haiti lies shrouded perhaps
forever in the past.
The island is believed to be the sixth point of land
charted by Columbus on his first voyage of discovery to
the New World, and his landfall was probably made near
Mole St. Nicholas on December 5, 1492. From there his
tiny squadron felt its way eastward along the coast until,
on Christmas Day, at Bord de Mer, near Cape Haitian, disaster
struck. The flagship, Santa Marl
a
f
grounded and all efforts
to refloat her were unavailing.
From the ship's timbers a small fortification was con-
structed on the nearby shore. Salvaged provisions from the
wreck were used to provide a meager supply of stores, and
with much difficulty a few of the ship's cannon were dragged
ashore. Some 38 volunteers remained behind when Columbus
set sail with his remaining two ships on the return voyage
to Spain. The stockaded shelter built from the wreckage
of Santa Maria was christened "La Navidad" in honor of the
day the grounding had occurred.
It is not known what transpired among the band of
thirty-eight during the Admiral's absence, for on his

return the following year there were no survivors.
Columbus came back to La Isla Espanola (later to be
known by the somewhat Latinized "Hispaniola" ) with a
larger expedition, permanent settlers, and plans for making
the island the center for Spain's further exploration and
exploitation of the New World. Chance and perhaps geo-
graphical imperative led to the establishment of the
principal Spanish city and emporium on the island at
Santo Domingo, on the southeastern coast, a more con-
venient taking off point for the Spanish fleets sailing
to Central and South America. The city, the first per-
manent Spanish settlement in the Western Hemisphere, was
founded in 1*1-96 by Columbus* brother, Bartholomew. This
shifting of Spanish interest to the eastern part of the
island is of the utmost significance in Haiti's later
development.
There never was a great deal of mineral wealth on
the island and the few placer mines where the Indians
gleaned their bits and specks of gold were soon panned
out, to the disgust of the conqulstadores . Sugar cane,
however, introduced from the Canary Islands on Columbus*
second voyage, thrived in the receptive soil and climate
of Hispaniola. Its intensive cultivation hastened the ex-
tinction of the island's aborigines, already being carried
away by European diseases, for they proved to be ill-
adapted to heavy field labor. M 0f a native population
estimated at 300,000 in 1^92, 60,000 were counted in 1508
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and in 15^8 less than 5OO." 1 At the urging of the Bishop
BartolemS de las Casas, who was touched by the horrors
Inflicted on the Indians, the Spanish Crown consented to
the importation of African slaves. The first blacks
arrived in 1512 and were put to work chiefly in the
eastern part of the island. For more than a century
the western part (Haiti) was virtually deserted.
The hegemony of Spain on Hispaniola, as in other
parts of the New World, was not destined to go unchallenged.
In 1629 » French and English survivors of a Spanish ex-
pedition against their "illegal" settlement on the island
of St. Christopher in the Leewards, made their way in
open boats to the small island of Tortuga, off the north-
western coast of Hispaniola. They were later joined there
by Dutch refugees. From their custom of cooking meat over
Indian spits called "boucans," they came to be known as
"boucaniers" - a name that would cling to them in slightly
corrupted form when they later turned their hunting instincts
to the sea.
Continually harassed by Spanish expeditions against
them, they organized a society called the "Brethren of the
I
Coast" which, with the tacit support of English, Dutch,
and French warships and privateers, proceeded to terrorize
the Spanish Main. Their principal settlement on Tortuga,
1. Selden Rodman, Haiti t The Black Republic
,
(New Yorki
Devin-Adair Co., 195^). -p.5.
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Cayona, was for a time one of the most prosperous, and
reputedly the most dissolute and bawdy of "colonies" in
the West Indies.
A chronic shortage of women on Tortuga was redressed
from time to time by the purchase of negro women from
traders, or by their abduction along with a few white
women from the Spanish settlements. Indentures and
prostitutes were also occasionally imported from Europe.
From these heterogenous unions were to spring the Creole
•
and mulatto people destined to play such prominent roles
in the later history of Haiti.
From about the middle of the seventeenth century,
French influence was predominate on Tortuga, and that
influence gradually spread along the adjacent coasts of
western Hispaniola. Small settlements and farms sprang
up along the banks of rivers and spread into interior
valleys - a development foreshadowing the great French
plantation society that would flower in the next century.
Thus it was that by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, France
acquired title to the "French part of Santo Domingo," or
Saint Domingue
.
For administrative purposes, France divided her new
colony into three provinces . In the northwest was North
Province, containing the fertile Plaine du Nord and the
colonial capital, Cap Francais (later Cape Haitian). West
Province comprised the central part of the colony, the
lorthern shore of the Haitian "notch" and the Cul de Sac.

Its principal city, Port-au-Prince, was not founded until
1749. South Province was the rugged and almost inaccessible
southern peninsula.
The economic development of the colony during its
French period was impressive by any standards. Magnificent
plantation homes dotted the plains and vast armies of
slaves toiled in the cultivation of sugar, coffee, indigo,
cotton and cocoa. Cap Francais became an opulent center
of wealth and the arts - the "Paris of the Antilles" -
while in European Paris the expression "rich as a Creole"
became proverbial
.
Saint Domingue was renowned as the
richest colonial possession in the world and for a time
the value of its foreign trade overshadowed that of the
thirteen English colonies on the North American mainland.
On the eve of the French Revolution the annual value of
Saint Domingue' s foreign commerce was somewhat in excess
of $78,000,000, and more than 1,400 vessels and 11,000
seamen were employed in the trade with Europe alone. 2
Personal property in the colony was valued at nearly
$300,000,000. The foundations of this wealth, however,
were extremely unstable. The census of 1788 counted 28,000
whites, 22,000 "gens de couleur" (mulattoes and free negroes),
and 405,000 slaves. Moreover, the social fabric within
each of the racial groups - the whites, the mulattoes, and
2. International Bureau of the American Republics, Haiti
,
A Handbook
. Bulletin No. 62 (Revised to September 1, I893),
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1893), PP. 87-88.

the blacks - was rent by jealousy, suspicion and hate.
The native-born whites resented their French-born admin-
istrators. The mulattoes, owners of an estimated 10
per cent of the colony's land and slaves by 1789, were
notoriously cruel taskmasters who drew the "color line"
with almost paranoic precision. The free blacks themselves
aspired to be slave owners, a status they seemed to covet
almost as much as they had their own freedom. At the
festering bottom of the social heap, the very worst ig-
nominy for a black was to be slave to another black.
The collapse of this delicate and fragile structure
that was Saint Domingue in the closing decade of the
eighteenth century came about not, however, as a result
of an internal failure of its underpinnings, but as a
direct result of the winds of revolution which swept France
in this period and which were felt in gale strength as
far away as the West Indies.
Six representatives of the island's plantation aris-
tocracy succeeded in being seated at the Estates General
in France which convened in 1?89. If their hope had been
to secure a voice for their colonial constituency, they
succeeded all too well. Once the situation in Saint
Domingue had been brought to their attention, the emerging
Jacobin politicians of France, egged on by a rabid abolit-
ionist society, Les Amis des Nolrs , spoke out in support
of full political rights for the mulattoes and, eventually,
for the freeing of the slaves. The colony was flooded
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with propaganda urging liberty and equality, stirring the
poor whites, the mulattoes, and the blacks alike. The
racial pot was brought to such a dangerous boil that the
third element in the revolutionary motto - fraternity -
seemed ephemeral indeed.
On March 12, 1791 » at Cap Francais, two young mulattoes,
Vincent 0g§ and Chavanne, were broken on the wheel in public
execution. Their crime was agitation against the white
aristocracy for those citizenship rights promised by the
Jacobins in France, The spot where they were smashed by
the executioner's rod is today called the Square of the
Martyrs. Many human beings would perish there in the storm
that was now plainly gathering. Oge" and Chavanne had
sounded a tocsin that was soon to be heeded in the brooding






So now, in the Autumn of 1791, looking from the
sky-windows of Cap Francais, thick clouds of
smoke girdle our horizon, smoke in the day, in
the night fire; preceded by fugitive shrieking
white women, by Terror and Rumour. Black demon-
ized squadrons are massacring and harrying with
nameless cruelty. They fight and fire 'from
behind thickets and coverts,' for the Black man
loves the Bush; they rush to the attack, thousands
strong, with brandished cutlasses and fusils, with
caperings, shoutings and vociferation, - which,
if the White Volunteer Company stands firm, dwindle
into staggerings, into quick gabblement, into panic
flight at the first volley, perhaps before it.
Poor Ogg could be broken on the wheel » this fire-
whirlwind too can be abated, driven up into the
Mountains: but Saint-Domingo is shaken ... writhing
in long horrid death- throes, it is Black without
remedy; and remains, as African Haiti, a monition
to the world.
- Carlyle, The French Revolution
.
The Jacobin winds from France had blown the elusive
scent of freedom to the island, and during the summer of
1791 » jungle drums thundered secret messages across the
Plaine du Nord and up into the marons - the mountain
fastnesses of Haiti. The revolt finally erupted on the
night of August 22, 1791 » at Turpin Plantation, not far
from Cap Francais. In the weeks that followed, bands of
marauding negroes roamed the rich plain at will, killing,
raping, looting, burning. The hated symbols of their past
servitude - the bell towers that had summoned them to labor
in the fields, the cane mills - were razed to the ground,
along with the splendid homes of their erstwhile masters.
They were finally checked at the gates of Cap Francais
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itself, but by then the surrounding countryside was a
smoking ruin and the white survivors of the holocaust
were virtually besieged in the cities and towns of the
colony.
From an alarmed France Commissions were dispatched,
but the Commissioners, pledged to an anti-slavery policy
and cheered on by the Amis des Nolrs . only succeeded in
exacerbating the situation. The melancholy climax of this
first phase of the Haitian Revolution was reached in June,
1793 » when Cap Francais was given over to savage looting
and burning. Refugees streamed across the border into
Spanish Santo Domingo, and from every port in the French
colony overcrowded ships sailed for the United States, the
nearby islands, and sometimes even for France, itself now
in the grip of the Terror. The Chief Commissioner, one
Sonthonax, remained remarkably unperturbed, however, and
reported to the home government that "... it is with the
real inhabitants of this country, the Africans, that we
will save to France the possession of St. -Domingue."^
On August 28, 1793» apparently on their own authority, the
Commissioners proclaimed the formal abolition of slavery
in North Province, an act that was confirmed by the govern-
ment in France in February of the following year when it
issued a decree abolishing slavery in all French colonies
1. Quoted in H. P. Davis, Black Democracy; the story of
Haiti




and declaring that all men domiciled therein, regardless
of color, were citizens of France. The Spanish in Santo
Domingo and the British in Jamaica could hardly view these
acts with indifference, and, the mother countries both
being then at war with France in Europe, the opportunity
was seized to claim parts of Saint Domingue for themselves.
Spanish forces, aided by a ragtag army of some 600 negroes
led by a black ex-coachman named Toussaint, advanced into
the French part of the island from the east. The British,
welcomed by the remnants of the proprietor class in South
and West Provinces, occupied Mole St. Nicholas. By the
spring of 1794 they were in Port-au-Prince with a large
and well-financed expedition, while Toussaint, his force
swollen to more than 4,000 men, was victor in a dozen
battles and had achieved high rank in the Spanish army.
At this moment, the seeming nadir for France in Saint
Domingue t two unrelated events occurred which dramatically
altered the military and political balance on the island.
In April, 1794, Toussaint with all his black troops suddenly
deserted the Spanish and joined forces with the shattered
French. The second event was the serious outbreak of fever
in the British expedition. The Spanish invasion of Saint
Domingue collapsed almost overnight, and when, in l?95t
peace came in Europe, Spain ceded all of the island of Santo
Domingo to France by the Treaty of Basle. The British,
bedeviled by disease and bitter guerrilla warfare, were
forced back into their principal strongholds at Port-au-
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Prince and Mole St. Nicholas. The fortunes of war now
clearly favored France, but a France whose power in Saint
Domingue rested primarily on black armies, not white.
By the fall of 1797, Toussaint L'Ouverture ("The Opener")
was commander in chief of the army and nominal custodian
of French interests in the colony.
In October, 1798, the British surrendered their last
foothold on the island at Mole St. Nicholas. Like the
Spanish, they had paid a heavy price for their Saint
Dominguan adventure? some 50,000 of their troops are be-
lieved to have perished in the campaign. Toussaint next
struck out at the dissident southern mulattoes, who were
chafing under his "black" rule. He unleashed one of his
lieutenants, Jean Jacques Dessalines, "The Tiger," on a
brutal march through South and West Provinces. This was
but the first of many racial purges that would stain the
pages of Haitian history. The mulattoes in check, he
dispatched another army to occupy the former Spanish part
of the island.
I
By 1800, Toussaint, honored as "First of the Blacks,"
ruled, in the name of France, all of Hlspaniola. The land
had been devastated by nine years of war. The farms, the
mills, the irrigation ditches and the roads had fallen into
a ruinous state throughout the island. And across the sea
Napoleon Bonaparte brooded on the lost treasures of Saint
Domingue
.
A temporary truce in Europe meant that Britain's sea-
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power was no longer an obstacle to the movement of French
troops and supplies across the Atlantic. Napoleon decided
to seize this opportunity and gave orders for the out-
fitting of an expedition which he entrusted to the command
of his brother-in-law, Leclerc. In December, 1801, more
than 50 ships bearing 22,000 troops, many of them veterans
of Napoleon's own campaigns, sailed for the West Indies.
Leclerc, accompanied by his wife, Pauline, sailed with
explicit instructions to secure Saint Domingue by a light-
ning campaign planned in detail by Bonaparte himself. There
were also orders for the social reconstruction of the colony.
"White women who have prostituted themselves to Negroes,
whatever their rank, shall be sent to Europe.... Suffer no
black above the rank of captain to remain on the island
. .
.
any person talking about the rights of those blacks who have
shed so much white blood shall under some pretext or other
be sent to France, whatever his rank in the service." 2
On February 3, 1802, the van of the French fleet glided
past the silent batteries of Fort Picolet and dropped anchor
Ln the harbor of Cap Francals
. The city was held by a small
rorce under the command of Henri Christophe, one of Toussaint's
trusted lieutenants. Prior to retreating he put the city to
;he torch so thoroughly that barely 60 buildings were stand-
ng when Pauline saw for the first time what was to have
:. Quoted in H. P. Davis, Black Democracy; the story of Haiti




been her New World capital.
Despite severe fighting in the interior, the French
achieved all of their important military objectives in but
a few weeks. On May 1, 1802, Toussaint and Dessalines
surrendered with their troops. The "First of the Blacks"
was subsequently spirited out of the country on the French
frigate La Creole and carried to France, there to die the
following April in a dungeon at the fortress of Joux. In
contradiction to Napoleon's orders, however, Dessalines
joined Christophe on the commissioned lists of the French
army, for another one of those amazing turnabouts in the
history of the revolution was then in progress. Malaria
and yellow fever swept through the French ranks like a
whirlwind, and despite pleas of ever increasing urgency,
Leclerc was unable to secure sufficient replacements from
France, though Napoleon would send him in the course of
that terrible year more than 20,000 additional men. The
French commander thus had no choice but to take the des-
perate gamble that he could retain control by playing the
black generals off against each other. That slim hope
utterly vanished when, late in the summer of 1802, word
spread to Saint Domingue that by order of Bonaparte slavery
had been reinstituted in the West Indian islands of Guada-
loupe and Martinique.
By the middle of October the remaining French on the
island were reduced to a precarious garrison existence in
but six cities. On November 28, 1802, Leclerc died of fever
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at the Cap, and Pauline returned to France. Leclerc's
successor, Rochambeau, held on for another agonizing year
while the ring gradually tightened. In October, I8O3,
Port-au-Prince fell to Dessalines, and a month later
Rochambeau surrendered the remnants of the French army
at Cap Francais.
When, under the terms of the surrender, Rochambeau
and 8,000 beaten soldiers sailed from the Cap on November
29 » I8O3, they left behind the graves of nearly ^5,000
brothers-in-arms who had perished in Napoleon's vain attempt
to restore the island to French control. They also left
behind a still sizeable white population which had somehow
managed to survive twelve crimson years of revolution.
Thus ended Napoleon's dream of New World empire. The
failure in Saint Domingue is believed to be an important
factor - perhaps the determining one - in his abrupt decision
to part with Louisiana. The later history and expansion of
the United States may therefore be seen to have been sig-
nificantly influenced by the events recounted above.
Rochambeau and his army were captured at sea by a
British squadron, and were imprisoned for the duration of
the war which had once again broken out in Europe. The
uneasy, threatened whites of Saint Domingue, cowering in




III. The Black Republic .
We will write this act of Independence using a
white man's skull for an inkwell, his skin as
parchment, blood for ink, and a bayonet as pen.
- Dessaline's secretary, at Gonaives, January
1, 1804.
On January 1, 1804, the day celebrated as Haitian
Independence Day, the victorious black generals gathered
at Gonaives and proclaimed Jean Jacques Dessalines "Governor-
General of Haiti for life." According to legend it was
Dessalines himself who gave. Haiti her name and her flag.
With his own hand he is said to have symbolically torn the
white stripe from the French tricolor and cast it underfoot.
What remained would be the National Ensign of the Haitian
Republic until, at a much later date, the blue stripe was,
appropriately enough, replaced by a black. African born,
uneducated, ex-slave to an ex-slave, a man of ferocious
instincts, he held in his heart pitiless hatred for all
whites, as exemplified by his motto* "Dessalines hates the
whites."
His first official act was to decree death to the
French still unfortunate enough to be in the country, and
when his subordinates seemed reluctant to carry out this
genocide, he himself led a murderous troop through those
cities and towns still providing shelter for the condemned.
The massacre began in the first days of January and con-
tinued into the spring of 1804. Before it ended, the whites
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in Haiti were exterminated as a class, not one in ten
escaping slaughter. The news of this terrible event spread
far beyond the Haitian frontiers and was noted with par-
ticular concern and alarm in the United States, where refugees
recounted tales which aroused fears in that Republic of
black revolution
.
The destruction of the white population in Haiti was
paralleled by the devastation wrought on the land. No
revolution, no war in modern history ever so completely
uprooted, demolished and eradicated the social, political
and economic structures of a country. It has never re-
covered to this day, and while, to be sure, the formal
institution of slavery was abolished, personal and political
freedom, for the overwhelming mass of the Haitian people,
iid not attend the removal of the French. At best what
occurred was the substitution of one form of despotism for
another, neither one of which holds any special attractive-
less on the pages of history.
The reign of Jean Jacques Dessalines was brought to an
abrupt end by the assassin's bullet on October 17, 1806, at
Pont Rouge, on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. Though his
Leadership was short in time, it was long in accomplishment.
Cn addition to the formal founding of the Republic and the
'solution of the French problem," he caused the first Haitian
sonstitution to be proclaimed which, in addition to abolish-
ng slavery forever, prohibited white men of whatever nation
Tom acquiring property of any kind. He attempted to restore

the island's agricultural prosperity, an effort that was
unfortunately not successful. Peasants were herded to
work in the fields under a share-cropping scheme whereby
they were to receive one- third of the harvest. Three groups
claimed proprietorship over the ruined plantations. These
were, first of all, the military chiefs, then the ancien
llbre or pre-revolutionary free blacks and mulattoes who
still held title to land, and lastly, the mulatto sons of
dispossessed white fathers.
With Dessalines dead, a military council met and named
Henri Christophe "Provisional Chief of the Nation." At the
same time, however, the council called for a constitutional
assembly and the formal election of a new head of state.
This assembly, the first legislative body to be created in
Haiti, met on December 18, 1806, in Port-au-Prince. One of
the leaders of the assembly was Alexander P§tion, a mulatto
educated in Paris who had returned to Haiti as an officer
in Leclerc's army. Christophe was quick to sense in PStion
his chief rival for power. The political struggle between
the two ultimately degenerated into a fitful civil war, and
after several skirmishes, during which he managed to capture
a large part of Dessalines' treasure, Christophe withdrew
with his army to the north. Haiti was thenceforth effectively
split into two parts, with PStion in control of the South
and West Provinces, and Christophe in command of the North.
Until March, 1811, Christophe governed the North as
"President of the State of Haiti," but in that month he

published the "Loi Consti tutlonelle rfu Consell ri'Etat q ui
Stabllt la royautS a Haiti." On June 2, 1811, the Chiefs
of the North gathered at the old French colonial capital
to witness the coronation. The Archbishop of Haiti, him-
self recently elevated to that post by Christophe, did the
crowning, proclaiming the new monarch Henri I. a nobility
was established with 4 princes, 8 dukes, 22 counts, 3?
barons and 40 chevaliers, among whom were a Count of Limon-
ade and a Duke of Marmelade - titles taken from districts
in North Province facetiously named by the French. Cap
Haitien, recently Cap Francais, was renamed Cap Henri.
By the King's order in the Code Henri, every adult man
and woman in the kingdom was required to work "from day-
light to 8 o'clock, then one hour off for breakfast on the
spot? from 9 to 12, then two hours offj and from 2 P.M.
until nightfall." 1 The soldiers of the king enforced this
regimen and an almost instant prosperity returned to the
North. The problem of a circulating currency was solved
by a most ingenious device. All ripe gourdes in the country
were declared state property and were collected by the Crown.
The gourde was and is useful to the Haitian peasant in the
manufacture of dishes, tools, containers, musical Instruments,
etc. Gourdes were then paid out as wages for work performed
on state lands, or in exchange for home-grown crops - princi-
L. Quoted in J. w. Vandercook, Black Majesty
, the r.if» of
^IstoHhe, (New York, Harper and Bros
.TT^TTTTI^T"

pally coffee. To this day the unit of Haitian currency is
called the gourde, though it has, of course, long since
ceased to be an actual gourde.
The Citadel la Ferriere, Christophe's - and Haiti's -
greatest monument, was begun on orders from Dessalines in
1804. In shape it is a stupendous warship, built with in-
credible labor on a mountain peak called La Bonnet a l'Eveque
- the Bishop's Hat - some 3,000 feet above sea level, 20
miles inland from the Cap. The prow of this great fortress
points to magnetic north and its walls, 20 to 30 feet thick,,
range in height from 80 to 130 feet. Three hundred and
sixty-five cannon, some of them 11 feet in length, trophies
captured from the French, the British, and the Spanish,
were dragged up the mountain and emplaced in the fortress
along with immense quantities of shot and powder. The
construction of the Citadel continued throughout the years
of Christophe's reign and, as attested by the events immed-
iately following his death, was still in progress when the
kingdom came to an end. Christophe seemed obsessed with the
necessity of completing this work, driving his people merci-
lessly. He himself is said to have labored on the walls as
a mason, sometimes by moonlight.
In 1820 he suffered a stroke which left him paralyzed
from the waist down. Deserted by his servants, the nobility
and the army, he committed suicide at Sans Souci when word
reached him that a mob was advancing on the palace. His
wife and daughters somehow managed to drag his body up the
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mountain to the Citadel, where it was placed in a pit of
newly mixed builder's lime. The spot is today marked by
a weathered stone inscribed simply, "Christophe - L* Homme."
In 1818 Christophers great rival, PStion, had died in
office of natural causes, one of the few Haitian presidents
to enjoy that distinction. He was succeeded by the mulatto
commander of the palace guard, Jean Pierre Boyer, who used
his position to secure unanimous election to the office.
He began his 25-year career as Chief of State on March 20,
1818. Christophers suicide enabled Boyer to reunite the
country. The only disappointment in a bloodless campaign
in the North was the discovery that there was in King Henri's
treasury not more than 10 million francs, instead of the
hoped for 250 million. The following year, 1821, the Spanish
part of the island revolted from Spain (which had reclaimed
it during the troubles following the death of Dessalines)
and with but little persuasion it attached itself once more
to the Republic. Thus the whole island was again ruled from
Port-au-Prince.
Boyer* s rule, the longest in Haitian history, was marked
by unsuccessful attempts to restore the island* s lost pros-
perity. The great estates of colonial times were effectively
oroken up into small parcels, but land reform seemed only to
lasten the separation of the people into two rigid social
classes
- the peasants and the elite. The former subsisted
}y share-cropping small plots of ground or by harvesting the
ipland coffee which now grew wild. The latter gravitated to
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the cities, controlled the army and the government, and
lived on the labor of the peasants by collecting export
duties on their cash crops.
Prior to Pe*tion*s death a new and more liberal con-
stitution had been adopted and authority divided between
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the govern-
ment. A court system was established and a larger bureau-
cracy formed to satisfy the political aspirations of the
Slites, largely mulatto, who now openly harked back to and
embraced the old French, Catholic culture.
From the very beginning of glite rule, certain practices
crept into the treasury service which became firmly rooted
there and which had a very bad effect on the operation of
the government. One of the worst of these concerned the
system adopted for the payment of public employees, including
the army and the navy. Payments were customarily made by
claims on the treasury called f eullles , which were often left
unredeemed for long periods of time, particularly during "la
saison morte " or the time between crops when, the customs
receipts being much less than at other times, there was often
insufficient funds in the treasury to cash them. Speculators
would routinely purchase feullles at huge discounts and by
exerting influence at high levels of government secure pre-
ferential treatment. Often the government itself was able
to purchase f eullles at a discount. Graft and dishonesty
were invited by the administrative procedures adopted and
over a period of time became thoroughly ingrained in the
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ethics of the Haitian public service.
An attempt was made to revitalize the country by-
encouraging immigration from abroad of persons of African
or Indian origin, particularly colored people from the
United States. In a four-year period some 13,000 freedmen
were enticed to Haiti with promises of free land and other
benefits. The experiment ended in dismal failure, however,
and most of the immigrants left Haiti at the first oppor-
tunity or abandoned their land for unproductive life in
the towns. Many charged that the discrimination they en-
countered on the island made their existence there little
better than slavery, and few were able to adapt to the
different customs, religion, language and laws of Haiti.
In 1822 Boyer appealed to the United States for recog-
nition, but President Monroe declined, arguing that France
had withheld recognition, that discrimination was practiced
on American commerce, and that the Haitian constitution
embodied anti-white articles. French recognition was se-
cured in 1825, but at a price. Under the guns of Ik ships
of war anchored in the harbor of Port-au-Prince, the Haitian
Government agreed to pay an indemnity of 115 million francs
as compensation to former French colonists. A second con-
cession was that French trade with the island would be
assessed at only one-half the duty charged other countries.
The financial drain to meet even partial payment of the
French debt was so great that in 1827 Boyer was forced to
issue the first Haitian paper currency. His success with
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it was not nearly so great as had been Christophers with
ripe gourdes. There was no possibility that this vast
foreign obligation could be discharged, and Haiti's in-
evitable default brought on what was but the first of many
such crises in its foreign relations.
The economic ills of the country, growing discontent
among the masses, and dissatisfaction in the army led to
a revolt against the President in January, 184-3. In March
of that year Boyer resigned from office and embarked on
a British warship. He died in Paris in I85O.
Following Boyer* s resignation another period of polit-
ical and racial turmoil shook the island. The peasant blacks,
promised impossible advantages by those who had organized
the overthrow of the President, felt that they had been de-
ceived. A vicious class warfare broke out and in the general
confusion the Dominicans, in 1844, reasserted their independ-
ence. The sudden death of Boyer* s nominal successor, Riche*,
on February 27, 1847, caught the mulatto Elites who controlled
the Haitian Senate, responsible under the constitution for
the election of the president, unprepared. To placate the
blacks they eventually agreed to select as president, some
say by drawing his name from a hat, the 60 year old, illiter-
ate head of the palace guard, Faustin Soulouque
. He was
thought to be both naive and agreeable, a most willing in-
strument through which the mulattoes could exercise political
control while satisfying the demands of the black masses for
a black president. Within two years, however, Soulouque
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learned enough about the exercise of power to overthrow
his patrons and carry out, in a few terrible days in April,
1848, a widespread massacre of mulattoes in Port-au-Prince.
His hold on the government secure, he turned his interest
to the first of a series of disastrous military campaigns
designed to reannex the Dominican Republic.
On August 26, 1849, at the "urging" of his officers,
he assumed the title of Emperor Faustin I. The coronation
was an extremely extravagant affair which took place in a
scene of great public jubilation at Port-au-Prince. The
nobility created by Faustin dwarfed even that of Chrlstophe.
The Emperor adopted as his motto "I am the State and my will
is law."
In spite of an almost paralyzed economy, Faustin pressed
his prolonged and expensive invasions of the Dominican Re-
public. Both countries were pushed to the brink of financial
ruin by this war, which was eventually ended by the joint
diplomatic intervention of the United States, Britain, and
France. His hold on the army weakened by the Dominican
failures, and the country in a severe and worsening depression,
the Emperor was deposed by a mulatto general, Fabr§ Geffrard,
in January, 1859.
The eight years of Geffrard* s presidency cast a relatively
bright light on the overall somberness of nineteenth century
Haiti. In i860 a concordat was signed with the Holy See, and
Rome assumed responsibility for the propagation of the Catholic
faith in Haiti, in exchange for state financial support.

Clergy were dispatched to bring the island's faithful back
to orthodoxy. On June 5, 1862, the administration of
Abraham Lincoln extended formal diplomatic recognition
to the second oldest "republic" in the Western Hemisphere.
In Boston, abolitionist societies celebrated the act as
Ma recognition of the Colored Man, not merely of Hayti."2
Recognition was followed, in 1864, by a Treaty of Amity,
Commerce and Navigation, which affirmed most-favored nation
treatment of American commerce in Haiti, a status enjoyed
on an informal basis since 1850. The treaty further stip-
ulated that Americans resident in Haiti and Haitians resi-
dent in the United States would not be required to pay
"any contributions whatever, higher or other than those
that are or may be paid by native citizens."
The years of Geffrard's rule were also marked by the
final efforts to foster negro colonization of Haiti from
the United States. In i860 an emigration bureau was opened
in Boston under the direction of a militant abolitionist
and associate of John Brown, Mr. James Redpath. Colorful
and attractive brochures were printed and circulated.
Prospective settlers were promised free passage to Haiti,
land, temporary housing and subsistence, and exemption from
military service. By November, 1861, some 1200 negroes
had been embarked for Haiti. Distressing stories of privat-
2. Quoted in Ludwell L. Montague, Haiti and the United States
,
1714-1938
, (Russell & Russell, New York, 1966), p. 86.

-py-
lori, disease, and ill-treatment of the pioneers gradually-
filtered back to Boston, however, and by the end of 1861,
public meetings were being held to denounce the colonization
scheme. In all, Redpath was responsible for sending about
1600 American negroes to Haiti, but in 1862 only 200 could
be accounted for there. Some, it is assumed, managed to
return to the United States.
In spite of this dismal experience, the federal govern-
ment in Washington decided, in 1862, to embark on a colon-
ization scheme of its own to alleviate the growing problem
of dependent negroes freed by the American Civil War. On
December 31, 1862, President Lincoln contracted with a
private organization to settle 5,000 American negroes at
Ile-a-Vache in Haiti. This too ended in debacle, and shortly
thereafter the Haitian Government lost interest in such
projects. Only ^-31 negroes were transported to Haiti by
the federal contractors, and most of these were later re-
turned to the United States.
The repeated failure of American negro colonization in
Haiti pointed out a distressing fact. The Haitian negro,
who had won his freedom in a bloody revolt from the French,
rather openly despised his American brother who, in Haitian
eyes, had been given his freedom. This prejudice was deeply
ingrained, and in the years ahead cultured Haitians would
look with disfavor on the assignment of American negroes




Revolutionary activity at Cape Haitian in 1866 re-
sulted in the British consulate being violated, and in
reprisal the city was shelled by British warships. In
September of that year the arsenal at Port-au-Prince was
blown up with the loss of many lives and great destruction
of property. When, in the following year, the presidential
guard revolted and began firing at the palace, Geffrard
took the route of his predecessors and on March 13, I867
,
sailed for Jamaica.
Geffrard* s immediate successor in office, Salnave,
attempted to repeat the maneuver in which Soulouque had
been so successful. He encouraged the peasants to rise
against the mulatto bourgeoisie, but instead of quick
victory over the mulattoes, a protracted period of bitter
civil strife ensued. In I87O the presidential palace,
converted by Salnave into a powder magazine, was struck by
a shot fired from a captured government vessel in the harbor,
and was utterly destroyed by the resulting explosion and
fire. The President escaped momentarily to Santo Domingo,
but was arrested there and returned to Port-au-Prince where,
bound to a stake amid the rubble of the palace, he was
executed by a firing squad.
An editorial which appeared April 6, 1871, in the
gazette du Peuple
. Port-au-Prince, is revealing.
For sixty eight years
. . . what have we done?
Nothing or almost nothing. All our constitutions
are defective, all our laws are incomplete, our
customs houses are badly administered, our navy
is detestable, our finances are rotten to the core,
our police are badly organized, our army is in a
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pitlable state, the legislative power is not
understood and never will be, the primary elect-
ions are neglected and our people feel not their
importance, nearly all our public edifices are
in ruins, the public instruction is almost en-
tirely abandoned.
Following the execution of Salnave, a succession of
"presidents" each one of whom entered and/or left the
office by unconstitutional means, held the trappings of
power in Port-au-Prince. Nissage-Saget (1&70-1&74), Michel
Domingue (1874-1876), Boisrond Canal ( 1876-1879 )# and I<ysius
Salomon (1879-1888) made their brief appearances on the
disordered pages of Haitian history.
The presidency of Florvil Hyppolite (1889-1896) gave
the country a brief respite from its long political misery.
Foreign investment was encouraged. The revolutionary claims
of France were funded by a bond issue, though at ruinous
cost. Some schools were established and a body of law
enacted. Public buildings were constructed, most notably
the famous iron markets which still stand in the principal
cities of Haiti. There was even serious effort to limit
graft and improve the efficiency of government. Represent-
ative government was not functioning, however, and indeed




IV . The Widening American Concern .
As far as can be seen, the time will come when
stable governments for the American tropical States
must be assured by the now existing powerful and
stable States of America or Europe. The geographical
position of those States, the climatic conditions,
make it plain at once that sea power will there, even
more than in the case of Turkey, determine what for-
eign State shall predominate - if not by actual pos-
session, by its influence over the native governments.
The geographical position of the United States and
her intrinsic power give her an undeniable advantage;
but that advantage will not avail if there is a great
inferiority of organized brute-force, which still
remains that last argument of republics as of kings.
- Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power
Upon History, 1660-17^3
.
It is perhaps well at this time to depart for a moment
from the chronological account of Haitian history, and re-
view the several aspects of American interest in the Black
Republic. The picture is somewhat complex, for there was
ever a wide variance of views and conflicting concerns
among Americans with economic or emotional ties to Haiti.
American policy was thus forged in the heat of opposing
forces, forces which seldom, if ever, seemed to add ration-
ally as vectors on a force diagram. It is just this aspect
of policy formulation which makes its study so intriguing,
for seemingly insignificant acts and events have from time
to time become governing, and have directed American policy
in unpredictable ways. Thus it was, as will be seen, when
American intervention in Haiti came, it came when what might
have been considered compelling reasons for it - the desire
for a Caribbean naval base, the need to forestall European
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intervention, etc. - had ceased to exist as a result of the
American war with Spain and the involvement of the European
powers in their own war in Europe. And, paradoxically, the
intervention came not under Theodore Roosevelt, but Woodrow
Wilson.
It is almost as if there were a peculiar inertia shap-
ing the affairs of men, a great weight attached to a strong
but elastic line tugged at over a period of years or decades
by those intent on displacing it in their own direction.
When it finally begins to move, the elasticity of its tether
carries it beyond the position of its first movers who may,
in fact, have already surrendered their hold on the line to
others of opposing inclination. The process may then be
seen to begin again in reverse. This swing effect in Am-
erican foreign policy is as observable as the rise and fall
of the ocean tides, but its regularity and predictability
in time are by no means so precise. The forces of change
and inertia are ordinarily so nicely balanced that a
minuscule weight applied at a critical time may achieve
an effect that is apparently grossly disproportionate and
even, to an uncritical eye, irrational.
American interests in Haiti pre-dated the independence
of both Republics, for the sugar islands of the West Indies,
of which Hispaniola was by far the richest, were an integral
link in the chain of trade upon which rested the prosperity
of New England merchants. Slaves and fish products were
traded in the islands for cheap molasses which, converted
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into rum in New England towns, was sold to acquire more
slaves and to expand the fisheries. British interference
with this trade (manifested by the several Molasses Acts)
can indeed "be said to have been one of the prime irritants
leading to the American revolution.
Haitian and American independence did not alter the
basic commercial relationship between Haiti and the New
England states, though of course the Black Republic no
longer provided a market for African slaves. The Haitian
revolution did, however, cause considerable alarm and
foreboding in the southern states of the North American
Republic, anxious over the example set for their own large
slave populations by the Haitian negroes. Henceforth a
profound dichotomy of interests concerning Haiti developed
along geographical lines in the United States. In general,
the North urged recognition and expanded ties with Haiti
because it seemed it would be good for business. The South
routinely blocked recognition and cared little for the trade
interest of the North. It is significant that in regard to
Haiti, recognition came only after the secession of the
southern states.
Naval developments, the acquisition of California, and
concern over the effective control of an isthmian route to
the Pacific influenced American interests in Haiti. American
naval power, a late arrival on the Caribbean scene, found the
best sites for naval bases already taken by the European
powers, with Samana Bay in the Dominican Republic, St. Thomas
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in the Danish West Indies, and Mole St. Nicholas in Haiti
the only attractive sites still thought to be attainable.
The decline of sail and the emergence of steam as a means
of naval propulsion made such a base in the Caribbean even
more vital in the eyes of naval strategists, for the new
propulsion system "shortened the legs" of warships and made
necessary the pre-positioning of large stockpiles of coal
in the areas where such ships would be required to operate.
Pressures for Caribbean bases and. coaling stations peaked
during and shortly after the American Civil War. The de-
cline of the great Union fleet after that war and the com-
pletion of the first trans-continental railroad in 1869
(which lessened for a time American interest in the isthmian
route to California) cast an eclipse on the project of
Caribbean bases, a project which, despite aborted attempts
to annex the Virgin Islands and the Dominican Republic,
did not revive in earnest until American interests turned
once again toward an isthmian canal and the rebuilding of
the American Navy.
How much did the philosophy of "manifest destiny"
shape American policy in Haiti during the latter part of
the nineteenth century? Throughout American history there
has been an unfortunate fascination with the mission
civllisatrlce , but insofar as Haiti itself is concerned
(the same would not be true for the Dominican Republic)
there seems at no time to have been serious consideration
given to the annexation of Haiti to the United States,
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though this was suggested as a possible cure for Haiti's
problems by President Andrew Johnson in his message to
the Congress on December 9, 1868. The political and
racial realities, to say nothing of the experience of
France on the island, tended to dampen ardent annex-
ationist spirits. To many, the Haitian problem seemed
simply insurmountable, wrapped as it was in the American
negro problem. The last serious negotiations for a base
at Mole St. Nicholas took place in 1889-1890 when, in
spite of considerable American assistance given President
Hyppolite in his climb to office, the project failed,
probably because of the Haitian constitutional bar to
the white ownership of property.
If the fire of manifest destiny was dimmed in Haiti,
that other beacon of American policy in the Caribbean, the
Monroe Doctrine, most definitely was not. Several incidents
already cited illustrate that the guns of foreign warships
were not slow to enforce what was considered vital state
interest. The threat to the Monroe Doctrine lay in the
chance that a casual bombardment or landing of troops might
blossom into full-scale and permanent foreign occupation.
Gradually the feeling grew in American governing circles
that if military demonstrations were necessary to keep
Haitian affairs in order, those demonstrations should be
American, not European. This theory was simply a fore-
runner of Theodore Roosevelt's "corollary" to the Monroe
Doctrine. Visits to Haiti by United States naval vessels
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became more frequent and, in 1888, U.S. marines were
landed at Port-au-Prince to quell a disturbance which
seemed to threaten the safety of foreign nationals
.
The European powers did not accept exclusive American
protection of their interests, however, and their own
cruisers continued to call at Haitian ports. A most
glaring example of foreign military pressure, and one
with somewhat humorous overtones, occurred in 1897.
A German national named Emil Luders, who was the
operator of a livery stable in Port-au-Prince, attempted
to prevent the arrest of one of his Haitian employees by
claiming extraterritoriality for his stable, He was
himself arrested on a charge of assault and battery grow-
ing out of the affair, and was eventually sentenced to
a year in prison and fined $5°°. Luders, however, was a
veteran of the German army, and had in fact served in the
Kaiser's own regiment. An imperial letter was dispatched
to the Haitian president, Simon Sam, demanding the re-
lease of the distinguished livery stable operator, the
punishment of those responsible for the arrest, the removal
of the judges who had passed sentence, and the payment of
a large indemnity. The Haitian government appealed to the
United States for aid in the name of the Monroe Doctrine
but none was provided. When the Kaiser sent two cruisers
to enforce his demands, the American Minister in Port-au-
Prince felt that the United States had made a mistake and
that it was losing influence in Haiti, a position adhered

o by prominent Americans including Theodore Roosevelt and
enry Cabot Lodge.
The Spanish-American War and its immediate aftermath
aw a dramatic increase in American naval power and a
rowing tendency among certain Americans, made heady by
he easy victory over Spain, to consider the Caribbean an
jnerican mare nostrum . The acquisition of naval bases in
>uerto Rico and in Cuba (Guantanamo Bay) made such bases
.n Haiti or the Dominican Republic unnecessary, but Am-
erican admirals still expressed concern lest another sea
power - and in this period they most often meant Germany
-
should establish itself there. The policy of the Navy in
regard to Haiti thus changed from one advocating acquisition
of bases on the island, to a policy of denying them to
potential enemies. The broader aspects of American policy
in the Caribbean were of course stated in no uncertain
terms
in President Theodore Roosevelt's message to Congress
on
December 6, 1904. Henceforth it would be the resolve of
the United States to "exercise an international police
power"
in the Western Hemisphere should "chronic wrongdoing" on
the
part of delinquent states require it. Gradually, the
arrival
of an American warship in a troubled Haitian port became the
accepted signal for the "guard" to be shifted.
Meanwhile, its finances a shambles, its politics im-
possible, the Haitian state careened along its dangerous
way.

V. The Winding Path to Anarchy .
However, It Is visible that God protects our
little corner of the earth; for notwithstanding
the faults of its children, the country is still
unimpaired, and will so pass into the hands of
our children's children.... And thus if all
citizens give me their aid, we would easily avoid
the misfortune that has fallen on Dominica.
- President Nord Alexis of Haiti, at public
audience, February 5» 1905.
At 7«25 in the morning on April 11, 1900, a large
meteor of great brightness crossed the sky over Port-au-
Prince, trailing a long train of nebulous matter that
remained visible for some moments. About three minutes
after its passage, a loud explosion shook the city. The
sound was so sharp as to cause a trembling of the earth.
The phenomena caused considerable anxiety among the Haitian
populace, who looked upon it as foretelling dire disasters
to the Republic.
Indeed, a sign from heaven was scarcely needed, so
precarious had become the condition of the Haitian state.
Yet another financial crisis was throttling the life of
the economy, and grave constitutional questions were being
aired concerning President Simon Sam's term of office.
The Haitian external and internal bonded debts were
ordinarily secured by pledges made against the customs
receipts. These receipts were paid into the National Bank
of Haiti, a French corporation which was granted its con-
cession during the administration of President Salomon,

on April l f 1880. The signer of that concession for Haiti,
the President of the National Assembly, had a peculiar and,
Judging from later circumstances concerning the Bank, humorous
name - "Innocent Coco. M
The 1900 crisis was rather simply founded on the fact
that an inadequate percentage of the customs receipts was
finding its way into the state treasury, that is, the Bank,
The Haitian customs service, needless to say, was notoriously
corrupt. By a remarkable feat of legerdemain, however, the
government debt was refinanced and consolidated, further
mortgaging anticipated state revenues. Two classes of bonds,
payable in 14 years, were Issued. The first, known as Les
Grandes Consolidations , would bear interest at 12% per
annum. The second, Les Petites Consolidations , would yield
only 6% per annum. It was stipulated that both interest
and principal were payable in American gold. The Consoli-
dated Debt was approved by a unanimous vote of the Haitian
Senate and House of Delegates, and the vote itself should
have been cause for suspicion. The consolidation and the
role of the National Bank merit further attention, but first
it will be necessary to examine the concurrent political
situation.
Articles 90 and 93 of the Haitian Constitution con-
cerned the election of Presidents. They readi
Article 90. The President of the Republic is elected
for seven years. He will enter upon the duties of
his office on the 15th of May. Only after an inter-
val of seven years ... [may he succeed himself].

Article 93* In case of the death, resignation or
forfeiture of the President, the one who replaces
him is named for seven years and his functions end
altvays on the 15th of May, even though at that time
the seven years of his powers are not finished.
During the vacancy, the Executive Power will be
exercised by the Secretaries of State in Council
assembled, and under their responsibility.
The joker in the case of President Sam, who was elected
by the National Chambers on April 1, I896, upon the sudden
death of General Hyppolite, was that at the time of his
election a law was enacted requiring him to enter upon the
duties of the presidential office at once and to remain in
office until May 15, 1903..
It is perhaps proper at this time to state that the
Haitian Constitution failed to provide for judicial review
of acts of the legislature, such as that performed by the
Supreme Court in the United States. Thus, there was a
body of opinion in Haiti (the "Ins") which held that acts
produced by the executive and legislative branches of the
government were perforce constitutional. Another body of
opinion (the "Outs") held otherwise.
According to Article 93 of the Constitution, General
Sam's term of office would expire on May 15, 1902, but by
the I896 law his term would not expire until a year later.
The electoral system in Haiti, patterned after the French,
further aggravated the situation. The Chamber of Deputies
was elected by popular vote to serve for a term of two
years. The Chamber was in turn responsible for the elect-
ion of the upper house, the Senate, whose members served

for a term of six years. When a President was to be
elected, both houses met in joint session as the National
Assembly, and the election took place at the congressional
session just preceding the expiration of the presidential
term. By tradition there were many candidates, for not
only honor and a legal salary of $24,000 in gold awaited
the successful candidate, but almost unlimited opportunity
to pillage the state treasury. Not surprisingly, the
electors were frequently wooed with promises of material
advancement, as well as eloquent appeals to patriotism.
If this judgement of Haitian political morality in the
period seems harsh, it is nevertheless believed to be
accurate
.
Adding to the comic opera overtones in Port-au-Prince
at this time were the unabashed maneuverings of the great
powers for commercial advantages. France, which the year
before had signed a commercial treaty with Haiti resulting
in mutually reduced tariffs, heaped ceremonial honors on
high officials in the Haitian Government. The Minister of
Finance and the Haitian Minister in Paris both received the
Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, and on President Sam
was conferred the Grand Croix de l'ordre de l'Etoile Noire
.
Paris financial journals commented favorably on the financial
honesty of Haiti's officials in meeting their debts. The
United States Minister in Port-au-Prince, Mr. William F.
Powell, never ceased to act the role of a one man chamber
of commerce and consistently urged American capital to enter

Haiti, particularly in the fields of banking and railroads.
He entertained lavishly, arid a ball given by the Powells
in honor of President McKinley's second inauguration won
special praise in the Port-au-Prince press. Guests enter-
ing the Legation were greeted by a huge eagle, fashioned
in artificial flowers, with outspread wings, holding in its
beak a ribbon with the Inscription " E Pluribus Unum. "
The German community in Haiti, meanwhile, took the
much more direct and practical step of subscribing sub-
stantial funds toward the expenses of the German Govern-
ment in building new vessels to be added to the German Navy.
By coincidence, shortly after the announcement of the German
subscription, an Italian cruiser paid a visit to Port-au-
Prince to press, successfully, a claim against the Haitian
Government
.
It was apparently the intent of General Sam to serve
at least until May 15, 1903 1 but certain irregularities in
the January, 1902, legislative elections created such an
uproar that it became obvious he would have to step down.
It was said that in many places In the country only those
were allowed to vote who would promise to cast their votes
for the government's candidates. In other cases where
opposition candidates received a majority of the vote, their
election was set aside and some others named in their place.
If anyone protested such action he was arrested. As in all
Haitian elections, great use was made of the army. Troops
were marched to the polls and their votes cast as a group.
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The National Assembly delayed the vote for a new
President until May 12, 1902, when apparent agreement
was reached on President Sam's candidate, General Leconte,
who was believed to have the backing of the German commun-
ity. A rumor circulated that Leconte had promised Germany
a coaling station at Mole St. Nicholas, and an angry mob
forced its way into the Legislative Chambers just prior
to the ballot. Shots were fired and the disturbance spread
into the street. In all, some 100 persons are thought to
have lost their lives.
At the early hour of 6 A.M. the next morning, the
American Minister received a summons from the palace. He
was requested, in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic
Corps, to grant protection to the President and his Cabinet.
Powell called his colleagues to a hasty meeting at the
American Legation, and at 11 A.M. the diplomats as a body
escorted the outgoing administration of General Sam to the
harbor, where they embarked on a steamer. The ex-President
rode in Powell's own carriage.
The American Minister reported that "the President,
General Sam, retires from office moderately well fixed for
his future, having been able to secure and place to his
credit in France about 12,500,000 francs, or $2,500, 000. h1
As was customary in Haitian revolutions, "Committees
1. U. S,, National Archives, Department of State, Despatches
from U.S. Ministers to Haiti, 1862-1906, Powell to Dept. of
State, No. 1092, May 17, 1902, Micro Copy M-82, Vol. 38.
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of Public Safety" were established in Port-au-Prince and
all other major cities of the country to continue the
essential functions of government and to exert influence
in the choice of the Provisional Government that would be
formed pending new elections. Leading candidates in the
changed political circumstances busied themselves raising
armies, and there were threatened marches on the capital.
General Firmin, commander of the "Army of the North,"
quickly emerged as perhaps the strongest contender.
In spite of instructions to remain strictly neutral,
Powell, in his role of doyen
, persuaded his French, German,
and British colleagues to join him in a letter to Firmin
which urged that his army remain clear of the capital. The
diplomatic corps also recommended to the home governments
that round-robin visits of warships be scheduled during the
current unrest. Powell had occasion to be grateful for
USS Topeka's presence in Port-au-Prince, for while escorting
the particularly hated ex-Minister of Interior and Police,
General Tancrede Auguste, to the landing for embarkation
on a steamer, an ugly mob gathered and had to be dispersed
by crewmen from the cruiser.
Late in May, 1902, representatives from the various
Committees of Public Safety met in Port-au-Prince and a
Provisional Government was formed with Boisrond Canal, an
elderly ex- President of the Republic, assuming the interim
executive power. General Firmin was not represented, and
in the threatening calm which followed he remained with his
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troops in the north. In July another election, Haitian
style, was held, but at almost the same moment a vessel of
the Hamburg-America line arrived from New York with a long-
awaited cargo of 1500 rifles and coal for General Firmin in
Gonaives. The rifles were carefully packed in barrels labeled
"pork." The coal was for the antique Haitian gunboat Crete
& Pierrot which, with the mulatto admiral, Killick, had joined
forces with Firmin. The civil war was promptly renewed.
2
The expansion of Haiti's domestic quarrels to the high
seas, however, raised international questions. Admiral Killick
proclaimed a blockade of certain Haitian ports, and the Pro-
visional Government responded by declaring those ports con-
trolled by Firmin to be also in a state of blockade. The
question thus raised, of course, was that of effective block-
ade, and the United States, which 41 years earlier had seen
its efforts to close certain Confederate ports by paper block-
ade properly laughed at, this time adhered strictly to inter-
national law. American naval officers were directed to give
protection to American and unprotected foreign vessels if
it was determined that the declared blockades were not effect-
ive. Given the state of the contending Haitian navies, that
determination was almost a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless,
Admiral Killick in the Crete £ Pierrot prevented the American
merchant ship Paloma from entering Cape Haitian, and commercial
2. U. S. t National Archives, Department of State, Despatches
from U.S. Ministers to Haiti, 1862-1906, Powell to Dept . of
State, No. 1122, July 21, 1902, Micro Copy M-82, Vol. 38.
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interests went into uproar. On September 2, 1902, however,
he made a fatal error when he stopped, searched, and re-
moved goods from a vessel of German registry some 40 miles
from the Cape.
The German Charge* d* Affaires immediately cabled his
government, and four days later the German gunboat Panther
found the Crete S. Pierrot at anchor in the harbor at Gonaives.
An ultimatum was delivered, at the expiration of which the
Panther opened fire. Admiral Killick directed that three
kegs of powder, some large cartridges, and a can of kero-
sene be placed in his cabin, with a powder train laid to
the quarterdeck. He then ordered his officers and men
ashore. The last thing he was seen to do was to fire the
powder train with his cigar. A terrific explosion tore
the ship apart. The Panther then steamed out of the harbor,
ignoring the pleas of German residents in Gonaives who were
terrified by the angry mob which quickly filled the streets,
shouting "kill the Germans'." and "kill the whites'." 3
Killick' s charred body was discovered floating in the
harbor the next day and was taken ashore and buried with
honors. Thus did Haiti acquire her first naval hero, even
though he commanded forces dedicated to the overthrow of the
nominal government.
Though his naval arm was now destroyed, General Firmin
3. U.S., National Archives, Department of State, Despatches
from U.S. Ministers to Haiti, 1862-1906, Powell to Dept. of
State, No. 1158, Sept. 13 i 1902, Micro Copy M-82, Vol. 39.
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continued to press his struggle against the Provisional
Government, which was itself finding it difficult to field
an army. The American Minister reported that "in the
mountain districts . . . [recruits] are hunted like wild
animals and are driven into the cities like a drove of
cattle with their legs tied together with rope, sufficiently-
long to enable them to walk, and their arms tied behind
them." 4
It was Powell's conviction, stated in a series of des-
patches, that the prolongation of the Haitian civil war was
primarily due to foreign commercial houses making money out
of both parties in the conflict. Large loans, guaranteed
by a percentage of the already heavily pledged customs revenue,
were made to both the Provisional Government and to Firmin,
Arms and munitions at double their real value were similarly
supplied. Those providing money and arms knew that their
interests were secured regardless of which side won, for, as
in the past, their home governments would apply diplomatic
pressure, backed by the threat of naval bombardment, to what-
ever Haitian authority eventually achieved control. Under
the circumstances, foreign interests could not lose. An
interesting illustration of this game of playing both ends
against the Haitian middle is the fact that it was a German
vessel, of the same line as that later stopped by Klllick,
**-• U, S
., National Archives, Department of State, Despatches
from U.S. Ministers to Haiti, 1862-1906, Powell to Dept . of
State, No. 1171, Sept. 22, 1902, Micro Copy M-82, Vol. 39.

which supplied the coal needed by the Crete & Pierrot
.
Powell's solution to this dilemma was the displacement of
foreign commercial Interests by American, and he was thus
one of the earliest and most persistent advocates of "dollar
diplomacy," an attachment which would later lead to his own
downfall
.
The Provisional Government finally found a military
leader of some ability in the aged General Nord Alexis.
St, Marc and Gonaives were taken, and Flrmin and his
followers were forced to embark. On December 14, 1902,
General Nord Alexis, a vigorous 85, entered Port-au-Prince
at the head of an army of about 5»0°0 men. There was some
minor skirmishing and perhaps 15 persons were killed, but
the situation quickly stabilized. The army proclaimed its
general President of Haiti, an act ratified four days later
by the National Assembly.
As might have been expected, the new President of the
Republic found state finances in utter chaos. The public
debt had skyrocketed to nearly $29 » 000,000. Emergency
measures were taken to double the duties on imports, to
tax government bonds (originally Issued as tax-free instru-
ments), and to drastically increase the circulation of
paper currency. A Special Commission was appointed to look
into the recent consolidation of the public debt, and grumb-
lings in the House of Delegates were silenced by forcibly
dissolving that body. When the Minister of Finance resigned,
no one would volunteer to succeed him.
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Late in June, 19^3 » the Special Commission, composed
of two judges of the Supreme Court, an official of the
National Bank, and two businessmen, made their interim
report to the President. They charged the Bank with being
wholly responsible for the issue of |2, 000, 000 worth of
fraudulent bonds, and that the Bank Itself had shared in
the proceeds of that issue. The French Director of the
Bank, Mr. J. de la Myre, denied the charge and, to make
matters worse, informed the President that the government
had overdrawn its account at the Bank and additional funds
would not be advanced to pay the army. The President was
then quoted as telling his officers that there was money
in the Bank, and to "go and get It." 5
The more the "Consolidation Scandal" was investigated,
the worse it seemed. Orders were issued for the arrest
of all members of General Sam's cabinet, and one of those
officers, unlucky enough to have delayed his flight, was
interrogated by the Commission. He testified before that
body that the fraudulent issue of bonds had been made and
distributed, that he himself had strongly opposed the
measure when it was introduced at a Cabinet meeting, but
that he had been outvoted. The investigations continued,
and by October, 1903, the most glaring frauds, amounting
to nearly $3,000,000, had been discovered. In virtually
5» U. S., National Archives, Department of State, Despatches
from U.S. Ministers to Plaiti, 1862-1906, Powell to Dept. of
State, No. I3I6, July 2, 1903, Micro Copy M-82, Vol. 40.
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all of them the National Bank of Haiti seemed to have
profited equally with the late administration. The Bank,
on its part, claimed that it was not responsible because
it had acted at the direction of the Haitian President and
the Minister of Finance. In November, Nord Alexis ordered
the arrest of all the senior officials of the National Bank,
including the Director, Mr. de la Myre. Another diplomatic
crisis threatened, for most of the arrested officials were
French, and under the protection of the French Minister.
At year's end the Government's position was desperate.
Public employees had not been paid for months, and while in
the past some funds had always been found to pay out to them
for the holidays, this year there were none. Only the army
was paid, the Government borrowing at high interest and in
exchange for customs due bills, from the smaller commercial
houses. No money was available to make preparations for
Haiti's Centennial, talked about for years, and due to be
celebrated on January 1, 190^-. To keep the opposition in
check, the Government resorted to terror, mass arrests, and
public executions. The foreign legations were filled with
refugees, and the American Minister reported that many of
those fleeing the police entered his grounds by scaling a
20 foot wall. In mid-January the German Minister threatened
to have marines landed to quell disturbances at Port-au-
Prince.
The distress of the Haitian people worsened as the
year progressed. A disastrous fall in the foreign exchange

rate brought skyrocketing prices for those goods which
had to be imported. Much of Haiti's retail trade was
then in the hands of Syrian merchants, and the Govern-
ment deliberately started a vicious campaign against them,
fanning long-smouldering racial hatreds , There were then
about 1200 Syrians of all nationalities except German in
Haiti. By the President's decree in mid-March, 1905» all
who were not naturalized or citizens of some other country
were ordered out of the country by April 1 . Syrian shop-
keepers made frantic efforts to sell their goods and close
their stores. Many had large families and were terrified
by the freely circulating stories of machetes being sharpened
by the soldiers and the lower classes. The American Minister
urgently requested the presence of a naval vessel, fearing
the outbreak of looting and arson. Traffic boomed in
counterfeit naturalization certificates.
On April 1, 1905* those Syrians who could not secure
the protection of another state were forced out of business
and out of Haiti. Their departure was almost immediately
marked by another round in the spiraling inflation, Powell
reported that "there are many families here among the middle
class that are in a state of almost semi-starvation .... Many
families are parting xfith their jewelry and articles of
wearing apparel to obtain money to buy food," °
6. U. S ., National Archives, Department of State, Despatches
from U.S. Ministers to Haiti, 1862-1906, Powell to Dept. of
State, No. 1709, April 5. 1905, Micro Copy M-82, Vol. 45.
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Meanwhile, the trial of those connected with the
"Consolidation Scandal" had finally been held. Powell
thought that the Haitian Government placed itself in a
compromising position when the Minister of Foreign Re-
lations informed the French Minister that the Bank offic-
ials had to be tried and condemned for "political reasons."
The French Minister lost no time in communicating that
remarkable statement to the French Government and the press.
Correspondents from the leading Paris newspapers were sent
to Port-au-Prince to report on the trial.
The Haitian Government presented a careful and fully-
documented case, more than 200 witnesses appearing for the
prosecution. In the opinion of the American Minister, the
complicity of the Bank was established beyond all reasonable
doubt, though he felt that the Government erred in bringing
the Bank's officials and not the Bank itself to trial. On
Christmas Day, 1904, the jury delivered its verdict. Found
guilty and sentenced to various fines and prison terms of
up to four years were the Bank's Director and several lesser
officials. Concerned members of General Sam's government
were more severely dealt with, and sentences ranging upward
to life imprisonment at hard labor were meted out to T. Simon
Sam, ex- President of the Republic? Tancrede Auguste, ex-
Mlnister of the Interior? Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, ex-Minister
of War? and Cincinnatus Leconte, ex-Mlnister of Public Works.
It is a striking comment on the times that of the guilty
Haitians named, only one served any part of his sentence,

and the last three named were later elected to the office
of President of the Republic!
In July, 1905» the .American Minister was recalled to
Washington for consultations and there became involved with
a "syndicate of Capitalists" in a startling international
intrigue
.
The disastrous defeat suffered by Russia in the battle
of Tsushima Straits, May 27-28, 1905, left the Czar virtually
without a navy. It was patently impossible to build a new
fleet in time to continue the war at sea against Japan, but
one might be bought if the price were right. Powell's syn-
dicate of Capitalists became interested and found, not one,
but two states that were willing to part with their navies
under certain conditions. One of those conditions was that
the sale had to be indirect, through another state, in
deference to their own nice respect for international law
and concern over possible Japanese reprisal, remote as that
possibility seemed.
Thus it was that Powell was approached in Washington
by a representative of the syndicate which by chance was
even then considering, at his urging, a new consolidation
of the Haitian debt. If the Haitian Government would agree
to buy the naval vessels of Chile and Argentina (with money
advanced by the syndicate), and subsequently agree to trans-
fer those vessels to agents of the Russian Government at a
place to be determined on the high seas, the syndicate would
pay the Haitian Government the sum of "$200,000 or $250,000"
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as soon as the sale was confirmed. It seems probable that
the vagueness of the syndicate's offer was deliberate, and
the uncertain $50,000 reserved as a personal inducement to
the Haitian Minister in Washington, Mr. J. N. Leglr, should
'that prove necessary. The receptiveness of Mr. Lege'r to
the proposal, made by Powell at a Sunday meeting, is not
known, but he did agree to meet with the syndicate's rep-
resentative the following Tuesday.
Powell began to have second thoughts, however, about
:how best to approach the Haitian Government on this deli-
cate matter. He wrote privately to the Deputy Consul in
Port-au-Prince, Mr. Battiste, and instructed him to inform,
i unofficially, the Haitian Minister of Foreign Relations,
Mr. Fere*re*, of the substance of the syndicate's proposal
and to state that the matter was then in the hands of Lege*r
in Washington
.
Mr. Lege*r, when he found out what Powell had done,
considered it, perhaps not without reason, an attempt to
put him in a compromising position with his government
concerning the indefinite $50,000. The Haitian Minister
responded quickly, with high moral indignation, by regis-
tering a serious, and public, complaint with the American
State Department, charging Powell with attempted bribery.
What President Roosevelt, even then grooming himself to
act the role of peacemaker in the Russo-Japanese War, thought
about this airing of his Minister's interest in seapower
may well be imagined.
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Powell was permitted to return to Haiti to clean out
his desk, and his long years of service ended there on
November 25 » 1°05» more than a month prior to the arrival
I
of his successor. Ironically, the Haitian Navy was even
i
then awaiting delivery of the ex- Prins Gegarin , a 600 ton
vessel which for 16 years had plied the Black Sea under the
Russian flag. It was said to have cost the German agent of
the Haitian Government 120,000 francs at auction, and was
sold to Haiti for about $300,000 in American gold.
It is doubtful if any American diplomat ever stepped
into a situation more fraught with chaos than did Henry w.
Fumiss, the new Minister at Port-au-Prince. A colored man
from Indiana, of private means and shrewd native intelli-
gence, he owed his appointment to the strident lobbying
!iof negro groups in the United States. Thus it was that the
|itwo most important State Department posts in Haiti were
filled by negroes throughout most of the decade preceding
I the American intervention, for the consul at Cape Haitian,
Lemuel W. Livingston, was also a colored man. Both men were
discerning and articulate reporters, and their influence in
i:the shaping of American policy toward Haiti in this period
can scarcely be argued.
Furniss established himself in a new and comfortable
house in the suburbs of Port-au-Prince and became an in-
terested spectator of the Haitian political scene which
flashed, kaleidoscope-like, through a bewildering pro-
session of plots and counter- plots
. He bought a horse
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and traveled extensively through the countryside, master-
ing the local patois and studying the life and customs of
the people. What he found was an almost wholly illiterate
and apolitical peasantry ruled by venal and unscrupulous
"generals" and politicians whose only goal seemed to be
access to the treasury. This view, rather fully shared
by Livingston, led both men to favor and encourage direct
American action to right the crying wrongs of the Black
Republic
.
What Fumiss observed and reported concerning the evils
of the Haitian political system and the sham of its "demo-
cratic" institutions, would be verified and reinforced by
the statements and writings of dozens of equally qualified
reporters in the years ahead. Yet it seems doubtful that
such reports ever significantly tarnished the popular myth
of a small negro republic, in the clutches of foreign ex-
ploiters and would-be conquerors, fighting for freedom, and
liberty, and justice. As has been shown, foreign exploiters
there were, as well as those who coveted ultimate control
of the land and the people, but Haiti's real distress could
always be traced to failures of the human spirit in her
ruling class. That regrettable fact, however, did not com-
port with the reformer's and the zealot's image of Haiti,
and it was predictable that reaction to the American inter-
vention, when it came, would result in demands for a "return"
to conditions of democracy which Haiti had never actually
enjoyed.

The closing years of the Nord Alexis regime were dis-
tinguished by the brutal and the bizarre. The President,
then approaching the age of ninety, seemed to be mentally
unbalanced, and his derangement took on certain vicious
characteristics that boded ill for those who opposed him
or who aroused his suspicion.
In September, 1907, a special military tribunal was
established to try 17 persons accused of conspiracy a-
gainst the government. In his address to the court, the
prosecuting attorney said, among other things, that "it
was necessary that all the prisoners should be found guilty
and shot, even if the Government had to wade through blood
to do so, in order that it might be shown to the Govern-
ment of the United States of America that they [the Haitians]
were able to maintain order and were able to promptly put
down all attempts at revolution without the Intervention
7
of that Government." The attorney for the defense, when
he finally got an opportunity, said that the very illegality
and arbitrary action of the court would, for the sake of
numanity, appear to be reason enough for intervention by
the United States. He was not permitted to go on with his
3peech, the presiding officer tapping a bell which caused
DUgles to blow and drums to beat, effectively drowning out
whatever further was said. In less than half an hour, all
?. U. S., National Archives, Department of State, Numerical
?ile t 1906-1910, Furniss to Dept. of State, No. 244, Sept.
>6, 1907, vol. 219, Case 2126.
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the prisoners save one were found guilty and ordered shot.
The "trial" illustrates both the quality of Haitian justice,
and what was plainly a growing preoccupation with the threat
of American intervention. The latter was, of course, quite
understandable in view of American actions elsewhere in the
Caribbean, most notably next door in the Dominican Republic.
The American "menace" was a frequent topic of discussion.
^
Political executions became so frequent that victims
were jokingly said to have contracted a "sudden disease," and
this became the accepted euphemism for the murder of those
the government wanted quietly out of the way. Foreign legat-
ions and consulates were jammed with those seeking asylum, and
at this moment the United States reversed its former liberal
policy concerning the granting of asylum. Apparently convinced
that abuse of the right of asylum was a contributing factor to
political turmoil, and acting against the advice of Furniss,
who had the support of the entire diplomatic community in Port-
au-Prince, Secretary of State Elihu Root, in January 1908,
ordered an end to the sheltering of Haitians in the American
Legation and in all American consulates in Haiti
. When he later
learned that local revolutionary leaders remained in the con-
sulate at St. Marc, he summarily revoked that consul's commiss-
ion. The affair at St, Marc had an extremely unhappy denouement,
however, for no sooner was the American flag lowered from
B. U. S. t National Archives, Department of state, Numerical
File, 1906-1910, Furniss to Dept . of State, No. 461, Dec. 4,
1908, Vol. 221, Case 2126.
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|,he former consulate, but Haitian soldiers rushed in to
Lrag the refugees out . They were then marched to the
temetary where, after digging their own graves, they were
jj:hot.9 A helpless spectator to this was the Commanding
Jfficer of the American gunboat Eagle , himself under verbal
fire for violating the new American neutralism by his
iction in earlier preventing the Haitian Navy from bom-
barding the town
.
Somewhat taken aback by the summary slaughter of the
3t . Marc refugees, Root cabled Furniss instructions to hold
iny remaining Haitians seeking sanctuary "until absolute
guarantees from the President and Government of Haiti can
De obtained for their trial according to the orderly op-
eration of Haitian law," 10 Such a statement revealed an
appalling misconception of the true state of affairs in
Haiti. Furniss courageously tried, once again, to put
things in proper perspective.
Conditions in Haiti are such that it would be
impossible to have any guarantee carried out as to
legal and proper trials.... To consent ... to the
delivery of the refugees ... to the Haitian Govern-
ment for trial would just be going through a form
which would in reality guarantee nothing for the
accused. But even granting that the parties would
have a fair trial and would be legally condemned,
there is nothing to prevent their being cast into
prison to be tortured, exposed, and either made
9. U. S., National Archives, Department of State, Numerical
File, 1906-1910, Commanding Officer USS Eagle ltr 25-EJF of
Feb. 5, 1908, Vol. 220, Case 2126.
10. Ibid. Secretary of State to Furniss, Cable, Feb. 3, 1908,
Vol. 220, case 2126.
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away with or allovjed to die of some lingering
disease easily contracted in the prison. Under
such conditions ... it would really be more humane
to deliver the refugees to the Haitian Government
and allow them to be as summarily dealt with as
were those who took refuge in our Consular Agency
at St. Marc.... My opinion as expressed is also
the opinion of all my colleagues of the Diplomatic
Corps. H
In spite of its apparent cruelty and its faulty ex-
ecution in time, the new American policy was unquestionably
wise and long overdue. Consular asylum, though in fact
practiced for many years in volatile Latin American states,
had no generally accepted basis in international law. The
existence of so many safe havens scattered throughout
coastal Haiti took much of the risk out of revolutionary
activity. It is significant that among those expressing
sorrow to Furniss over the new policy, were distinguished
members of the Nord Alexis administration itself, perhaps
looking forward to the day when they themselves would have
to flee for their lives. By April, 1908, the American
Legation and consulates in Haiti were entirely cleared of
refugees, most of whom managed to find shelter in the
legations and consulates of other foreign powers . Asylum
ceased to be a matter of pressing concern to the American
Minister in Haiti. He had, however, other problems.
In April, 1907, Mr. James Gordon Bennett, publisher
11 . U . S., National Archives, Department of State, Numerical
File, 1906-1910, Furniss to Dept. of State, No. 299, Feb. 4,
1908, Vol. 220, Case 2126.

of The New York Herald
, had visited Haiti with a group of
,;friends while on a yacht cruise. By chance he met a
Haitian senator who took him to call on the President.
Mr. Bennett was pleased with his reception and the Haitian
officials were particularly gratified with his treatment of
jthem. Later the Government sent presents of coffee, fruits,
and other products of Haiti to him, and the upshot was that
!|
a Herald correspondent was sent to "interview President
jAlexis and take sides with his Government." 12 The corres-
pondent, a Mr. de Armas, spoke French fluently and his long
service as a newspaperman had made him naturally inquisitive,
.lis investigation of Haitian affairs soon led him to the
conclusion that it was impossible to further defend the
government. He cabled his observations to Bennett, who
Replied instructing Mr. de Armas to "tell the truth" but
;o be as "easy as possible on the present Government
.
m13
The Herald stories, at first read with eager pleasure
>y officials in Port-au-Prince, soon soured. Mr. de Armas
.eft Haiti in fear of his life, but his place was taken by
in undercover correspondent for the newspaper, and sen-
;ationalism crept into the accounts now regularly appear-
ng in the pages of the Herald. Speculation about possible
jnerican intervention, and editorial comment which seemed
2. U.S., National Archives, Department of State, Nle
'





to urge that course of action enraged the Nord Alexis
regime, and strengthened the opposition whose pledge it
now was to save Haiti from the "American peril."
How much the Herald stories sped the downhill slide
of the Haitian Government is a matter of conjecture. By-
November, 1908, a full-scale revolt was underway, however,
and its leader was Antoine Simon, for 18 years Governor-
General of the Department of the South. Government troops
sent forth to do battle were literally tied together to
prevent their desertion. Fumiss and his French and German
colleagues recommended joint intervention to protect foreign
interests and put an end to the disorders. American firms
doing business in Haiti bombarded the State Department with
pleas that troops be landed. From Secretary Root came the
terse and unequivocal reply that the "United States has no
idea of intervening in Haiti." By coincidence the record
contains a personal letter dated one day prior to Root's
cable to Furnlss, which sheds some light on why Theodore
Roosevelt failed to intervene in Haiti at what must have
seemed a propitious moment. The letter is the President's,
to Wm. Bayard Hale, editor of the Saturday Review of Books .
... The trouble as regards Haiti is not that the
Government fails to understand the situation, but
that the people, especially the educated people,
refuse to understand it. The Times and Evening
Post, for instance, represent a large constituency
14. U.S., National Archives, Department of State, Numerical
File, 1906-1910, Secretary of State to Furniss, Cable, Dec.
4, 1908, Vol. 220, Case 2126.
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which was lukewarm or hostile to what I did about
Santo Domingo - than which nothing so good for
Santo Domingo has ever been done. I got it thru
the Senate by two year's hard work, without a
particle of aid from what likes to call itself
the "educated conscience" of the people of the
country. Now, in Haiti, what we need is something
that will show our people that this Government,
in the name of humanity, morality, and civilization
ought to exercise some kind of supervision over the
island i but this should be done as a part of our
general scheme of dealing with the countries around
the Caribbean. In Cuba, Santo Domingo and Panama
we have interfered in various different ways, and
in each case for the immeasurable betterment of
the people. I would have interfered in some similar
fashion in Venezuela, in at least one Central Am-
erican State, and in Haiti already, simply in the
interest of civilization, if I could have waked up
our people so that they would back a reasonable
and intelligent foreign policy which would put a
stop to crying disorder at our very doors. Such
a policy would be a little in our own interests,
but much more in the interest of the peoples in
whose affairs we interfered. I think Mexico would
have gone in with us on a rational policy. But in
each case where I have actually interfered - Cuba,
Santo Domingo and Panama, for instance - I have had
to exercise the greatest care in order to keep public
opinion here with me so as to make my interference
effective, and I have been able to lead it along as
it ought to be led only by minimizing my interference
and showing the clearest necessity for it. In the
other cases I have mentioned, tho the need was great,it was not as great as those in which I did take
action, and the need could not have been as clearly
shown to our people. Our prime necessity is that
public opinion should be properly educated.
.
.^5
Nord Alexis, ninety-one and terribly frail, left the
palace at Port-au-Prince at five o'clock in the morning on
December 2, 1908, and accompanied by the French Minister
with a cavalry escort, proceeded to the harbor where he
15. U.S., National Archives, Department of state, Numerical
File, 1906-1910, Theodore Roosevelt to Wm. Bayard Hale. Dec
3. 1908, Vol. 220, Case 2126.
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was embarked in a French warship. Despite the early hour,
large crowds had gathered where it was supposed he would
pass. Several persons attempted to strike him, and shots
were fired at his entourage. The crowd took possession
of his baggage, breaking open the trunks and completely
cleaning them out, taking all of his clothing, private
papers, and money.
After the President embarked there was considerable
"Jolification" in the city. Many who had guns spent the
greater part of the day and night shooting in the air.
The whistle of bullets near the American Legation became
so common that Minister Furniss considered it unsafe even
to sit on the back porch of the building. He may be for-
given if he viewed the fall of the government with an over-
all feeling of relief. On the morrow, however, Simon's
army would clatter through the streets of Port-au-Prince





The Era of the Ephemeral Governments
.
As Bobo and his four frock-coated dusky followers
mounted the ladder, it was observed that all car-
ried their suitcases upon which had been painted:MDr. Rosalvo Bobo, Chief of the Executive Power,"
"Dr. So and So, Minister of the Interior," etc.
- Commander C. S. Baker, (SC) U.S.Navy
The suitcases observed in the hands of an aspiring
Haitian administration as it boarded an American ship in
the harbor of Port-au-Prince in 1915 were appropriate
symbols of the political history of Haiti in the last
years prior to the American intervention. On December
17. 1908, Antoine Simon was elected to the presidency for
the constitutional term of seven years. In the seven years
following that election no fewer than seven presidents were
elected and deposed in Haiti. Simon himself served the
longest, two years and seven months. The rapidity of the
turnover thereafter well explains why this period of their
history is called by the Haitians the " Epoque des Gouverne-
ments Ephgmeres ."
General Simon added a certain flair, an artistry to
the plunder of the state treasury. For one thing, he had
a large family to provide for, and all his sons were given
important offices where the opportunity for pilfering was
great. His daughter, Celestine, became a grey eminence
behind the throne, openly practiced voudeaux, and peddled
influence. The President's "perquisites" - pay and allow-
ances for a regiment that didn't exist, "secret funds,"

"rations," etc. - amounted to a little more than $1,000,
000 a year in addition to an official salary of $25,000.
On his birthday $25»000 was appropriated for fireworks
used in the celebration, and a skeptical Furniss reported
that $100 would have more than covered the actual expenses
associated with the display. In September, 1910, a special
law was passed setting aside the sum of $50,000 gold for the
purchase of a plantation for the President "in return for
amounts which he has to personally expend on various occas-
ions for the public good." 1
To the Simon administration fell the task of reorgan-
izing the National Bank, now increasingly in difficulty due
to rampant corruption in the customs service. In February,
1909, the Bank proposed a new contract which would give to
it the responsibility for collecting revenues and apport-
ioning disbursements, a proposal which the American State
Department, in registering its disapproval, characterized
as "a business proposition under which officials of the
bank may be enabled to assume a control over the political
affairs of the State, a condition which would tend to re-
sult in the complete subjugation of Haitian political rights
to French commercial interests and the increased influence
of a private corporation at the expense of the nation." 2




t° Dept. of State, No. 731, Sept. 17 , 1910, Micro
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Germany, through its Dresden Bank, attempted to buy-
out the French interests, and failing that, urged Simon to
force the National Bank into receivorship. With the en-
couragement of the American State Department, a group of
New York firms, including the National City Bank, entered
a bid. The eventual reorganization of the bank, in August,
1910, resulted in ?b% of the stock going to the original
French holders, 6% to the Dresden Bank, and $% each to the
American firms of National City Bank, Messrs. Speyer & Co.,
Hallgarten & Co., and Ladenburg Thalmann & Co
.
, the last
three being houses of close German affiliation. Along with
the reorganization went a 5% loan of $16,000,000, of which
the government netted only 72.3$. The low rate of issue is
explained not only because of Haiti's low credit rating, but
personal inducements of at least $5,000,000 paid to the
Haitian officials who signed the agreement. Money realized
from the loan was to be used to settle accounts with the
old bank, refund the internal debt, and retire the fiduciary
currency, for which purpose some $2,500»Q°0 was reserved.
The loan was secured by a tax of $1 gold on each 100 pounds
of coffee exported and a special 1$% surtax on imports.
Collection was left in the hands of the government, but
service of the public debt was controlled by the bank, the
sole depository of the Haitian Government. Only funds
surplus after service of the loans of I875, I896, and 1910
would be made available to the government.
In 1910 the National Railroad of Haiti was reorganized

also, under the directorship of a colorful financier and
adventurer named James P. MacDonald, who allegedly secured
valuable concessions by charming Simon's daughter, Celes-
tlne . Under the terms of the new contract, the Haitian
Government guaranteed 6% interest on the construction bonds
of the railroad up to a value of $35,000 per mile of con-
structed track. The National City Bank loaned MacDonald
$500,000 to start construction of the railroad, which was
to eventually run from Port-au-Prince to Cape Haitian, and
the bank received as collateral the bonds of the railroad.
National City already owned an interest in Haiti's only
other railroad company, the Central Railway of Haiti, op-
erator of the Plaine du Cul de Sac (P.C.S.) Railroad which
ran from Port-au-Prince to Lake Sumatre, a distance of
about 43 kilometers. The National Railroad concession
established a pattern for other foreign investments in Haiti,
and government default of guaranteed interest payments would
lead to heavy pressures for diplomatic and, eventually, mil-
itary intervention.
By early 1911 f the American Minister could report that
"the Simon Government, by its summary executions, merciless
slaughters, burlesque of liberty, misappropriation of govern-
ment funds and other unconstitutional acts, can now be re-
garded as vile a government as has ever existed in Haiti. "3
3. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929, Furniss
to Dept. of State, No. 835, Feb. 25, 1911, Micro Copy 610, vol. 3.
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That summer, revolutionary activity broke out in the
interior of the country, led by Cincinnatus Leconte. For
a time the situation was extremely confused, as may be
shown by the following sequence of events. In July, the
General of Valliere was ordered to the front, and during
the night was attacked. He retreated (or more correctly,
he ran back) with his soldiers to Valliere. The General
from Hinche, who was there with his soldiers, seeing the
fleeing troops, mistook them for the advancing enemy and,
without making inquiry or attack, set out with his troops
for Hinche. Arriving at the outskirts of Hinche, these
fleeing troops were, by the General at that place, mistaken
for the enemy and, becoming frightened, he ran with his
troops to Gonaives where he reported that Hinche had fallen.
When the truth became known, the whole affair was thought
to be a great joke.** Leconte 's real advance came late in
the month and Simon, convinced that the country was no longer
with him, embarked with his family on August 2, 1911. His
escape was made under cover of the German flag, the cruiser
Bremen landing 40 men. Celestine was shot and slightly
wounded on her way to the harbor.
The senior American naval officer at Port-au-Prince
received instructions to land forces as necessary to pre-
rent looting and to protect American lives and property.
K U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929, Furniss
o Dept. of State, No. 898, July 18, 1911. Micro Copy 610, Vol. 3.

This proved unnecessary, probably because of a joint warn-
ing by the Diplomatic Corps to the Generals commanding
revolutionary forces that fighting and disorder would not
be permitted in Port-au-Prince. With numerous foreign war-
ships then in the harbor, the warning was heeded and Leconte
proclaimed "Chief of the Executive Power" in a relatively
quiet ceremony. On August 4, 1911 > he was elected president,
unanimously, by the legislature. He entered office with
open German support, the German business community subscribing
an Immediate loan to his government of $200,000.
Leconte's subsequent pro-German leanings were viewed with
extreme distrust by the other foreign interests in Haiti, but
almost exactly one year later, on August 8, 1912, the President
died in an explosion of the powder magazine on the palace
grounds. The magazine was a one-story building with a thin
brick wall adjoining the palace and a barracks for the palace
guard. The explosion was apparently accidental, and was
attributed to failure to adequately ventilate a storage cham-
ber for black powder. The disaster occurred at three o'clock
Ln the morning and Leconte was trapped in his bed by debris
and burned to death in the fire which followed the explosion.
Jis son, the Minister of Public V/orks, also perished, along
d-th nearly 100 members of the guard. Syrians, those who re-
nained from the Nord Alexis purges of several years back, were
Hade scapegoats for the incident, and there were scattered
jases of looting and pillaging in the city.
Leconte was succeeded by another central figure in the
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"Consolidation Scandal," General Tancrede Auguste, whose
election occurred with almost indecent haste on the very
day of Leconte's death, Auguste 9 s rule, which lasted just
nine months, is most remarkable for the events surround-
ing his funeral and the choice of his successor. It was
popularly presumed that his death was caused by slow poison-
ing and that the party responsible was his mistress. Fur-
niss, a collector of backstairs gossip, reported, however,
that the President died in the terminal stages of syphilis
(in which case, of course, both versions may be presumed
to be correct*. ) ,*
The funeral service for the fallen president began at
813O A.M. on Sunday, May >±, 19-13, at the Port-au-Prince
Cathedral. The American Minister arrived on time and found
the German, French, and British Representatives, in full
diplomatic uniform, in the seats assigned to the Diplomatic
Corps, immediately in front of those to be occupied by the
Cabinet. Senators and Deputies were seated across the aisle,
facing the diplomats. The Cathedral soon filled and after
a short time the funeral cortege arrived, the body was placed
upon a bier, and the Cabinet, surrounded by officers armed
with sixteen-shot Winchesters, took their assigned places.
As was customary at Te Deum Masses in which Haitian officials
book part, most of the army was drawn up in the square facing
5. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929, Furniss




the Cathedral. The Mass progressed. The Archbishop de-
livered a sermon in which he urged that there be no strife
in the choosing of the new president, reminding Congress
of its duty to the Nation, and expressing the hope that
the progress commenced by the dead president would con-
tinue
.
A procession was then formed by the clergy and church
assistants, and at the funeral bier, just inside the front
door of the Cathedral, they began to perform the last rites.
At that moment, the crack of a rifle resounded in front of
the Cathedral, quickly followed by a volley from all sides
which threw the whole congregation into panic. Those near
the doors attempted to gain the center of the building, while
those near the main aisle stampeded in a crazed endeavor
to reach the anterooms at the rear of the altar. The German,
French, and British colleagues of the American Minister
mounted the dias in front of the altar, but Furniss, aware
that Haitians more often than not fired in the air rather
than at anyone, wisely took shelter in another part of the
Cathedral, away from the vicinity of the Cabinet officers.
Some shots were fired into the ceiling of the Cathedral by
soldiers shouting "a bas le cabinet!"
The firing in the vicinity of the Cathedral did not
last very long, but after the first volleys intermittent
shots seemed to threaten fresh outbreaks, and it was some-
time before many dared to venture out. Furniss, advised
by friends that there was a growing party in Haiti which
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believed that American intervention was the only salvation
for the country, and that an attack on the American Min-
ister might bring about that intervention, delayed his
departure from the funeral until he was convinced that the
neighborhood in the vicinity of the Cathedral was quite
deserted. Edging his way to a side door, he then slipped
out and ran the three blocks to the Legation.
^
Tancrede Auguste's death resulted in the "election"
of the first civilian president in Haiti's history. Sen-
ator Michel Oreste, a prominent lawyer, was chosen by a
vote of 72 to Zk t shortly after the funeral ceremonies
described above. His candidacy was unquestionably advanced
by an open distribution of promisory notes to the electors,
of from $300 to $1,000 payable after the election. One of
the first acts of the new administration was the introduction
of a law appropriating $126,000 gold for "extraordinary ex-
penses as a result of the death of President Tancrede Auguste."
rhe law passed handily .7
In the summer of 1913. coincident to the recent change
)f administrations in Washington, Henry W. Furniss was re-
placed as American Minister by Madison R. Smith. This change
ras unfortunate, since Mr. Smith proved to be ill-suited for
:he assignment. During his tenure important negotiations
>. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929. Furniss
JO Dept. of State, No. 1223, May 10, I9I3, Micro Copy 610, Vol k
'• Ibi.a» No. 1236, May 28, 1913, Micro Copy 610, Vol 4
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were Increasingly placed in the hands of special emissaries
from the Wilson administration. Furniss stayed on in Port-
au-Prince, in the capacity of private citizen.
In July, 1913 » Governor Osborne, a recent appointee as
Assistant Secretary of State, secured an agreement from the
Dreste government that Mole St. Nicholas would not be sold
Dr leased to any other foreign state. Whether such an a-
greement had any real worth, given the mercurial condition
of Haitian politics, is doubtful. A new revolution was
even then underway, nominally led by Davilmar Theodore.
Extraordinary measures were taken to shore up the Oreste
regime, including the use of USS Nashville to carry govern-
nent forces to Port-au-Prince in the face of rebellion. The
American Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, cabled
Smith that "the Department is disposed to do anything proper
to support constituted government
,
M 8 The revolt against
Dreste carried special significance since it was the first
such incident since the announcement of President Wilson's
Latin American Policy in his Mobile, Alabama address on
October 27, 1913.
In spite of American support, Oreste abdicated on Jan-
uary 27, 191^» and embarked on a German war vessel. The
attendant disorders at Port-au-Prince were kept in check by
German and American landing parties, USS Montana sending some
3. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
Secretary of State to Smith, Cable, Jan. 22, 191^, Micro
:opy 610, Vol. 4.

150 men ashore. The Theodore revolution was derailed en-
route to the capital, however, and the Zamor brothers,
Orestes and Charles, entered Port-au-Prince on February 7i
1914, at the head of an army of 4,000. Orestes Zamor was
elected president the very next day, and Charles Zamor was
named Minister of the Interior. Theodore, meanwhile, un-
furled the banner of revolution once more by proclaiming
himself "Chief of the Executive Power" from his stronghold
at the Cape
.
When the Zamors came into power they found, not sur-
prisingly, an empty treasury. Further, they were without
the means to effect the necessary reforms in the customs
service which would ensure them a future source of revenue.
The National Bank refused to advance them any funds, for
the government was unable to furnish security or collateral
of any kind. This enraged the President, and threats were
made against the bank, threats that were answered by the
French Minister who officially notified the Haitian Minister
of Finance that were the threats against the bank put into
execution, "the French Government would take very drastic
action without regard to the attitude of the United States. "9
This was quickly followed by demands from both France and
Germany for participation in the administration of the customs
houses of the country.
9. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929, In-
ternal Memorandum of the Latin-American Division, March 25,
1914, Micro Copy 610, Vol, 5.

At this moment a series of interesting exchanges
occurred between Secretary of State Bryan and Mr. R ,L
.
Farnham, an employee and later vice-president of the Nat-
ional City Bank of New York. Mr. Farnham also served at
this time as president of the National Railroad Company of
Haiti, and thus had numerous connections and sources of
information in both the railroad and the National Bank of
Haiti. Bryan, who seemed to harbor latent distrust of
officials in his own department, was on the receiving end
of advice passed to him by Farnham throughout the early
months of 191^. This advice reached him by letter, by
telegram, by telephone, and in personal conversation in
several face to face meetings. Mr. Farnham frequently pre-
faced his communi cations to the Secretary of State with an
expression of hope that they would perhaps present a view
of the situation in Haiti "somewhat different from the view
one obtains from the regular official reports." 10 The view
presented by Farnham described President Zamor as savage,
inebriate, and threatening to the National Bank and Railroad.
The only solution to the Haitian problem, Farnham stated,
was the effective separation of the customs service from
politics. His proposal was the further reorganization of
the National Bank into a corporation which would be k0%
American, 50% French, and 10$ German, with the new bank
10. u. S
., National Archives, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929, Per-
sonal letter from R ,L .Farnham to William Jennings Bryan, March
11,191^, Micro Copy 610, Vol. k t
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entrusted with the collection of the customs and the dis-
charge of the public debt. An essential element in Farn-
ham's plan was a guarantee of United States protection of
the bank in the execution of its expanded functions.
The Latin-American Affairs Division in the Depart-
ment of State was less than enthusiastic in support of the
proposal, not only because of the minority position of
American interests in the prospective corporation, but
because an advance guarantee represented a significant
departure from the prior policy of deciding such matters
on a case by case basis on the merits. Nevertheless, Mr.
Farnham, as the personal representative of Secretary Bryan,
Journeyed to Haiti in July, 1914- » and his mission was to
secure the consent of the Zamors to his "bank proposal."
Meanwhile, revolutionary activity in the north of Haiti,
aided by clandestine movement of arms and munitions across
the border from the Dominican Republic, had increased dras-
tically. An interesting sidelight to the struggle, and per-
haps an example of "CIA" activity long before there was a
CIA, may be seen in the purchase by the Zamors of a three-
inch field piece in New York and the hiring of a former
U.S. Navy lieutenant and a former Navy gunner's mate to
assist in the reduction of a rebel fortification at the
northern town of Ouanamlnthe, The field piece and the Navy
veterans rode to Haiti on the same ship with Mr. Ron Hazel-





The war In Europe made any reorganization of the Nat-
ional Bank such as envisaged by Farnham improbable, and
after several weeks in which he commandeered American war-
ships, gave instructions to State Department representatives,
and generally made a nuisance of himself, he returned to
the United States. Minister Smith, in the interim, had been
relieved by the equally unenergetic Arthur Bailly-Blanchard,
and the latter arrived in Haiti with a State Department
alternative to the Farnham proposal, a plan for American
supervision of the customs through the device of an American-
nominated and Haitian-appointed Financial Advisor. The
plan was embodied in the draft of a proposed convention with
Haiti which followed closely the lines of that in effect with
the Dominican Republic. At this same time USS Hancock and
800 marines were ordered to Guantanamo to be held in readi-
ness should they be needed in Haiti.
The Zamors were apparently agreeable to the convention
as a last desperate measure to remain in power. They in-
sisted, however, that the United States land its forces as
a preliminary step to negotiating the treaty, in order to
take the edge off opposition charges that they were pre-
paring to •'sell" their country to the Americans. Bryan,
lowever, remained firm in his contention that the plan could
Dnly be adopted on the prior "request" of the Haitian Gov-
2rnment for friendly American assistance. In this impasse
bhe internal situation in Haiti steadily worsened. Political
prisoners were paraded through the streets of Cape Haitian

md shot amid cries of "Viva Zamor'. M and opposition leaders
;old Consul Livingston that they would rather see themselves
md their country perish ten times over than remain in control
>f the present administration. In August the government
ibrogated its agreement with the bank and brought suit against
;he National Railroad, steps which brought cries of outrage
"rom Mr. Farnham and stern warnings from Secretary Bryan.
!n September soldiers in Port-au-Prince threatened the Zamors
rtth death unless salaries were paid, and they were then
;lven permission to take food from the markets. The country
;ottered on the brink of absolute anarchy.
On October 19 • 1914, the USS Tacoma , with the consent
>f all the foreign consuls, sent its landing party ashore
it Cape Haitian to protect foreign interests in the face of
me imminent fall of the city to the revolution, and a few
lays later Charles Zamor agreed to guarantee "to have the
riews of the United States Government adopted" in exchange
"or effective assistance in triumphing over the revolution ,-M
Robert Lansing, the Acting Secretary of State, sent an
irgent request to the White House for instructions concern-
.ng Haiti, and shortly thereafter the following cable was
;ent to Bailly-Blanchard in Port-au-Prince s
Transport Hancock with eight hundred marines has
been ordered to proceed to Port-au-Prince immed-
.1. U. S
., National Archives, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929*
iailly-Blanchard to Dept. of State, Cable, Oct. 25, 1914,
•licro Copy 610 1 Vol. 5.

lately with orders to land men at your request.
Hancock is due at Port-au-Prince evening of October
30. Battleship Kansas from Mexican waters has also
been ordered to Port-au-Prince.
Department is still contemplating convention along
lines of its instructions of July 2nd. At the same
time it is desired to reach agreement for a fair
election to be held within a specified time similar
to Department's action in Dominican Republic.
Department feels it advisable to negotiate with
Zamor brothers and if President Zamor has already
left the country wishes every protection offered
Charles Zamor now reported refugee in Consulate.
Upon arrival Hancock you will at your discretion
request Commanding Officer to take charge of Port-
au-Prince and will restore Charles Zamor to his
cabinet functions. Further instructions will be
sent shortly. Report by cable. 12
Thus, the decision to intervene had been taken, at the
belated "request" of Charles Zamor. The American response,
However, was not taken in time, for Lansing's cable crossed
tilth one from Bailly-Blanchard which reported a general
uprising in Port-au-Prince during which the Zamors had fled,
:he President to a Dutch vessel and Charles to diplomatic
isylum in the French Legation. When the Hancock and its
larines arrived on the morning of October 31, 1914, absolute
>alm reigned in the city, and no occasion could be found for
;he landing of troops. On November 6, 1914, Davilmar Theo-
ore arrived in the capital amid the ringing of bells and
he firing of a Presidential salute. The next day he was
lected "constitutionally" the President of the Republic.
Secretary Bryan, once more at the helm of the State
2. U.S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
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Department, cabled instructions for the American Minister
to advise Theodore that the United States would recognize
him as a "provisional" President when he had named a three-
man commission to go to Washington to negotiate a convent-
ion or conventions covering: (1) American control of the
Haitian customs service, (2) settlement of all matters out-
standing between the Government of Haiti and the railroad,
(3) settlement of questions outstanding between the Govern-
ment of Haiti and the bank, (k) agreement by Haiti to give
full protection to all foreign interests in Haiti, (5) a-
greement by Haiti never to lease any Haitian territory at
Mole St. Nicholas or anywhere else in the country to any
European Government for use as a naval coaling station, and
(6) appointment of a Haitian commission empowered to sign
a protocol for use in settlement by arbitration of pending
claims of American citizens against Haiti. ^3
The Theodore Government resisted Bryan's demands, and
made a counter-proposal to grant Americans special privi-
leges in mining, etc. Bryan replied that what t*as required
;to attract American capital was peace and stability, not
special privilege. Strongly pressed, an attempt was made
bo open the question of customs control, but on December 3>
bhe Haitian Minister for Foreign Affairs while undergoing
questioning on the subject was physically attacked in the
;
-3« U.S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929, Sec-
retary of State to Bailly-Blanchard, Cable, Nov. 12, 1914,
licro Copy 610, Vol. 5.

Senate Chambers and accused of trying to "sell" Haiti to
the United States. He departed amidst the wildest ex-
citement and later submitted his resignation. The Theodore
administration next threatened to forcibly remove funds
from the National Bank.
In this crisis, Mr. Farnham hurried to Washington and
in a meeting with Bryan secured his consent for an extra-
ordinary transfer of $500,000 in gold - part of the funds
reserved under terms of the bank's contract for retirement
of the old Haitian paper currency - from the vaults of the
National Bank to the National City Bank in New York. Be-
cause this measure was expected to meet with strong resist-
ance from the Haitian Government, arrangements were made to
effect the transfer using an American naval vessel and Amer-
ican marines
,
The USS Machi as was ordered to Port-au-Prince
and on December 17, 1914-. a party of eight marines armed
with stout canes and concealed revolvers transported the
sold from the bank to the Mac hi as without incident. The
\merican officer commanding the operation wisely chose the
iaitian siesta hour for the transfer and the gold passed
through nearly deserted streets on its way to the harbor.
Joth the American Minister and the local manager of the bank
strongly protested Secretary Bryan's decision in this matter.
In mid-January, 1915? having refused recognition of the
'heodore Government, President Wilson decided on a new in-




The more I think about that situation the more
I am convinced that it is our duty to take immed-
iate action there such as we took in Santo Domingo.
I mean to send a commissioner there who will seek
and obtain an interview with the leaders of the
various contending factions of the Republic and say-
to them as firmly and definitely as is consistent
with courtesy and kindness that the United States
cannot consent to stand by and permit revolutionary
conditions constantly to exist there. They might,
as in Santo Domingo, insist upon an agreement for
a popular election under our supervision and be told
that the result of that election would be upheld by
the United States to the utmost.
Is not this your judgement?^'
Apparently that was Mr. Bryan's judgement, and he re-
commended that Governor John Franklin Fort, Mr. Charles
ogswell Smith (both of whom had recently acted as commiss-
ioners to Santo Domingo) and Mr. Arthur Bailly-Blanchard
comprise the Haitian Commission. The President agreed.
The situation in Haiti, however, was precarious and
it looked as if the Theodore Government might fall at any
aoment . The leader of the new revolution was Vilbrun
Juillaume Sam, and his activities in the vicinity of Cape
[aitian caused Consul Livingston to request the presence
>f a naval vessel. Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, Com-
lander Cruiser Squadron, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, arrived there
1th USS Washington on January 23, 1915. Shortly after
is arrival the Admiral, in company with Livingston, called
n Sam and the meeting was a memorable one . Years later,
aperton would recall the "very gorgeous black gentleman
^
. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
tate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929, Wood-
ow Wilson to Secretary of State, Memorandum, January 13, 1915,
icro Copy 610, Vol. 6.

arrayed like a head bellhop at the Waldorf" who greeted
jthem at the door of Sam's headquarters to direct them through
a room and up a pair of steps. The black gentleman then
suddenly disappeared, to appear again, still resplendent,
at the head of the stairs where he took their caps and gloves
iand ushered them into a large reception room, saying that
the General would be pleased to see them in a moment. He
.jthen disappeared again. While the Admiral waited, a large
portrait caught his eye. It seemed familiar. When General
Sam appeared, the Admiral was surprised to recognize him as
:the bellhop, only this time he had discarded his coat for a
inore elaborate one and an enormous sword clanked round his
heels . A glance at the portrait on the wall convinced him;
it also was Guillaume Sam. 1-5
Through Livingston Admiral Caperton was informed of the
lsual course of Haitian revolutions* and in his interview
with General Sam he extracted a promise that as Sam advanced
:/ith his army to Port-au-Prince there would be no looting
)f the towns along the way. The Admiral also arranged to
'iave naval officers meet Sam at each major stop on his march
•o the capital, to remind him of his promise. He then de-
parted Cape Haitian with the Washington and proceeded to
rort-au- Prince, arriving there on January 27, 1915. to dls-
over a tense situation involving the American schooner
5. Admiral William B. Caperton, "Activities While in Command
f Cruiser Squadron, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Commander in
hief, U.S. Pacific Fleet" (Unpublished manuscript), The




Alice Pendleton and the Haitian Government,
President Theodore had declared a blockade of the
ports of northern Haiti, but was unable to enforce it be-
:
cause the Haitian naval vessels were at Port-au-Prince
without coal or funds to purchase any. The Alice Pendleton
,
meanwhile, had been at Port-au-Prince since January 11 with
600 tons of coal contracted for, but not yet paid for, by
the Haitian Government. When Caperton arrived he found the
American schooner lying alongside a wharf, between the
Haitian gunboats Nord Alexis and Pacifique . In view of the
financial condition of the Theodore Government, its urgent
and vital need for funds, the lack of coal for the gunboats,
the exposed position of the Alice Pendleton , the approach
of the revolutionists, and the generally insecure condition
at Port-au-Prince, the Admiral decided to ready his landing
party and to keep in constant touch with the American Min-
ister.
On January 29 » 1915 » the Theodore Government published
a proclamation changing the depository for customs and tax
receipts from the National Bank to such business houses or
Danks as it might designate, and that same day, payment
laving been advanced, the Alice Pendleton began discharging
Lts coal to the Haitian gunboats. Renewed threats were
llrected at the National Bank to forcibly remove funds al-
ready on deposit there, and these threats were countered by
i strong warning issued through the American Minister, a
rarning underscored by the arrival, on January Jl , of the
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USS Montana with 65O marines. The decision was made,
however, to await the arrival of the Haitian Commission,
and in the interim the Theodore Government finally fell,
on February 22, 1915. The President embarked on a Dutch
ship and Sam arrived in Port-au-Prince to the ritualistic
ringing of bells and cheering of the populace, followed
by the equally ritualistic election, on March 4, 1915.
Governor Fort and Mr. Smith landed the next day.
President Wilson's Haitian Commission accomplished
nothing in a ten-day sojourn in Port-au-Prince. Governor
Fort found his accomodations unsanitary and unsafe, and
complained bitterly of the lack of a U . S . warship in the
harbor during part of the Commission's stay. Brief meet-
ings were held with the newly elected President and his
Minister of Foreign Affairs, but these ended on a sour note
when the Minister asked to see the Commission's credentials
and they could not be produced - Secretary Bryan having
leglected to provide any. After a week in the country, Gov-
3rnor Fort reported that the Commission was in full possession
)f the facts and stated that a longer stay would be unpro-
iuctive. He and Smith sailed from Port-au-Prince on March
.5, 1915t on the USS Nashville
. Minister Bailly-Blanchard
lid not accompany them, and apparently did not anticipate
Aryan's cable, after Fort had reported to President Wilson,
fhich stated, in parti "The President regrets to learn that
:he American Minister to Haiti has disregarded the ins true t-
ons given him by this Government and has not only failed to

perform his duty as a member of the Commission but has on
the contrary, used his influence to obstruct the work en-
trusted to the Commission. A full and immediate explanat-
ion of his attitude and the reasons therefore is requested . "16
'This severe reprimand apparently was more the result of
Governor Fort's ill-temper than anything done or left un-
ione by Bailly-Blanchard, for after a hasty trip to Wash-
ington and explanations, the American Minister was returned
bo his post. His absence would cause him to miss, however,
a moment of high drama in Haitian history.
In retrospect, the Fort mission was very poorly timed,
xnd it is doubtful that even the most skilled negotiator,
fhlch the Governor patently was not, could have achieved
President Wilson's ends. Having just assumed office, Sam
lad a breathing spell, albeit a short one, before the next
'evolution began. His most pressing financial problems
rere eased by large cash loans from his uncle, ex- President
;imon Sam, and by a lucky stroke the man he considered his
hief potential rival, Orestes Zamor, was arrested shortly
.fter entering Haiti from the Dominican Republic and thrown
nto prison at Port-au-Prince.
President Wilson was not of a mind to wait for the de-
elopment of a new Haitian crisis, however, and chose a new
nd more capable emissary in Paul Fuller, Jr., a member of
6. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
tate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
ecretary of State to Bailly-Blanchard, Cable, March 26, 1915,
icro Copy 610, Vol. 5.

a prominent New York law firm. Fuller, carrying credent-
|
ials as Presidential Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni-
I potentiary, arrived in Port-au-Prince in May, 1915, and
:
immediately set about to negotiate a treaty which skirted
the sensitive issue of American financial control. He had
detailed instructions from the President himself. The most
: memorable and, in the light of later American experience,
:most poignant part of those instructions ivas the admonition
that "only an honest and efficient government deserves
i
support. The Government of the United States could not
justify the expenditure of money or the sacrifice of Amer-
ican lives in support of any other kind of government
,
M1?
Such a government, of course, did not exist, and had never
existed in Haiti
.
Fuller's draft convention provided for the posting of
an American Minister Plenipotentiary to Haiti who would
advise the President of Haiti "as to such matters as effect
the honest and efficient administration of the Government,
the President of Haiti agreeing that he will follow the
advice so given to the extent of requiring honesty and
efficiency in officials and of removing those found to be
lishonest and inefficient." 18 (President Wilson later
-7. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
>tate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929 Pres-
'•nnv^iT^ ? Wl,l8 °n t0 ?aul Fuller ' Jr.. May 6, 1915, Microopy olU, Vol
, 5
,
f'^VV' ^Tati0nal Archives, Records of the Department of
•taoe Relating to Political Relations Between the United State-*d Haiti, 1910-1929, Paul Fuller to Secretary of State! cable?lay 22, 1915. Micro Copy 611, Vol. 1.

directed that "dishonest and inefficient" be changed to
read "dishonest or inefficient.") The question raised by
the section quoted is when does advice cease to be advice
and become something else? It would seem that that point
is reached when it is agreed to follow, in advance, the
"advice" given.
The draft convention contained four specific agree-
ments in addition to that cited above. These were» (1)
The Government of the United States of America will pro-
tect the Republic of Haiti from outside attack, and from
the aggression of any foreign power, and to that end will
employ such forces of the army and the navy of the United
States as may be necessary, (2) the Government of the
United States of America will aid the Government of the
Republic of Haiti to suppress insurrection from within and
will give effective support by the employment of the armed
forces of the United States army and navy to the extent
needed, (3) the President of the Republic of Haiti covenants
that no rights, privileges or facilities of any description
whatsoever will be granted, sold, leased or otherwise accorded
directly or indirectly by the Government of Haiti concerning
the occupation or use of the Mole St. Nicholas to any other
foreign Government or to a national or the nationals of any
other foreign Government, (k) the President of the Republic
of Haiti covenants that within six months from the signing
of this Convention, the Government of Haiti will enter into
an arbitration agreement for the settlement of such claims
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as American citizens or other foreigners may have against
the Government of Haiti, such arbitration agreement to
provide for the equal treatment of all foreigners to the
end that the people of Haiti may have the benefit of com-
petition between the nationals of all countries. ^9
Two major issues confronted Fuller in his discussions
with the Haitian Government. The first of these concerned
recognition, for though a special representative of the
United States was formally engaged in treaty negotiations
with the Sam Government, that Government had not been re-
cognized by the United States. Sam Insisted on recognition
before signing any treaty, and President Wilson just as
steadfastly insisted on a treaty before granting recognition.
;
0n May 28, 1°15» however, Bryan cabled that "the President
authorizes recognition before signing provided you have his
[Sam's] written promise to sign treaty immediately after
recognition. "2° The real stumbling block in the negotiations,
however, concerned the terms under which American military
forces would be permitted to operate in Haiti. It was the
contention of the Sam Government that American forces in
Haiti would have to withdraw at the first demand of the con-
stitutional authorities. To this Fuller would not agree,
stating that such a provision would in effect place the armed
19. U. S ., National Archives, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Political Relations Between the United States
and Haiti, 1910-1929, Paul Fuller to Secretary of State, Cable,
May 22, 1915» Micro Copy. 611, Vol. 1.
20
• l^id'» Secretary of State to Paul Fuller, Cable, May 28,
L915i Micro Copy 611, Vol. 1.
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forces of the United States at the beck and call of a
oreign government. Sam replied that while he himself
lid not doubt the good intentions of the United States,
ntervention was a very sensitive subject with the Haitian
>eople, and his counter- proposal on troop employment was
therefore a final one. On June 5* 1915. Fuller left Port-
u- Prince, the convention unsigned.
Meanwhile, revolution had broken out once more in the
orth, this time under the eccentric leadership of Dr. Ro-
alvo Bobo, a former minister in the Theodore government.
n June he took temporary control of Cape Haitian, looted
he customs house, and paraded the heads of several p-overn-
ilent officials through the streets. Threats were made to
brcibly remove refugees from the French consulate, and
.50
ailors were promptly landed from the French cruiser Des-
artes. Convinced that there was a widespread conspiracy
Ejainst him, Sam ordered sweeping arrests in Port-au-Prince
Etd nearly 200 opponents, many of them from the best Haitian
fimilies, were thrown into the National Prison. Foreign
Ligations and consulates, with the exception of the American,
N:re again filled to overflowing with those seeking asylum.
re deteriorating political situation, and more particularly
te landing of French sailors at the Cape, resulted in the
Bering of Commander Cruiser Squadron, then in Mexican waters,
; proceed at once to Haiti.
Thus it was that USS Washington, after a midnight pro-
f
:sionlng, got underway at the most unlikely hour of 2:25

A.M. on June 26, from Progreso, Mexico, and steaming on
16 boilers headed east across the Caribbean. After a brief
fuel stop at Guantanamo Bay, the armored cruiser continued
on to Cape Haitian, arriving there at 9; 27 in the morning
on July 1, 1915.
Within ten minutes after anchoring, a salute of 13 guns
was exchanged with the Descartes which, as Admiral Caperton
learned, had withdrawn its landing party a week earlier.
The French Commanding Officer placed himself at the Admiral's
iisposal, but in keeping with his instructions, Caperton
simply thanked him for his services and informed him that
le would henceforth assume responsibility for the safeguard-
.ng of foreign interests at the Cape.
With Consul Livingston the Admiral next conferred with
;he French Consul and the commander of the Haitian forces
n the city. He then announced that he would not permit any
'lghting in the city, and that any battles between the two
intending parties would have to be fought "well clear of
;own." This was necessary, he said, to carry out his orders
.0 ensure the protection of foreign life and property, and
e stated that he was prepared to land United States forces
f that should be required. He further proclaimed the im-
rtiality of the United States in the existing political
ifficulties. A copy of the Admiral's proclamation on this
atter was delivered to Dr. Bo'bo, then encamped on the out-
kirts of the city.





which arrived from Guantanamo after an over-
light anchorage at Port-au-Prince, where conditions seemed,
for the moment, stable.
On July 9, one officer and twenty-nine marines were
Landed by Washington to quell a disturbance in the town
and they remained there to set up a patrol of the streets.
Small detachments were posted at the American consulate, the
ailroad station, and the telegraph office. From then until
ruly 27. the two American ships maintained a close watch on
;he threatening situation at Cape Haitian. Eagle took on
oal and certain provisions, including: "48 garters, Peary
isle, 24 mouthpieces for clay pipes, 5,000 Melanchrino cig-
rettes, 432 Hershey almond bars, 72 packages of playing
ards," all carefully noted in the deck log. A marine pri-
ate °n Washington was sentenced to a bad conduct discharge
nd a loss of pay in the amount of £;68.80 for using excess-
vely obscene language (brilliantly recorded for posterity)
o the Corporal of the Guard, and on the same ship a lowly
oal passer was awarded a Deck Court Martial for "refusing
o obey a lawful order, in that he did, when ordered to get
! bucket of drinking water for the fireroom watch, refuse to
b so." 21 Discipline within the Cruiser Squadron was strict.
At about this same time, the Squadron legal officer
t.-obably prepared, for the Cruiser Squadron Commander, the
:-. U.S., National Archives, Record Group 24, USS Washington
Sld Uss Eagle deck logs, July 1915.

following untitled* undated memorandum.
Our duty in protecting American interests is
partly covered by [Navy] Regulations, Articles
1646-1647-1648-1649-1650
.
Under these articles we are duty bound to con-
fer with the diplomatic Consular representatives
in all cases where injury to the United States or
to its citizens thereof is committed or threatened,
in violation of the principles of international law
or treaty rights
.
The only treaties now existing between the United
States and Haiti are:
(a) A treaty of citizenship
(b) A treaty of extradition
(c) A treaty of arbitration
We have a right to land a force only on our in-
itiative when the rights of self-preservation are
involved. In the case of the United States it in-
cludes the protection of the State, its honor, and
its possessions; that is, for example, the Consulate
and its records and the lives and property of United
States citizens against the arbitrary violence, actual
or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may
suffer irreparable injury.
If we do land a force for this purpose, it must
only be used as a last resort and then only to the
extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish
the end required.
In all cases where forces are landed, especially
where the local authorities are unable to give adeauate
protection to life and property, the assent of such
authorities, or of some one of them, shall first be
obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the
interests involved. 22
In view of the circumstances surrounding Admiral Caperton's
Later armed landing at Port-au-Prince, it is important to note
;hat apparently his sole authority for taking that action was
Lrawn from the general instructions contained in Navy Regulat-
ons. Years later he would affirm that in testimony before a
lenate Select Committee investigating the intervention, and his
2. U. S., National Archives, Naval Records Collection, SubjectHe, Haiti, 1911-1927, Record Group 45.

operation plan for the Caribbean deployment contains
he statement that "the Commander of the Cruiser Squadron
ad no orders except to proceed to San Domingo City, Port-
ia- Prince, Havana, and the east coast of Mexico, for the
arpose of acquainting himself with the political situation
1 these countries ," 2 3 His frequent complaint in official
Dmmunications to the Navy Department during his operations
i Haitian waters was the silence of the Department con-
signing American policy toward Haiti. Admiral Caperton's
e of the forces at his disposal, though no doubt influenced
{ discussions with American diplomatic and consular re-
resentatives, was accordingly predicated largely on his
rofessional judgement and interpretation of his duty to
ifeguard American life and property. Such latitude, ex-
mding even to armed intervention in the affairs of a
>reign state, is almost inconceivable in the context of
>dern-day communications, contingency planning, and strict
vilian control of the military.
The Admiral's attempt to apply "Marquis of Queensbury"
lies to Haitian revolutionary activity, relatively success-
il in the earlier Sam revolution and in moderating Bobo's
jrrorism at the Cape, failed to forestall the savage climax
Haiti* s era of ephemeral governments, which was played out
i the capital, Port-au-Prince, on July 27-28, 1915, at a rare
•ment when no foreign warship stood guard in the harbor.
;
.
U. S., National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Sub-
ct File, Haiti, 1911-1927, Record Group ^5.
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The following narrative has been pieced together from sev-
eral contemporary sources, but draws principally on the
Dfficial report of the American Charge" d* Affaires in Port-
au-Prince at the fall of the Sam Government, Mr. R .B
. Davis,
Jr.^
From what has been written thus far about Haitian re-
solutions, it may be seen that they ordinarily followed a
/ell defined pattern with certain variations brought about
>y the unexpected death in office of the President. An
'army" of dissidents would gather in a place remote from the
;apital, usually in the north, and after an almost leisurely
>rocession to Port-au-Prince, arrive at the seat of govern-
lent to find the old administration embarked or in diplomatic
sylum. The revolutionary army^s General would then be pro-
laimed the new President of the Republic. This was the se-
uence Admiral Caperton expected the Bobo revolution to follow,
ut early in the morning on July 2?, 1915, a group of 50 or
ore revolutionaries, led by Charles de Delva, suddenly broke
heir asylum in foreign legations in Port-au-Prince and attacked
he presidential palace, having secured the control of the
achine guns commanding the palace grounds. This they apparently
scomplished by enrolling sympathizers in the palace guard,
irer a period of several months. In the attack the guard was
^uted, with a loss of perhaps 50 killed and some 200 wounded.
*-. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
-ate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929, R .B
.
ivis, Jr. to Secretary of State, Memorandum, January 12, 1916
-cro Copy 610, vol. 6.
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President Sam and several of his officers succeeded in
barricading themselves in the palace, but it soon became
evident that the revolutionists were determined to burn them
out. Several smaller buildings on the palace grounds were
put to the torch and oil had been sent for to use in firing
the palace itself. Taking advantage of heavy smoke from
:he burning buildings and temporary confusion in the re-
volutionary ranks, Sam made a sudden dash for an iron gate
.n the wall which separated the palace grounds from the
rench Legation compound. with admirable presence of mind
^e brought with him from the palace the huge key which opened
he gate, but the iron lock had rusted shut. His potential
ssassins hard on his heels, he then scaled the 20-foot wall
n a burst of superhuman energy. At the top of the wall a
hot from his pursuers struck him in the leg, and he fell
the ground on the French Legation side of the wall. There
13 was assisted into the Legation by Charles Zamor, who for
urne months had himself found asylum in the Legation from
lam's own police.
Meanwhile, at the National Prison, a wholesale slaughter
16? political prisoners had been carried out, apparently
1 Sam's prior instructions to General Oscar Etienne should
' (Sam) be driven from the palace. Among those brutally
eked to death in the prison courtyard was ex-President
•estes zamor, the brother of Charles. The prisoners, al-
st without exception, were members of Slite Port-au-Prince
lilies, when news of what had happened leaked out, the
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streets became filled with enraged and grieving people.
General Oscar, who had taken refuge in the Dominican Leg-
ation following the massacre, was discovered there by the
father of three boys slain at the prison. Oscar was dragged
into the street, shot and mutilated, and his body left lying
in the gutter before the Legation. So intense was the feel-
ing of the people against Oscar that no one could be found
to carry his body away for burial and it lay where it fell,
to be spat upon by passers-by, until the following day when
Lt was saturated with oil and burned on the spot.
In the meantime an enormous crowd of hysterical people
lad gathered in the vicinity of the National Prison. Every-
where one looked little processions could be seen, led by
:wo men carrying on a plank the body of one of the victims,
followed by friends and relatives whose curses against the
resident mingled with those of the people who stood in the
treets and watched. It is not clear just how it became
enerally known that the massacre was the result of an order
iven by Sam, but there seemed to be a conviction in every-
ne's mind that the President was personally responsible for
he death of the prisoners. The French Minister, Mr. Girard,
lmself a mulatto, sent urgent requests to the American and
ritish Charge's d'Affaires that they come to the French Leg-
ation and render such assistance as they could should an
ittempt be made to forcibly remove the President. Minister
lirard was gravely concerned for the safety of his wife and
«o young daughters, who were then with him at the Legation.
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Both Charges sent despatches requesting the presence
of warships, and proceeded at once to the French Legation.
There they found that the President had been joined in
asylum by his wife and several of their small children,
the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Relations, several
officers of the army, and numerous servants. President
Sam was in a perfect frenzy of fear, creeping about the
house like a hunted animal, so terror stricken that when
He passed an open window he would crawl on all fours for
fear that someone on the outside would see him and shoot
.iim. During the afternoon disorganized mobs entered the
Legation grounds on several occasions and were, with great
lifficulty, dispersed. Toward evening, however, the street
outside the Legation became nearly deserted.
Just before nightfall a friend of the two Ministers
seeking refuge in the Legation came and after some con-
versation all three men departed. That the Ministers chose
;he hazards of passing unharmed through the city rather
;han the safety of the Legation convinced the American
'harge*, Mr. Davis, that there were plans afoot to enter
;he Legation that night and remove the President. He and
lis British colleague, Mr. Kohn, agreed to stay with Minister
rirard throughout the night.
In spite of their apprehensions, the long night passed
neventfully and through mid-morning of the next day, July
8, absolute calm prevailed in the city. Things seemed so
ulet that Davis decided to risk a quick visit to the Amer-
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ican Legation to see if a reply to his despatch of the day
before had been received. The British Charge1 agreed to
await Davis 8 return before making a similar check at his
(Legation. About an hour after Davis left, however, Mr.
£ohn, convinced that the continued quiet in the city made
lis presence at the French Legation unnecessary, also de-
parted, without waiting for Davis • return.
In the meantime a doctor had been brought to the Leg-
ition to treat the President's leg wound, which was determ-
ined to be not serious. The wound was dressed and treated
,dth a liberal application of pungent iodoform. Sam then
-eturned to his hiding place within the Legation, the Min-
.ster's private bathroom which led off the second floor
laster bedroom. The door to the bathroom was cleverly con-
•ealed, at Madame Girard's suggestion, by placing the Min-
ster's huge, high-backed bedstead in front of it. The
irards then retired to the Legation sitting room, which
an completely through, from front to back, the large house,
oth doors to the sitting room were unbarred and open, so
hat the front and back gates to the Legation grounds, at
he end of very long gravel driveways, could be constantly
bserved
.
Unbeknown to the French Minister, however, a mob of
ome 80 men had already entered an adjoining property at
he side of the Legation and were even then scaling the
all. They were on the Legation porch in an instant and
espite frantic efforts by the Girards to bar their doors

the men forced their way in and demanded that the French
Minister surrender the person of the President. Girard
courageously refused. A quick search of the Legation failed
to uncover Sam's hiding place. A servant, who had the mis-
Tortune to resemble the President, was almost killed on the
spot before being able to persuade his attackers of his true
dentity. Once more Sam's surrender was demanded of Girard,
ind once more it was refused. A second and more thorough
search began, and it is possible that this too might have
'ailed, were it not for the strong scent of iodoform which
it last betrayed the presence of the wounded President. The
Minister's bed was roughly shoved aside, the heretofore con-
ealed door broken down, and Sam, slashed several times in
he face, dragged by his heels down the stairs and out of
he Legation before the eyes of his wife and children. Loudly
creaming his innocence of any connection with the massacre
t the prison, he was kicked and shoved the length of the
riveway. At one point he hooked his arm through the spokes
f a parked carriage in a vain attempt to free himself from
is captors. A blow from a club broke his arm and he was
breed nearer the gate, beyond which he could now see a raging,
banting mob. The gate, of iron and spiked at the top, was
acked and Sam's abductors attempted to throw him over the
ate to the impatient mob on the other side. His body caught,
:artlally impaled, on the spikes at the top, and from there




Mr. Davis, meanwhile, had reached the American Legation
Lhere he read a telegram stating that the Washington would
arrive in Port-au-Prince that morning, and in fact he could
already make out the lines of the warship on the horizon as
Lt prepared to enter the harbor. As he retraced his path
:o the French Legation, his ear caught one terrific howl of
'ury from that direction and he quickened his pace, convinced
tfiat something terrible was on the verge of happening. As
te turned into the street which ran by the French Legation,
Is way was suddenly blocked by a mass of people which com-
lately filled the street from wall to wall. He could see
jhat something or somebody was on the ground in the center
f the crowd just before the gate of the Legation, and a
joment later a man disentangled himself from the crowd and
ushed howling by him, with a severed hand from which the
lood was dripping, the thumb of which he had stuck in his
Duth. Behind that man came other men, with the feet, the
fcher hand, the head, and other parts of the fallen Presi-
bnt displayed on poles, each followed by a mob of scream-
ig men and women. The trunk of Sam's mutilated body came
ist, at the end of a rope as it was dragged through the
:reet
.
This was the procession viewed in part by Admiral Cap-
'ton through binoculars from the bridge of the Washington





"In searching history one finds the stories of
certain small nations which other powerful nat-
ions have only been able to overcome by practi-
cally annihilating them. This task has always
proved long and difficult, and in the end proved
a fatal tax on the conquerors. In view of this
it would be prudent, very prudent, not to under-
take such a task in the twentieth century, and
under the eyes of the Civilized World. And not
only because this task would today as well as
yesterday, be long, difficult and in the end of
fatal cost to the one attempting it, but because
now more than ever it would be ignoble, base and
criminal ."
- Rosalvo Bobo, Graduate in Law and Medicine at





fcl. The Establishment of American Control
.
For foreigners the situation was extremely critical.
The foreign legations, up to this time, had never
been invaded, but the invasion of the Dominican Leg-
ation, where General Oscar had taken refuge, followed
the next day by the invasion of the French, took away
this last safeguard against violence from the natives.
The ignorant classes, having seen these legations
violated with apparently no evil results to the invad-
ers, could not be expected to respect their inviol-
ability as they had in the past} and as a result there
remained no place of safety, nor was there any Haitian
authority which could be looked to for protection.
- Robert Beale Davis, Jr., American Charge^ d , Affaires,
Port-au-Prince.
The Washington anchored shortly before noon on July 28,
:?15» and as soon as a boat could be lowered an armed party
ias sent ashore to escort the French Minister and the Amer-
ican and British Charge's for a hurried meeting with Admiral
aperton on board the flagship. All of the diplomats urged
tie immediate landing of an American force to restore some
egree of sanity to the chaotic Haitian capital and to safe-
aard foreign interests. Minister Girard was particularly
nportunate, stating his fears for his wife and daughters,
lone and defenseless in the French Legation. At the con-
Lusion of this meeting, the Admiral was convinced of the
ecessity for sending his forces ashore without delay, but
3 still took the time to formally notify General Polynice
id several other members of a hastily formed Committee of
Jblic Safety ashore of his intentions. General Polynice,




The French Minister and the two Charges left the ship
it ^ilO P.N. and, perhaps as much for the desired effect
jshore as for protocol, a 17 gun salute was fired in honor
(f the senior diplomat. At 4 $5° P.M. Washington's landing
]arty, consisting of two companies of marines and three
ompanies of seamen, all under the command of Captain George
^n Orden, USMC, was landed at Bizoton, a defunct naval
2*rd about a mile southeast of the center of Port-au-Prince.
he total strength of the landing party was 3^0 officers
nd men. The marines had of course been sent ashore on
timerous earlier occasions, both in Haiti and in Mexico,
Ut the bluejacket battalion had never before been landed
ather for duty or for drill.
The flagship's guns were manned during the landing,
tit fire support was not called for by Captain Van Orden.
b split his landing force into two parallel columns and
arched them into the center of the city, disarming all
Uitian soldiers encountered on the way. Scattered shots
ure exchanged and two Haitians were killed and ten wounded.
here were no American casualties. A considerable amount
' arms and ammunition was seized. Guards were posted at
he foreign legations and, at nightfall, bivouacs were made.
Unitary conditions at the principal bivouac area, the
:mtral market, are recorded in a report made to the Bureau
Medicine and Surgery by the medical officer who accom-
inied the landing party ashore.

. .
. Against the protest of the Medical Officer the
Seamen's Battalion and the ship's company of Marines
were made to bivouac in the filthiest and most un-
sanitary place in the city. The floor of the market-
place, a square building roofed-over but open at the
sides except for a low brick wall, was covered with
filth} triturated dried human excrement? dust fouled
with spits fruit skins? banana stems? and in one
place a shallow pool of foul smelling water was pre-
sent. The whole place was pervaded with a heavy
odor, worse than a stable, and more like an open air
privy. The posts, inside, which supported the roof,
smelt heavily of dried urine. (It is a habit of these
Haitian negroes to urinate and defecate wherever they
find a convenient place.) It was in this place that
the men were obliged to stay overnight and, in fact,
until the middle of the following afternoon. The
sailors, of course, had no cots to lie on. Cots for
the Marines arrived about 2 A ,M . The majority of the
men got no sleep that night, preferring to sit on the
curb or against the wall rather than lie in the filth.
In this place were absolutel3r no facilities for the
men to police themselves. There was no urinal or
privy accessible in the vicinity, neither was there
any water obtainable for any purpose
.
Water from the ship arrived about 5 A.M. The dis-
tribution of it was not properly supervised by a
petty-officer. Breakers were rolled on the dirty
floor and subsequently opened with only a mechanical
cleansing around the bungholes . The hospital corps
endeavored to supervise further handling of the break-
ers, propping them off the floor, and sterilizing
around the bungholes with carbolic acid...-';
Sanitation, the sailors were quick to learn, was not a
laitian long suit. The city water system, of French colon-
.al vintage, was contaminated at hundreds of points where
rater mains had been broken into to form crude public "wells"
diich then received the plentiful effluvia from the streets.
?igs, chickens, and ducks roamed the town almost at will,
U.S., National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Sub-
ject File, Haiti, 1911-1927, Record Group 45. P .A . Surgeon




nd a foul-smelling gutter in front of the American Leg-
tion was a favorite wallowing place for hogs nominally the
roperty of the Haitian President. The water in the harbor
tself was so bad that most ships* captains refused to use
t even for scrubbing decks
.
Sanitary conditions ashore were not the only problems
aced by the naval landing party, however. Their equipment
as grossly inadequate. Packs (quickly dubbed "mankillers"
)
•at into shoulders. Sailors' shoes were not designed for
iDng marches, and their uniforms (sailor whites, dyed brown)
<Ld not hold up well under rough use. They suffered from
!isects and crawling vermin. Their most regrettable weak-
I3ss was their lack of training for the duties they were
assigned ashore. This was underscored on the night of Jan-
ury 29 » when two members of the bluejacket battalion were
finned down in the street outside their bivouac by their
<«i shipmates firing wildly in the dark. The arrival of
flditional marines permitted the gradual withdrawal of the
ailors and their return to more customary duties afloat.
1\e USS Jason brought a company of marines from Guantanamo
ci July 29 i the USS Connecticut landed the Second Marine
ligiment on August 4, and USS Tennessee arrived with the
I.rst Marine Regiment on August 15. This brought the total
nirlne strength in Haiti to 88 officers and 1941 enlisted.
Tie last of Washington'
s
bluejacket battalion was embarked
1 August 18, 1915.
Throughout the initial period of the occupation, there

J.W7"
ms little fighting. Admiral Caperton at first had the
judging support of the Committee of Public Safety, it-
«lf pledged to the candidacy of Dr. Bobo, who, as the
."^ader of the most recent revolution, was considered to
13 Sam's logical successor. The Admiral's Chief of Staff,
(iptain Edward L. Beach, who represented the Cruiser Squad-
:Dn Commander in political negotiations ashore, was not
.'iipressed with Bobo's qualifications for high office, and
te passed his observations to the Admiral who in turn sent
nem on to Washington where they eventually reached Presi-
dent Wilson in virtually the same language couched by Cap-
ain Beach. Bobo was pictured as an inflamatory and per-
!aps deranged self-seeker, with decided anti-American senti-
:ents . This assessment of Bobo was not kept a secret by
he Admiral or his Chief of Staff and led to an early and
pen break with Bobo's supporters in the Committee.
The landing of American forces had been decided upon
y roughly 4 P.M. on July 28, and the landing itself was
ccomplished less than an hour later. Admiral Caperton in-
ormed the Navy Department of his action immediately, but
ashington's orders to land were not received on board the
lagship until almost six hours after American Intervention
ad become a fait accompli
. There is little doubt, however,
hat intervention had already been decided upon by Presi-
ent Wilson, and that American policy was to accomplish that
ntervention at the first favorable opportunity. Paul Fuller's
•eport to the President concerning his unsuccessful attempt
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:o negotiate a treaty was quite specific in its recommend-
ation to land marines for the purpose of establishing an
lonest and efficient administration. He viewed that as a
lecessary first step in securing a treaty along the lines
)f the Piatt Amendment, and stated his belief that only an
American occupation could effect a permanent change in Haiti's
.ntolerable political condition. 2 The Division of Latin Amer-
.can Affairs fully concurred with Fuller's report. Presi-
lent Wilson's comment on the report was that "it gives me
i great deal of concern. Action is evidently necessary and
10 doubt it would be a mistake to postpone it long. "3 At
;his same moment there was decided diplomatic pressure from
prance for American intervention. The French Embassy in
Washington informed the Wilson administration that it was
irgently desired that the United States take energetic action
.n Haiti} that if she did, France would look with approval
>n her action and be willing to support her in every way
Provided that a just recognition of French claims in Haiti
)e made} that should the action taken not be energetic, but
jomposed of half-way measures, France would not look on it
*lth such approval.
1. U. S. ( National Archives, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929, Paul
duller, Jr., to President Woodrow Wilson, Report, June 14,
L915i Micro Copy 610, Vol. 5.
\* I Dl fl« , President Woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State,
•lemorandum, July 2, 1915, Micro Copy 610, Vol. 5.
K Ibid
. ,
Internal Memorandum of Division of Latin American
Iffairs, February 26, 1927, Micro Copy 610, Vol. 20.
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In spite of what has been recounted above, Admiral
Caperton's landing of American forces in Haiti caught the
Wilson administration essentially unprepared. The be-
lated order from Washington to land stated that foreign
interests should be protected and that the representatives
of England and France were to be informed of that fact
and asked not to land forces of their own. On July 29.
Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote to the Secretary
of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, that "under no circumstances
should he [Caperton] withdraw American marines from Haitian
territory until 1 have had an opportunity of conferring
with you. "5 For more than a week Admiral Caperton's pleas
for a statement of American policy went unanswered while,
with a great deal of evident soul-searching, that policy
was formulated in Washington
.
Advice to the President and the Secretary of State
poured in from many predictable sources. Governor Fort
suggested that the Haitian cacos (irregular soldiers) be
lisarmed through the simple technique of buying their rifles
Tor a dollar or two each. So great was the cacos need for
noney now that the Americans had ended the revolutionary
Profession, he asserted, it seemed quite probable that within
thirty days the government could be the owner of all the
irms in Haiti if his suggestion were put into effect. (The
5. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
State Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929. Sec-
retary of State to Secretary of the Navy, Memorandum, July
30, 1915, Micro Copy 610, Vol. 6.
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Occupation authorities did in fact later pursue such a
policy with marked success.) From Mr. James P. McDonald,
Df the Haitian National Railroad, came a long letter com-
prising his views of what should be done in Haiti. He
recommended a Provisional President for Haiti who would
then be charged with the negotiation of a treaty giving
the United States control of Haitian finances and the right
bo employ its armed forces to still rebellion. After the
signing of the treaty, a permanent President would be chosen
;o replace the Provisional President, who, after his role
.n the making of the treaty, would be so unpopular that he
jould no longer be effective. Mr. R ,L . Farnham of the Nat-
.onal City Bank hurried to Washington to confer with Robert
Lansing, but the latter, as opposed to his predecessor, Mr.
Sryan, was not so enamored of Farnham' s reasoned argument
>r persuaded of the cleanness of his hands when it came to
[aiti. Of all those who had the President's ear, either
Lirectly or indirectly through Lansing in the days lmmed-
ately following the landing of American forces, Paul Fuller,
r., appears to have been most influential. He argued that
.11 governmental functions in Haiti should be taken over by
;he United States and confided to the War Department, pend-
ng an honest election and the establishment of a responsible
Haitian Government.
The legality of the American landing in Haiti, under the
'onstitution, worried President Wilson, and the Division of
atin American Affairs, quoting liberally from a 1912 memo-
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randum prepared by J. Reuben Clark, presented its views on
;he subject. (Mr. Clark, ironically, was destined to be the
mthor of a much more famous memorandum in 1928 expressing
i philosophy somewhat divergent from that which follows.)
Inasmuch as the use in foreign countries of the
military forces of the government for the purpose
of protecting American life and property therein
situated does not amount to an act of war or to a
declaration of war, it is doubtful if Congress has
authority directly to control such use....
It appears unnecessary to elaborate any argu-
ment going to show that the President as Chief Ex-
ecutive is, under the Constitution, primarily charged
with the conduct of our foreign relations, including
the protection of the lives and property of our citi-
zens abroad, save in so far as the Constitution ex-
pressly vests a part of these functions in some other
branch of government (for example, the participation
of the Senate in the making of Treaties)... .
Under this general right to protect American citi-
zens, their property, etc., it is thought that prac-
tical intervention does not constitute an act of war,
but purposes to render to Haiti friendly services, or
acts not amounting to war. If this intervention can
accomplish the re-establishment of a government which
can maintain peace in Haiti and can leave in the hands
of the United States Government or of American citizens,
the financial control, that is, in the form of the
collection of customs and the disbursement of public
funds received from all sources of national income,
it is thought that such a reorganization would bring
to Haiti that stability which is indispensable to its
proper future development .6
It stretches the imagination to conceive "practical in-
tervention" carried to the extent of achieving complete fi-
ancial control as not constituting an act of war. Further,
ustifying the intervention on the grounds that it was nec-
.
U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
;tate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929, Latin
.merican Affairs Division to Secretary of state, Memorandum,
ugust 5, 1915. Mcro Copy 610, Vol. 7,
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jssary for the protection of American lives and property
.s difficult, for the fact is that throughout Haiti's
^evolutionary miseries American lives and property were
'emarkably well respected. It goes without saying, however,
;hat that respect was almost certainly due to the threat
>f heavy retaliation, a threat quietly Imposed by the almost
constant presence of American warships in Haitian waters
.
Lansing, despite the solicited and unsolicited advice
showered upon him, found the situation in Haiti immediately
ifter the landing both distressing and perplexing. There
:eemed to be no excuse, no grounds for reprisal as there
tad been at Vera Cruz, for the continued presence of American
'orces ashore. The justification eventually accepted and
•fferred to President Wilson was that it was the humane duty
»f the occupying forces to furnish the means to relieve
amine conditions in Port-au-Prince and other Haitian cities,
f naval authorities were directed to take over the collect-
on of customs on imports and exports, funds realized might
•e expended for the relief of starving people. Conditions
rere indeed grim in Haiti as a result of years of revolut-
onary disruption, and Admiral Caperton reported that women
nd children were actually dying in the streets of Port-au-
'rince from hunger. He requested relief funds from the
avy Department and received from Josephus Daniels the terse
irection to "inform influential Haitians no funds available
or supplying food. Suggest they form proper organized re-
ief society and if possible devise some scheme for work.

--L-O-
;f necessary you are authorized furnish what provisions
rou can spare at Navy rates. Great danger of encouraging
.dleness should be kept continually in mind."' There were,
)f course, no influential Haitians with the slightest in-
terest in forming societies for the relief of the starving
lasses
.
On August ^, 1915» President Wilson, with misgivings,
lade his decision.
My dear Mr. Secretary*
These are serious matters and my own judgement
is as much perplexed as yours.
I fear we have not the legal authority to do
what we apparently ought to do, and that if we did
do what is necessary it would constitute a case
very like that of Mr. Roosevelt's action in Santo
Domingo, and have very much the same issue.
I suppose there is nothing for it but to take
the bull by the horns and restore order. A long
programme
. .
. involves legislation and the co-
operation of the Senate in treaty-making, and must
therefore await the session of our Congress.
In the meantime this is plain to met
1. We must send to Port-au-Prince a force suffi-
cient to absolutely control the city not only but
also the country immediately about it from which it
draws its food. I would be obliged if you would
ascertain from the Secretary of the Navy whether he
has such a force available that can reach there soon.
(This will probably involve making the city author-
ities virtually subordinate to our commander. They
may hand the city government over to us voluntarily.)
2. We must let the present Congress know that we
will protect it but that we will not recognize any
action on its part which does not put men in charge
of affairs whom we can trust to handle and put an
end to revolution.
3. We must give all who now have authority there
7
. Secretary of the Navy to Commander Cruiser Squadron, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet, Despatch, August 3, 1915» Admiral William B.
:aperton Papers, MSS Division, Library of Congress.
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or who desire to have it or who think they have it
or are about to have it to understand that we shall
take steps to prevent the payment of debts contracted
to finance revolutions: in other words, that we con-
sider it our duty to insist upon constitutional gov-
ernment there and will, if necessary (that is, if they
force us to it as the only way) take charge of elect-
ions and see that a real government is erected which
we can support...
§
Upon receipt of the above, Robert Lansing went about
;he business of drafting detailed instructions to Admiral
laperton and Charge* d* Affaires Davis to implement the Pres-
dent's decision. The Naval General Board reaffirmed its
>osltion of a year earlier concerning Mole St. Nicholas
md Lansing included in the draft of his instruction to
.dmiral Caperton a statement to the effect that the United
itates disavowed any intention to seek the cession of the
[ole for a naval base. This statement, however, was deleted
>y the President himself who substituted words to the effect
hat the question of the cession of Mole St. Nicholas would
»e taken up at a later date with the reorganized Haitian
overnment.9 This does not, however, mean that the President
ntertained any sinister desires for Haitian territory, though
hat was the interpretation placed upon his wording by later
ritics of the intervention. Almost certainly he was simply
xpressing Yankee shrewdness by not giving away a valuable
. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
tate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929* Pres-
dent Woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State, August 4, I9I5,
icro Copy 610, Vol. 6.
• 1^-1^* Woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State, August 9, 1915,
icro Copy 610, Vol. 6.
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;ard in advance of treaty negotiations.
In the meantime, Admiral Caperton and his Chief of
Staff, Captain Beach, were caught up in the whirlpool of
laitian politics. There were two major factions hoping to
lame Sam's successor in office. The Committee of Public
Safety, representing the latest revolutionists, backed
3obo, while the Congress, then in session, leaned toward
judre Dartiguenave, the President of the Senate. There
.s little doubt but that for the presence of American forces,
events would have taken their normal course in Haiti and
tobo would have been elected handily. To be sure, Congress
jlected the President, but Congress had never before stood
n the way of a general whose cacos were in the streets of
ort-au- Prince. Bobo's open anti-Americanism made him quite
acceptable to both the Admiral and Mr. Davis, and both
:ent uncomplimentary reports concerning his character to
;heir superiors in Washington. Captain Beach held frequent
leetings ashore with representatives of both factions, and
radually became convinced that Dartiguenave was indeed a
ara avis - a reasonably honest Haitian politician. It seems
ikely that Mr. Furniss, the ex-Minister, helped persuade
im of that, for several meetings with Dartiguenave took place
•t Furniss 1 house. The same despatches that damned Bobo,
oon began to praise Dartiguenave, especially in view of the
atter's willingness to grant the United States everything
t could conceivably want in a future settlement, including




On August 6, 1915 t Admiral Caperton gave orders that
ill Haitian soldiers not living in Port-au-Prince were to
Leave the city, and within a few hours of his announcement
larines began to arrest those who remained. There was some
resistance and two Haitians were killed. This move, made
)Ossible by the reinforcement of the landing party by the
>econd Marine Regiment, broke the back of the Bobo move-
lent. The next day, August 7, he received from the Navy
)epartment its first statement of policy. He was directed
.0 conciliate the Haitian people and to ensure them that
he United States had no intention of keeping its forces
n Haiti any longer than absolutely necessary to effect the
e-establishment of a stable and firm government by the
aitian people. This was followed, on August 9» by an extra-
rdinary despatch which stated, among other things, "when-
ver the Haitians wish you may permit the election of a Pres-
dent to take place. The election of Dartiguenave is pre-
erred by the United States."10
More precise instructions were sent to the American
'barge* d* Affaires. Davis was directed to confer with the
.imiral and in a manner as best determined by the two of
.iem, ensure that the following was made unmistakably clear
"D the leading Haitian politicians.
"). Acting Secretary of the Navy to Commander Cruiser Squadron,
I. S. Atlantic Fleet, Despatch, August 9, 1915, Admiral will-
bm B. Caperton Papers, MSS Division, Library of Congress.
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Firstx Let Congress understand that the Government
of the United States intends to uphold it, but that
it cannot recognize action which does not establish
in charge of Haitian affairs those whose abilities
and dispositions give assurances of putting an end
to factional disorders.
Second: In order that no misunderstanding can possi-
bly occur after election, it should be made perfectly
clear to candidates as soon as possible and in advance
of their election, that the United States expects to
be intrusted with the practical control of the customs
and such financial control over the affairs of the
Republic of Haiti as the United States may deem
necessary for an efficient administration.
The Government of the United States considers it
its duty to support a constitutional Government,
It means to assist in the establishing of such a
Government, and to support it as long as necessity
may require. It has no design upon the political
or territorial integrity of Haiti? on the contrary,
what has been done, as well as what will be done,
is conceived in an effort to aid the people of Haiti
in establishing a stable Government and in maintain-
ing domestic peace throughout the Republic .-*•*-
The above was passed almost verbatim by Captain Beach
o all Senators and Deputies at an informal meeting early
'i August 11, 1915 • Charg£ d' Affaires Davis was present at
hat meeting and further explained the demands which would
*s made of the reorganized Haitian Government by the United
;tates. Later that day, the Committee of Public Safety, in
< last effort to prevent the imminent election of Dartiguen-
ire t ordered the Congress dissolved and sent soldiers to
J3al the doors of the Chambers. This move was anticipated
V the American authorities, however, and marines shooed the
J)ldiers away from the Chambers. Captain Beach then con-
3-. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
£;ate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
^cretary of State to R ,B . Davis, Despatch, August 10, 1915,
Kcro copy 610, vol. 6.
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fronted the Committee and ordered it dissolved, stating
that its further continuance would cause its members to be
considered public enemies and rebels against the United
States
.
On August 12, with Captain Beach on the floor of the
laitian Chambers, Sudre Dartiguenave was elected President
)f Haiti, gathering 9^ of the 116 votes that were cast.
Immediately after the votes were tallied, enthusiastic
;heering broke out among the Delegates. The President-
tlect made a brief speech in which he thanked the American
orces for their presence, and when he left the Chambers
or the ceremonial ride to the palace, Admiral Caperton's
hief of Staff rode in the presidential carriage with him.
f the Haitian capital on the day of the election, Beach
rote: "Everything quiet. Port-au-Prince had the appearance
f being owned in fee simple by U. S. Marines."-1-2 The
eather observation for the day, as recorded in the deck
og of USS Washington , was "stormy,"
Z , U. S. f National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Sub-
set File, Haiti, 1911-1927, Record Group 45, Captain Edward




The strongest is never strong enough to be always
the master, unless he transforms strength into
right, and obedience into duty.
- Rousseau, The Social Contract.
For the first time in more years than most people then
Living in Haiti could remember, Haiti had a president who
lid not owe his election to a revolutionary faction. To be
sure, the election of Dartiguenave could by no stretch of the
imagination be called democratic, and he was, in a manner of
speaking, a creature of the United States military inter-
rention. But, depending upon the wisdom and justice of the
Americans, his election brought hope to a people who for
lany generations had seemed to live without it.
On election day, August 12, 1915* &n American military
;overnment was set up at Cape Haitian, and in the next few
.ays the towns of St. Marc, Pe'tionville, and Le*ogane were
•ccupied. An exulting Chief of Staff noted in his manu-
•cript i
Hark, hark, the dogs do bark,
The Cacos are leaving the towns.
All in rags and some in tags,
But none in velvet gowns.
1
On August 1?, Captain Beach formally introduced the
.
U. S., National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Sub-
ect File, Haiti, 1911-1927, Record Group kS t Captain Edward
<• Beach, undated and untitled Manuscript.
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toierican Charge" d' Affaires to President Dartiguenave, whose
government had not yet been recognized by the United States,
4r. Davis delivered to the President a draft of the pro-
Dosed treaty between the United States and Haiti, and he
requested that the Haitian Congress pass a resolution with-
mt delay authorizing the President to enter into negot-
.ations. Dartiguenave reaffirmed his intentions to give
:he United States everything that it desired in the treaty,
uid stated his belief that the Haitian Congress would inter-
)ose no serious objections.
The very next day, however, the Secretary of the Navy
lirected Admiral Caperton to take charge of the Haitian
customs service, and to use the funds collected "for or-
;anizing and maintaining an efficient constabulary, for
;onducting such temporary public works as will afford
mmediate relief to the discharged soldiers and starving
>opulace by giving them employment, and finally for the
lupport of the Dartiguenave Government ."2 This action,
rhich struck the Haitians at a most sensitive point, boded
11 for the successful conclusion of treaty negotiations,
h August 21, the customs house at Cape Haitian was taken
ver, and by September 2, with the taking over of the cus-
toms collection at Port-au-Prince, the operation was com-
plete
. Navy Paymasters, at first from the ships of the
.
U, S., National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Sub-
ect File, Haiti, 1911-192?, Hecord Group 45, Secretary of
he Navy to Commander Cruiser Squadron, U.S. Atlantic Fleet,




;ruiser Squadron, and later ordered to this duty from the
Jnited States, assumed office at each Haitian port as
:ollector of Customs and Captain of the Port. Untrained
ind almost entirely unprepared for such service, the Pay-
lasters brought to this unusual assignment a spirit of
.nnovation and honest administration that almost overnight
transformed the Haitian Customs Service.
An "Admiral Caperton Account" was opened at the National
jank of Haiti, and into this account were paid all funds
;ollected by the Paymasters. Military commanders were then
luthorized to draw on this account under two appropriations:
Public Works," and "Military and Civil Government of United
States Forces." Great leeway was granted in the administrat-
on of the accounts, and relatively large sums were expended
n the purchase of arms from the cacos - as Governor Fort
.ad recommended to President Wilson.
One particular evil of long standing in the Haitian
conomy prior to the American intervention was a wildly
luctuating foreign exchange rate. During the first months
f the U.S. Navy°s administration of the customs service
fixed rate of five gourdes to the dollar was established,
n officer who participated in this stabilization wrote
hat it was vigorously opposed by Haitians quoting the best
rench economists, who tried to show that the Paymasters
ere ignorant of financial laws and were attempting to
ccomplish the impossible. The exchange rate was stabi-




rgument against this American action was that of the Hait-
iin Minister of Finance, who said that his friends were
escustomed to seeing the exchange rate fluctuate, that they
c>unted on it, and that it was an economic crime to ruin
tieir business .3
At the time of the seizure of customs control, the
jiblic debt of Haiti was estimated to be as follows t (a)
ternal debt, about $20,000,000 (market value $16,000,000)}
(>) Internal debt, about $2,250,000 (market value #1,625,
C>0) j (c) Floating debt (interest guarantees, etc.) $2,250,
C»0. The entire debt was secured, in one way or another,
t liens on the customs revenue. It became a policy of the
Ccupation authorities to give priority to the rapid re-
trement of the public debt, a policy which may have had
a prolonged depressing influence on the growth of the Hait-
in economy.
While the Paymasters were at work reorganizing the
c stoms service, Admiral Caperton sought to have the treaty
poposal accepted by the Haitian Government. President
Drtiguenave, as previously noted, seemed agreeable from
te start, but the American takeover of the customs service
i advance of negotiations resulted in sharp resistance to
te treaty within the Haitian Congress. Under the Consti tut-
in, ratification was required by both the Chamber of Deputies
3 Captain Charles Conard, (SC), USN, MA Year in Haiti's
Cstoms and Fiscal Service," U.S. Naval Institute Proceed-
ings, vol. 49, No. 4, April, 1923.
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m& the Senate. Failure of the Haitians to immediately
accept the treaty proposals, which went considerably be-
fond those offered by Paul Fuller prior to the intervent-
ion, was viewed by some American officials as rank in-
gratitude. Secretary of State Lansing was fully aware of
;he moral position of the United States in pressing the
legotiations, however, and he expressed his misgivings in
i letter to President Wilson.
I confess that this method of negotiation, with
our marines policing the Haitian capital, is high
handed. It does n°t meet my sense of a nation's
sovereign rights and is more or less an exercise
of force and an invasion of Haitian independence.
From a practical standpoint, however, I cannot but
feel that it is the only thing to do if we intend
to cure the anarchy and disorder which prevails
in that Republic....
I have not been unmindful of the possible criti-
cism which may be aroused in the Senate in case
this treaty should be signed and submitted to them
for action. As I said, it seems a high handed pro-
cedure, but I do not see how else we can obtain the
desirable end of establishing a stable government
in Haiti and maintaining domestic peace there.
^
To the above, the President replied* "This is, I think,
.ecessary and has my approval. Do you think it will affect
jatin American opinion unfavorably?"
5
Measures subsequently taken to secure the treaty on
jnerican terms were extraordinary. On August 25, the Acting
.
U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
tate Relating to Political Relations Between the United
states and Haiti, 1910-1929, Secretary of state to President





President Woodrow Wilson to Secretary of State,
emorandum, August 13, 1915. Micro Copy 611, Vol. 1.
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Secretary of the Navy (Franklin D. Roosevelt), Secretary
:>f State Lansing, and Captain Edward L. Beach (temporarily
recalled to the United States by his wife's serious illness)
aet in Washington and drafted a message to President Darti-
juenave, signed by Beach, in which the Haitian President
;as assured of continued support by the United States should
le decide to dissolve Congress, dismiss his Cabinet, and
'orm another government of "patriots'* who would be willing
;o accede to the treaty. At about this same time the Ameri-
an Charge" d'Affaires was instructed to orally impress the
de facto Haitian authorities" of the serious consequences
hlch would attend rejection of American demands. Should
hat happen, two courses of action would be considered,
he United States would either establish a military govern-
ent pending "honest elections," or permit control of the
aitian Government to pass to those willing to cooperate
ith American authorities/
In spite of the above efforts at persuasion, on August
y , the Haitian Government made a written reply to the latest
reaty proposition in which practically every stipulation
<f the original treaty was either omitted or so changed as
*:> defeat its purpose. The American Legation at Port-au-
(. U. S., National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Sub-
let File, Haiti, 1911-1927, Record Group 45, Acting Secretary
jf the Navy to USS Washington
, Despatch, August 25, 1915.
h U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
f^ate Relating to Political Relations Between the United States
fid Haiti, 1910-1929, Secretary of State to American Legation,
J>rt-au- Prince, Despatch, August 24, 1915, Micro Copy 611, vol.
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>rince was then instructed to conclude the treaty as orig-
nally drafted without modification, and to inform the
:aitlan Government that it was expected to proceed without
o
ndue delay.
Admiral Caperton then applied more direct pressure by
reclaiming martial law, on September 3» 1915. The order
pplied to Port-au-Prince and all other areas under his
ilitary control, which by then included virtually all im-
ortant cities and towns. The proclamation of martial law
as accompanied by a specific decree directed at the Haitian
ress, in which trial before military courts was established
or "the publishing of false or incendiary propaganda against
he Government of the United States, or the Government of
aiti, or the publishing of any false, indecent, or obscene
ropaganda, letters signed or unsigned, or matter which tends
o disturb the public peace. "9
President Dartiguenave reported that these measures
lad strengthened his hand, but that certain influential mem-
Isrs of his Cabinet remained adamant against those portions
<f the treaty proposal having to do with financial matters,
^assured of Admiral Caperton' s continued support, he then
L U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
Jtate Relating to Political Relations Between the United States
nd Haiti, 1910-1929* Secretary of State to American Legation,
brt-au- Prince, Despatch, August 29» 1915. Micro Copy 611,
bl. l.
!. U, S., National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Sub-
let File, Haiti, 1911-1927, Record Group 1*5, Office of the





lemanded and received the resignations of his Minister of
Public Works and Minister of Foreign Affairs. American
offensive operations against the cacos, who were becoming
broublesome, particularly in the north, were held in a-
Deyance while Dartiguenave pressured his reordered Cabinet
to accept the treaty. Finally, on September 16, the "Treaty
3etween the United States and Haiti - Finances, Economic
Development and Tranquility of Haiti" was signed by the new
4inister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Borno, and Charge* d' Affaires
)avis. Of its 16 articles, the following are particularly
loteworthy and they form the legal basis for much of what was
;o be attempted by the Occupation.
Art. I. The Government of the United States will, by
its good offices, aid the Haitian Government in the
proper and efficient development of its agricultural,
mineral and commercial resources and in the estab-
lishment of the finances of Haiti on a firm and solid
basis
.
Art. II. The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon
nomination by the President of the United States, a
general receiver and such aids and employees as may
be necessary, who shall collect, receive and apply
all customs duties on imports and exports accruing
at the several custom houses and ports of entry of
the Republic of Haiti.
The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nom-
ination by the President of the United States, a
financial adviser, who shall be an officer attached
to the ministry of finance, to give effect to whose
proposals and labors the minister will lend efficient
aid. The financial adviser shall devise an adequate
system of public accounting, aid in increasing the
revenues and adjusting them to the expenses, inquire
into the validity of the debts of the republic, en-
lighten both Governments with reference to all event-
ual debts, recommend improved methods of collecting
and applying the revenues, and make such other re-
commendations to the minister of finance as may be




Art. V. All sums collected and received by the gen-
eral receiver shall be applied, first, to the pay-
ment of the salaries and allowances of the general
receiver, his assistants and employees and expenses
of the receivership, including the salary and ex-
penses of the financial adviser, which salaries will
be determined by previous agreement; second, to the
interest and sinking fund of the public debt of the
Republic of Haiti; and, third, to the maintenance
of the constabulary referred to in Article X, and
then the remainder to the Haitian Government for
purposes of current expenses....
Art. VIII. The Republic of Haiti shall not increase
its public debt except by previous agreement with
the President of the United States, and shall not
contract any debt or assume any financial obligation
unless the ordinary revenues of the republic avail-
able for that purpose, after defraying the expenses
of the Government, shall be adequate to pay the in-
terest and provide a sinking fund for the final dis-
charge of such debt.
Art. IX. The Republic of Haiti will not without a
previous agreement with the President of the United
States, modify the customs duties in a manner to re-
duce revenues therefrom; and in order that the reven-
ues of the republic may be adequate to meet the public
debt and the expenses of the Government, to preserve
tranquility and to promote material prosperity, the
Republic of Haiti will cooperate with the financial
adviser in his recommendations for improvement in the
methods of collecting and disbursing the revenues and
for new sources of needed income.
Art. X. The Haitian Government obligates itself, for
the preservation of domestic peace, the security of
individual rights and full observance of the provis-
ions of this treaty, to create without delay an
efficient constabulary, urban and rural, composed
of native Haitians. This constabulary shall be organ-
ized and officered by Americans, appointed by the
President of Haiti, upon nomination by the President
of the United States. The Haitian Government shall
clothe these officers with the proper and necessary
authority and uphold them in the performance of their
functions. These officers will be replaced by Hait-
ians as they, by examination, conducted under direct-
ion of a board to be selected by the senior American
officer of this constabulary and in the presence of
a representative of the Haitian Government, are found
to be qualified to assume such duties. The constab-
ulary herein provided for, shall, under the direction
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of the Haitian Government, have supervision and
control of arms and ammunition, military supplies,
and traffic therein, throughout the country. The
high contracting parties agree that the stipulations
in this article are necessary to prevent factional
strife and disturbances.
Art. XI. The Government of Haiti agrees not to
surrender any of the territory of the Republic of
Haiti by sale, lease or otherwise, or jurisdiction
over such territory, to any foreign government or
power, nor to enter into any treaty or contract
with any foreign power or powers that will impair
or tend to impair the independence of Haiti.
Art. XII. The Haitian Government agrees to execute
with the United States a protocol for the settle-
ment, by arbitration or otherwise, of all pending
pecuniary claims of foreign corporations, companies,
citizens or subjects against Haiti.
Art. XIII. The Republic of Haiti, being desirous tofurther the development of its natural resources,
agrees to undertake and execute such measures as in
the opinion of the high contracting parties may be
necessary for the sanitation and public improve-
ment of the republic, under the supervision and
direction of an engineer or engineers, to be appoint-
ed by the President of Haiti upon nomination by the
President of the United States, and authorized for
that purpose by the Government of Haiti.
Art. XIV. The high contracting parties shall have
authority to take such steps as may be necessary toinsure the complete attainment of any of the objects
comprehended in this treaty and, should the necessity
occur, the United States will lend an efficient aidfor the preservation of Haitian independence and the
maintenance of a government adequate for the protect-ion of life, property and individual liberty.
Art. XVI. The present treaty shall remain in fullforce and virtue for the term of ten years, to be
counted from the day of exchange of ratifications,
and further for another term of ten years if, for
specific reasons presented by either of the high
contracting parties, the purpose of this treaty has
not been fully accomplished
...
.10
Treaty with Respect to the Finances, Economic Develop-*t and Tranquility of Haiti," u S Treats <
*l. 39 Statutes at Large, I654 * ^^^ N°-
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The treaty was silent concerning the presence of
American forces in Haiti, nor was anything said about
American control or influence over the Haitian judiciary
or public education. These apparent oversights would
provoke heated controversy in the years ahead.
The signing of the treaty was followed by the formal
recognition of the Dartiguenave Government by the United
States, and at 8:55 A.M. on September 1?, 1915 » Admiral
Caperton's flagship fired a national salute of 21 guns
with the Haitian Ensign at the fore. The treaty signed
was not the treaty ratified, however, and further American
pressure was applied to bring the recalcitrant Haitian
Congress into line. Funds for the ordinary expenses of
bhe Haitian Government, including the salaries of Senators
and Deputies, were frozen. On October 3- Dartiguenave
;hreatened to resign unless the overdue salaries were paid,
and he was informed that funds would be available immed-
.ately upon ratification of the treaty. This tactic had
.ts desired effect on the Chamber of Deputies, which rati-
fied the treaty by a vote of 75 to 6, on October 6. The
Admiral then authorized an allowance to be paid to the
laitian Government to meet current expenses, but, as direct*
:d by the Navy Department, he kept the question of back
:alaries for the employees of the government open, pending
inal ratification of the treaty.
Opposition continued in the Haitian Senate, and the
merican State Department became more and more apprehensive
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)f ultimate defeat of its proposals. This seemed a real
possibility when, on November 8, the Haitian Senate issued
i lengthy report which declared certain articles of the
;reaty unconstitutional, and recommended renewal of treaty
legotiations with a view to obtaining a treaty the terms
f which would practically nullify Unites States control
n Haiti. Firmer measures were evidently required to secure
atification, and they were immediately forthcoming. The
ecretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, after consultation
ith Secretary Lansing, directed Admiral Caperton to make
he following statement to President Dartiguenave and his
abinet.
I have the honor to inform the President of Haiti
and the members of his Cabinet that I am personally
gratified that public sentiment continues favorable
to the treaty} that there is a strong demand from
all classes for immediate ratification, and that
the treaty will be ratified Thursday. I am sure
that you gentlemen will understand my sentiment in
this matter, and I am confident if the treaty fails
of ratification that my Government has the intent-ion to retain control in Haiti until the desired
end is accomplished, and that it will forthwith pro-
ceed to the complete pacification of Haiti so as toinsure internal tranquility necessary to such de-
velopment of the country and its industry as will
afford relief to the starving populace now unemployed
Meanwhile the present Government will be supported
in the effort to secure stable conditions and last-ing peace in Haiti, whereas those offering opposition
can only expect such treatment as their conduct merits.The United States Government is particularly anxiousfor immediate ratification by the present Senate ofthis treaty, which was drawn up with the full in-tention of employing as many Haitians as possible to
aid in giving effect to its provisions, so that suffer-ing may be relieved at the earliest possible date
Rumors of bribeiy to defeat the treaty are rife, but
are not believed. However, should they prove true,




In private instructions to Admiral Caperton, appended
;o the above, Secretary Daniels stated that it was expected
;hat the American position would be made sufficiently clear
;o remove all opposition and to secure immediate ratificat-
on of the treaty. That expectation was fulfilled, and on
ovember 12, 1915» the Haitian Senate ratified the treaty
»y a vote of 25 to 9. Pending approval by the United States
lenate (given by unanimous vote on February 28, 1916), a
odus vivendi was entered into by the two governments which
ermitted the terms of the treaty to be put into effect
mmediately
,
Thus did the United States secure a treaty and assume
he "obligations" which would be cited in the years ahead
s both justification and necessity for a prolonged and
ncreasingly unpopular military occupation of the Black
epublic
.
1. U, S., National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Sub-
ect File, Haiti, 1911-1927, Record Group 45, Secretary of
he Navy to Commander Cruiser Squadron, U.S. Atlantic Fleet,





We were all imbued with the fact that we were
trustees of a huge estate that belonged to minors....
The Haitian people are divided into two classes,
one class wears shoes and the other does not....
Ninety-nine percent of the people of Haiti are the
most kindly, generous, hospitable, pleasure loving
people I have ever known . They would not hurt any-
body . They are most gentle when in their natural
state. When the other one percent that wears vici
kid shoes with long pointed toes and celluloid
collars, stirs them up and Incites them with liquor
and voodoo stuff they are capable of the most horr- ^
ible atrocities; they are cannibals. They ate the
liver of one Marine.... Those that wear shoes I took
as a joke. Without a sense of humor you could not
live in Haiti among those people, among the shoe
class.... But the people who were barefooted, the
women wearing mother hubbards and the men dungarees
halfway up to their knees, with scarred feet, in-
dicating the hardest kind of toil, and with great
blisters on their hands, and with the palms of their
hands as hard as a piece of sole leather - those
people you could absolutely trust. I went all over
Haiti living with them in their shacks, and they
always gave you the best they had - food and any-
thing they had in the world. They did not know the
value of anything. They did not know anything about
time, distance, or value.... What we wanted was clean
little towns, with tidy thatch-roofed dwellings.
That is what the country can afford, and what it
ought to have ....
- Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler, USMC, October
27, 1921.
With the treaty ratified, Admiral Caperton felt free
t) turn his attention to the settlement of affairs with the
cicos of the north, who, with increasing boldness, were
literrupting the flow of food, water, and goods for export
i.to the principal towns and ports of a large area of the
c-untry. The cacos were not a numerous force, and earlier
e forts to "buy" them and their weapons had met with some
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uccess. As much as 50,000 gourdes had been offered late
n September for the surrender of each 1,000 cacos with
;heir weapons. Further, an American guarantee that the
[aitian Government's proclamation of general amnesty would
>e respected was widely published throughout the country,
n spite of this it was evident that a military campaign
rould have to be launched against the diehard remnants of
he caco armies, and in the period November 1-17, 1915
»
heir strongholds in the mountains of the north were sys-
ematically reduced, often by personal heroics on the part
f Marine officers and men which would win them lasting
ame in the Corps. Only one American officer and one en-
isted man were wounded in the entire campaign, which was
limaxed by the killing of perhaps a hundred cacos at the
apture of Fort Riviere. The news of what he considered
n excessive shedding of Haitian blood caused Secretary
aniels to order a suspension of the American offensive,
ut by then the back of the cacos resistance had been broken.
The success of American military action in Haiti, where
. relative handful of marines and sailors were able to disarm
•id pacify a population of perhaps two and a half million
•ispersed over rugged and difficult terrain, seems almost
iicredible in view of later American experience in Vietnam.
he explanation lies, of course, not only in the undoubted
ourage and professionalism of the marines, and their great
uperiority in weapons, but in the nature of the cacos sold-
er, who was, more often than not, half-starved and recruited
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rith clubs to fight for a "cause" of which he knew and
ared little. It was not, as some suggested at the time,
.
question of inherent inferiority in the Haitian char-
.cter as a fighting man - the French experience in Haiti
ould seem to disprove that. If there was a failure of
pirit, it almost certainly was a failure of the e*lite
eadership to persuade the Haitian soldier that he was
ighting for anything other than his General's personal
ain . The overwhelming mass of the Haitian people ex-
ressed virtually no sympathy for the cacos and their gen-
rals, and it seems quite probable, except for perhaps a
ery brief period in 1919» that the American marines were
ctually a more welcome sight in the eyes of the peasants
han were their cacos brothers.
One of the first acts of the American intervention had
een to disband the regular Haitian armed forces, which prior
o 1915 had consisted of 38 line and 4 artillery regiments,
regiments of the Presidential Guard, and a gendarmerie of
lore than 1800 men. The paper strength of this force was
bout 11,000 men, officered by 308 generals and 5° colonels,
lus additional honorary high ranking officers appointed by
he President pro tem from among his friends and supporters,
'ne pay of a private was one gourde a month, plus four gourdes
::>r subsistence, little of which was ever received by the
laitian enlisted man, soldiers' pay and most appropriations




Under Article X of the Treaty an "efficient constab-
iLary" was to be established to replace the armed forces
c" Haitit and even before the ratification of the treaty
£;eps were taken in that direction. In September, 1915r
tie first units of. the Haitian Gendarmerie were formed,
Ith an initial strength of 336 men, most of whom were
pivates . By February 1, 1916, the Gendarmerie was re-
sponsible for policing the entire country, its strength
iicreasing to 2,533 Haitians and 115 American commissioned
eid non-commissioned officers detailed to the Gendarmerie
f>r service. In June, 1916, the American Congress passed
£ law authorizing the service of Americans in the Haitian
Gndarmerie, and henceforth American Marine and Naval per-
£>nnel were commissioned in the Gendarmerie while still
biding rank and entitled to pay from their parent services.
Mjor Smedley D. Butler, who had earned a Medal of Honor
f>r his part in the reduction of Fort Riviere, was commiss-
i>ned a Major General in the Haitian service and became the
f.rst Commander of the Gendarmerie d* Haiti. This organ
-
i:ation progressed in strength and efficiency so rapidly
tiat by the end of 1916 the Marine Brigade was withdrawn
fx>m the interior of the country to the coastal towns, prin-
c. pally Port-au-Prince and Cape Haitian, and Gendarmes had
tie responsibility for both police and military matters
tiroughout the country.
Haitians were enlisted voluntarily in the Gendarmes,
Ci enlistment papers similar to those used by American mar-
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iies. They wore marine uniforms, with the exception of
tie Marine Corps device. They were issued marine weapons
eid received marine training. There was absolutely no
dfficulty in getting sufficient volunteers, but the phys-
ial condition of the recruits was appalling.
We made every effort to cure those that we had,
so that they would not go to sleep standing up in
the daytime. That was the one test. I have fre-
quently found a sentry on a post in front of an
important building sound asleep, standing up with
the sun shining in his face. That is not his fault.
He was diseased. An examination showed that 95 Per
cent of them had blood diseases and 85 per cent had
intestinal worms, and we took immediate measures to
cure it, and before I left Haiti the gendarmes could
keep awake for two or three hours .... Never during
the time I was in Haiti, nor from any reports I have
received since, has any disloyalty on the part of a
gendarme occurred.... My orderly in Port-au-Prince
was the worst Caco in Haiti, and I picked him out
because he was the ugliest brute I ever saw, and I
trusted him with my children, my wife, and every-
thing. He was the most faithful man I have ever
known
. . . .
Whenever I had an inspection to make in
the woods, I left my family with this ugly Caco
sleeping on a couch on the front porch of my house,
and he never would move for two weeks. They would
take his food to him. And nobody would come into
the yard either. I trusted him absolutely. It is
a great army, that gendarmerie.... 1
Within the Gendarmerie, Haiti was divided for purposes
o command into Departments, headed by Colonels of Gendarm-
eie, and further subdivided into Districts. The Department
o Port-au-Prince had seven Districts, the Department of the
C;pe eight, and the Department of Cayes three. Districts
1 U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
3ate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
S-atement of Brig. Gen. Smedley Butler to Select Committee




ere normally commanded by a Captain of Gendarmerie , and
istricts were in turn subdivided into three to five Sub-
istricts, commanded by Lieutenants. Gendarmerie outposts
ere permanently established at strategic points and these
ere commanded by non-commissioned (Haitian) officers,
wo squadrons of cavalry were held in reserve at Port-au-
rlnce and at Cape Haitian. The service of the Gendarmerie
s one of the bright spots of the Occupation and, as will
e discussed later, extended far beyond the normal range
if police and military duties.
Commencing January 1, 1916, all salaries and expenses
«f every nature, pertaining to the Haitian Government, were
<rdered paid directly to the employees or claimants by agents
<f the American Occupation. This action raised a storm of
rotest in the Haitian Government, whose members saw yet
nother source of "income" - the discounting of feuilles -
iLped away. The system adopted was to effect payment by
decks of a non-negotiable character, thus assuring that
]inds actually reached the hands of those for whom intended.
'ie "implied insult" of ending the transfer of funds to
pvernment officials was heightened by American action taken
o verify the correctness of paylists provided by the govern-
rsnt
.
Municipal elections in January, 1916, drew the attent-
ion and concern of American authorities. When the election
Asts at Petitgoave mysteriously disappeared on election
<fe, the Mayor of that town was arrested by the Gendarmerie
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and American officers moved in to supervise the town elect-
ions
.
In the atmosphere created by these and other actions
which the Haitians viewed as interference beyond that per-
mitted by the treaty, the working relationship between the
Occupation authorities and the Haitian Government steadily
ieteriorated, particularly as early promises of American
aid and capital inflow failed to materialize. An attempt
bo negotiate a $2 million dollar loan with a New York bank
Ln December, 1915» failed when the bank insisted on the
'moral guarantee of the United States Government" and that
guarantee was not offered. Thus, Haiti's financial plight
ictually worsened in the early months of the intervention,
.n spite of American control of the customs. Interest as
yell as amortization payments on the public debt went into
.efault. In fairness to the American authorities, however,
:his was the almost inevitable result of conditions brought
•bout by the war in Europe, particularly the collapse of
•he French coffee market and a disastrous decline in Haitian
xports. The general economic condition and specific Ameri-
an actions to make the Haitian Government more "efficient"
esulted in widespread unemployment that was felt hardest
y those who had formerly made their living on the labor of
he peasant class or in non-productive government work. Con-
ations in the cities, especially in Port-au-Prince, reached
amine proportions in the first winter of the intervention,
hd American efforts at relief were not overly generous.
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It is interesting, in the light of the welfare ethic
hat would flower half a century later, to examine the
o-dest program placed in effect by the Americans at Port-
u- Prince. The following is extracted from an official
eport made to the Navy Department by P .A . Surgeon P ,E
.
arrison, entitled "Account of the Red Cross Relief Work
n Port-au-Prince, Haiti, January to April, 1916 .
"
For several months, waste food collected from
American naval vessels in the harbor of Port-au-
Prince, and from the Marine Forces ashore, had been
distributed at the Wesleyan Mission, under the dir-
ection of its pastor, the Reverend Mr. Turnbull
.
This work has been continued, and the cost of collect-
ion and distribution paid out of the Red Cross funds.
[The sum of $1500. was donated by the Red Cross during
this period.] From ten to twenty-five barrels of
food have been collected and distributed daily,...
Our records show from 250 to over 400 persons fed
once or twice daily with this food, the average num-
ber in the "bread line" during 13 weeks being 320..,.
In as much as the daily amount of food collected
from the ships varied greatly, according to the num-
ber and sizes of ships in the harbor, a certain supply
of dry provisions was kept on hand to supplement the
distribution on poor days....
These dry groceries were used also to relieve a
form of poverty which the "bread line" could not reach.
Our attention was called repeatedly to cases of extreme
need in families of educated and self-respecting people
"who, from one cause or another, had been reduced to a
condition of actual want. The chief causes active in
producing such conditions were loss of employment
occasioned by recent political changes, the failure
of the Haitian Government to pay salaries for several
months, and the depressed state of business and indus-
try.... Such families would not stand in line with a
ragged and dirty crowd of humanity clamoring for a
portion of the food collected from the ships, but they
would come quietly to the depot with their identifi-
cation cards and receive a small package of rice or
beans to be cooked or eaten at home....
We have already drawn attention to the danger of
encouraging and prolonging a state of indigency, es-
pecially among an ignorant population whose sense of
self-respect is not sufficiently developed to make
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dependence obnoxious. The number of persons apply-
ing to the Red Cross for food constantly tends to
increase, and undoubtedly would increase indefin-
itely if not controlled. The bread line becomes a
regular point of call for the professional beggars
of the city. Kany not really in need come with
false stories of distress. Two or more members of
the same family have been discovered, each separate-
ly drawing food for the entire family. A number
have attempted to obtain a double portion of food
by applying at the two depots under different names.
A few instances have been reported to us of families
leaving their homes and coming long distances to
Port-au-Prince because they heard that food was be-
ing given away here. Two extreme instances have
come to our attention of men declining opportunities
to work for wages because the work would interfere
with their daily call at the food depot....2
On January Jl, 1916, USS Washington , which had lain at
nchor in the harbor of Port-au-Prince for six long months,
er crew for the greater part of this time confined to the
hip except for "recreation parties" permitted in late October
iid thereafter, got underway for Guantanamo and eventually
he United States. A thousand little dramas are recorded in
ashlngton's log from the hot, sultry days and nights spent
:i Haiti. The ship's buglar lost three front teeth in a
iLght on board and his injury was recorded as "not in the
line of duty," A wardroom cook by the name of Ah Hee was
'iken to Captain's mast for "gross carelessness, allowing
oap to get into the wardroom lunch." Two firemen were warned
J:>r "cheering the French cruiser," and an ordinary seaman,
]3turning from one of those "recreation parties" ashore, was
<. U. S., National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Sub-
let File, Haiti, 1911-1927, Record Group 45.
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£2ntenced to loss of pay in the amount of $3.48 for "failing
D report to the venereal head for prophylactic treatment,
£"ter having been lawfully directed to dose."
The flag of the Cruiser Squadron Commander was shifted




Cficers of these two ships relieved each other so that
Ciptain Edward L. Beach of the Washington could continue to
e-.t as Admiral Caperton *s Chief of Staff,
An increasingly bitter relationship between the Darti-
gienave administration and the Haitian Congress was climaxed
o April 5, 1916, by the Presidents dissolution of the Sen-
ae, which had threatened to impeach him. This action had
te reluctant support of Admiral Caperton
. Dartiguenave
atempted to get the Chamber of Deputies to function as a
cnstituent assembly, a project of doubtful legality, but
te Chamber refused to pass on the constitutional changes
dsired by the President. It appeared that those would have
t await the election of a new legislature, scheduled for
te following January.
On May 10, 1916, disturbances in the Dominican Republic
ailed Admiral Caperton to Santo Domingo, where he was to
rmain until his relief by Rear Admiral Pond on July 18.
Inceforth military command in Haiti was exercised by the
ferine Brigade Commander, who reported through the Admiral
n Santo Domingo to the Navy Department. By this time Amerl-
lh Naval and Marine Corps officers had assumed administrative
xitrol not only of the customs service, but public safety,
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ublic works, and public health. In June, 1916, President
llson nominated and President Dartiguenave appointed the
irst general receiver for Haiti, under the terras of the
reaty . In July the first financial adviser was named,
avy Paymasters were relieved of their duties in the Haitian
ustoms service on August 29» 1916, and thereafter the char-
cter of the Occupation regime gradually became more civilian
his did not, however, improve the working relationship with
be Haitian Government. From the very start strong disagree-
i3nt arose between the Minister of Finance and his financial
dviser, but in spite of their respective titles there was
Ittle question of where the decision making power rested.
A year after the initial landing of American forces in
lalti, Americans there looked with increasing disfavor on
lie Haitian Government they had been most instrumental in
Ringing to power, and considered it not only hopelessly
^efficient and insincere in carrying out its agreements
nth the Occupation, but thoroughly detested by the people
ad maintained in office only by the presence of armed
iaerican force. The solution of Haiti's troubles seemed
€> far away as ever.
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(. A New Constitution
.
I wrote the Haitian Constitution myself, and if
I do say it, I think it is a pretty good consti-
tution
.
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 18, 1920.
If I should be, as I fully expect to be, elected
President of this just and honorable Republic, I
will not empower an Assistant Secretary of theNavy to draft a Constitution for helpless neigh-bors in the West Indies and jam it down their
throats at the points of bayonets borne by United
States Marines.
- Senator Warren G. Harding, August 28, 1920.
o
As the year 1916 drew to a close, something in the
ature of organized political opposition to the Dartiguenave
overnment appeared in Port-au-Prince. This opposition was
airly well divided into two groups calling themselves "The
rogressives" and "The Nationalists." The former claimed
P be in favor of doing everything necessary for the de-
i3lopment of the country, while attacking the President for
bing too easily controlled by the Americans. The latter
stated openly for Black rule and charged that Dartiguenave
vis preparing to amend the Constitution in such a way as
t> grant White ownership of land - the implication being
tiat such would be but the first step toward return to slavery.
Ith groups were violently anti-Occupation and pledged to
t.e impeachment of the President.
As previously indicated, Dartiguenave commanded little
rspect from American authorities in Haiti, and questions
wre raised with Washington concerning American policy should
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;he President in fact face ouster by the legislature which
?as scheduled to be elected in January, 1917 . That policy
ras delineated in a Navy Department memorandum on January
,
1917 which stated that the United States Government "will
ot countenance any impeachment proceedings which may be
ntered into by the legislative body of Haiti, but, on the
ontrary,
... will consider such action as a move to begin
evolutionary and disorderly political activity in the Re-
ublic." Th.is policy was made clear to the Haitian Govem-
ient and the political opposition by American diplomatic
nd military representatives in Port-au-Prince. The reason
J>r
this perhaps surprising continued support of Dartiguenave
ay be found in part in his suddenly more agreeable attitude
bward the Americans, but more particularly in the need for
certain changes in the Haitian Constitution which it was
blieved could only be secured through the wholehearted
apport of the President.
In November, 1916, the Haitian Government had presented
t» the Occupation authorities and to the American Legation
i Port-au-Prince a draft for a new Constitution to be pre-
ssed to the National Assembly in April, 1917 . This draft
v..s forwarded to the American State Department and after a
creful study certain modifications were "suggested." These
i eluded (1) the elimination of a residence requirement of
lU'JV' National Archives. Naval Records Collection, Sub-Jet File, Haiti, 1911-1927, Record Group 4<5.
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five years for foreigners to qualify for ownership of pro-
perty (the complete text of this article in the new Con-
stitution eliminated a bar to white ownership of real pro-
oerty in Haiti which had existed for 11 3 years), and (2)
ratification in the new Constitution of all acts by the
American military authorities in Haiti. These recommend-
itions were considered most necessary, but others were
suggested as being of somewhat lesser importance to the
Jnited States. These were: (a) Curtailment of exorbitant
ixpense accounts for Secretaries of State? (b) disestab-
.ishment of the Council of State, which was considered un-
ecessary in view of the existence of legislative bodies;
c) impeachment of Justices of the Supreme Court and the
ourt of Appeals in the same manner as impeachment of Cab-
net officers; (d) non-discrimination of foreigners in
atters of protection; (e) elimination of the Chamber of
.ccounts, which was considered redundant in view of the
'ffices of Collector of Customs and the Financial Adviser.
With considerable difficulty, the Dartiguenave Govern-
isnt was persuaded to accept all of the proposed changes
li its draft Constitution. None of them appear today to be
treasonable, and the only really controversial point con-
cerned foreign ownership of property. This last was con-
sidered essential to attract investment capital to Haiti,
liough for years the constitutional bar to ownership had
ben sidestepped by foreigners, particularly Germans, through
be simple device of dummy Haitian partnerships.
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Th e election of a new national assembly was held with-
out incident in January, 191?, and by all accounts it was
as fair and honest as any election Haiti had ever known.
The polling places were carefully supervised by the Gen-
iarmerie, with its American officers discreetly in the back-
$round. A date in April was set for the convening of the
assembly and its consideration of the new Constitution.
In the latter part of January and the early weeks of
February, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D.
toosevelt, accompanied by the Commandant of the Marine Corps,
lajor General George Barnett, made an inspection trip to
laiti. Arriving in Port-au-Prince, their party crossed the
ountry on horseback to Cape Haitian. Mr. Roosevelt talked
'reely with Haitian and Occupation officials along his route,
nd was apparently much impressed with the progress being
ade by the American marines in their road building and
anitation work. He later reported an almost total absence
f complaints directed against the Occupation. The impend-
ng war with Germany cut short a planned excursion to the
ominican Republic, and the party hurried back to Washington
rom Cape Haitian
.
In March, the Haitian Government formally requested the
pod offices of the United States in the negotiation of a
•3an of $30,000,000 for the purpose of developing the country's
:5sources and to take advantage of a favorable opportunity
•) retire some of its foreign debt (an opportunity brought
<i by the war in Europe). In order that the proposed loan
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might be placed on advantageous terms, the American Govern-
ment thought it desirable to extend the life of the Haitian-
American Treaty for an additional period of ten years, as
permitted by Article XVI of the treaty, thus assuring pro-
spective purchasers of Haitian bonds that the United States
would have a continuing interest in their repayment. The
agreement extending the life of the treaty for the full
additional ten years was signed on March 28, 1917, by the
iaitian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Louis Borno (later
^resident of the Republic), and the American Minister to
Dort-au- Prince, Arthur Baflly-Blanchard, who was once more
it his post. This made the new expiration date May 3, 1936
i.e., 20 years from the formal exchange of ratifications),
fte extension was vigorously assailed by opponents of the
Teaty on two grounds: (1) only 11 months having passed
ince its coming into legal effect, the conclusion that it
ould not in the original 10 year period of its life "fully
ccomplish" its purpose was not justified, and (2) the ex-
ension of the treaty was not presented for action to either
he Haitian Congress or the American Senate. Article XVI,
owever, provided for the extension of the treaty under given
ircumstances, and that provision had been accepted by the
espective legislative bodies without argument, and further
:atification was probably not necessary.
Though the treaty was duly extended, the hoped for loan
<Ld not materialize. This further embittered the Haitian
Overnment toward the United States.
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When the new Congress assembled in April, 1917, it
J&.S presented with the American-approved draft of the new
institution. It appears that the Dartiguenave Government,
n a momentary pique, let it be known that the proposals
ere actually American demands, and as a result the Congress
ummarily rejected them and began work on its own revised
onstitution, taking time off, however, to reject, unanimously,
11 American-inspired proposal for a declaration of war on
lermany
.
On June 16, 1917 i President Dartiguenave suggested to
jnerican officials that the Congress be dismissed and the
jroposed Constitution submitted to the people for referendum,
tews of this reached the legislature, sitting as a National
Assembly, and its members rushed to complete their version
I a new Constitution. The reading of their draft was in
p*ogress when the Chief of the Gendarmerie, Smedley Butler,
etered the Chambers and delivered to the Speaker the Presi-
int's decree dissolving the Assembly. When the Speaker
rfused to accept it, Butler read it to the Assembly himself,
impeccable French, and then ordered the Chambers cleared.
With the Assembly dispersed, constitutional reform pro-
is eded at a more leisurely pace. It appeared evident that
p:ovision would have to be made for the operation of Haitian
5«rernmental affairs in the absence of a legislature, since
* legislature could apparently be elected which was the
Lust Inclined to be cooperative with the Occupation. The
fck of drafting yet another Constitution for Haiti fell,
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ptwithstanding Mr. Roosevelt's later claim to authorship, to
iree American officials directly concerned with the Occupation.
•iese were Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp (the Senior Naval Officer
|i Haiti and in Haitian Waters), Brigadier General Eli Cole
Marine Brigade Commander), and Mr. F. L. Mayer (American Charge"
('Affaires at Port-au-Prince). Mr. Roosevelt's role seems to
live been limited to a rather cursory review of work done by
lie officials named above.
2
The drafting proceeded into the fall of 1917 and was
£icompanied by frequent consultations with the Dartiguenave
Overnment, particularly with Louis Borno, the Minister for
Dreign Affairs. The challenge was to produce a document,
democratic and liberal in tone, which could still be used to
ulidate unrepresentative government. The Constitution
L.tlmately produced begins with the words "the Republic of
liti is one and indivisible, free, sovereign and independ-
eit. Its territory, including the islands dependent thereon,
1: inviolable, and cannot be alienated by any treaty or by
E.y convention ."3 It provided for a popularly chosen Senate
9:d Chamber of Deputies, and for the election by those two
bdies meeting in joint session as the National Assembly of
a President whose term of office would be four years (as
U.S., National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Subject
<le, Haiti, 1911-1927, Record Group 45, F. L. Mayer to Admiral
I S. Knapp, August 12, 1918.
3 The complete text of the Constitution, in translation, is
*und in Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control
,
L3:5-193.0 > (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931).
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pposed to the previous term of seven years). Deputies
ere reduced in number from 72 to 36, and Senators from
9 to 15. Provisions were made for a Council of State
omposed of 21 members appointed by the President, which
:i addition to its regular duties of advising the Presi-
ont, would exercise the legislative power in the absence
J the elected legislature. Freedom of the press, trial
V jury, and the right of assembly were guaranteed. The
sensitive issue of foreign ownership of land was treated
V Article V of the Constitution, which reads: "The right
t> own real estate shall be given to foreigners residing
ii Haiti and to the societies organized by foreigners for
pirposes of residence, and agricultural, commercial, in-
distrial or educational enterprises. This right shall
c:ase after a period of five years from the date when the
freigner shall have ceased to reside in the country or
te activities of said companies shall have ceased." A
secial article ratified the acts of the American Occupat-
in. Finally, the Gendarmerie d'Haiti was established as
le country's only legal armed force.
The real joker in the American-drafted Constitution
1918 lay in Title VIII, the Transitory Provisions. After
establishing the term of the incumbent President so that it
wuld expire on May 15, 1922, Title VIII went on to provide
tdat "the first election of members of the legislative body
a:ter the adoption of the present Constitution shall take
place on January 10 of an even-numbered year. The year
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hall be fixed by a decree of the President of the Republic
ublished at least three months before the meeting of the
rimary assemblies. The session of the legislative body
hen elected shall convene on the constitutional date immed-
ately following the first election." This, coupled with
lie provision giving the legislative power (including the
;ower to elect the President) to the presidentially appointed
ouncil of State, actually made it possible for the incumbent
resident to remain in office indefinitely and to rule with-
ut benefit of an elected legislature by the simple devices
<r not naming a date for the legislative elections and by
licking the Council of State with his own men. A final pro-
vsion under Title VIII suspended the irremovability of
Ridges for a period of six months from the date of the pro-
mlgation of the new Constitution.
These provisions, all of them, were carefully thought
cit. American experience with the last elected Haitian
Lgislature had made it clear that the options were estab-
lshment of open American Military Government or support
o an American-influenced Haitian dictatorship. The third
O'tion, evident today with the advantage of hindsight, was
Ithdrawal, but that apparently received no serious con-
s deration
.
The legality of adopting the new Constitution by public
rferendum worried American officials, especially Admiral
tfapp, and this probably explains the transitory provision
cncerning the Haitian judiciary. If necessary, American
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uthorities were quite prepared to pack Haitian courts to
nsure that American actions in Haiti were not thwarted by
i^gal technicalities. Knapp put his misgivings in a letter
b the Secretary of the Navy in which he expressed the view
pat as the Constitution of Haiti then in effect would re-
Biin legally in effect until amended, the method of amend-
Djnt should, in legal strictness, conform to the old Con-
stitution . This would not be the case, he wrote, if the
Constitution is changed by popular vote. He suggested, how-
cer, that this legal issue might be resolved by relying on
tie theory that all powers" in democratic government come
ciginally from the people, and that if it is impossible
t the regular method prescribed in the Constitution to
aiend it to contain certain features desired by the people,
i would perhaps not be improper to refer the matter to
te people as a whole.
Knapp' s philosophical loophole, if one were actually
leded in Washington at the time, was apparently accepted,
tough the circumstances surrounding the constitutional
rferendum when it was actually held stripped it of what
Ji'ral justification it might possibly have had. American
action in the adoption of the Constitution, as in the sign-
tog and ratification of the treaty, rather poorly clothed
bb bald fact that ends were being taken to justify means.
^ U. S., Marine Corps Records, Correspondence File of First
^visional Brigade in Haiti, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington,





On June 12, 1918, the plebiscite on the new Consti-
tution was held, under the supervision of the Gendarmerie.
Ls the overwhelming majority of those voting could not
•ead or write, ballots did not have to be marked. White
.allots, signifying approval, were handed to each voter as
e approached the ballot box. Pink ballots, signifying
isapproval, were available from the attending Gendarmes
n request. Entertainments, food and drink, and other per-
uasions were used to get out the vote. At some polling
laces, in order to discourage repeating, the thumbs of
•oters were marked with indelible ink as they left the ballot
bx. The Gendarmerie had received strict instructions not
1) use influence to obtain affirmative votes, but officers
vjre told that they could and should explain the Constitution
t> the people who were unfamiliar with its provisions. Con-
s.dering the large population of Haiti and the fact that there
lis no registration, the turnout of just under 100,000 was
qite small, even though it was probably the largest vote
eer given in Haiti.
The Brigade Commander, Colonel John H. Russell, wrote
tat the Dartiguenave Government used its influence to obtain
b-e adoption of the Constitution and "it is thought all
5'vernment employees voted at least once for it."^ it seems
i-ear that most of those voting did not know what they were
1 U. S., National Archives, Naval Records Collection, Sub-
ot File, Haiti, 1911-1927, Record Group 45, Colonel John
Russell to the Chief of Naval Operations, June 1?, 1918.
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noting for. Russell reported that one man when questioned
;hought that he was voting for the election of a Pope, and
mother thought that he was voting for the President. It
s likely that most of the Haitian glite class boycotted
;he referendum altogether.
Under the circumstances it is perhaps not surprising
hat the people overwhelmingly approved the new Consti-
ution by a vote of 98,29^ to 796. The Constitution pro-
laimed and adopted, the Occupation authorities proceeded
carry out their obligations under the treaty. Soon,




I , The Caco War.
Haitians, the day like the 1st of January 180^
will soon rise. Since k years the Occupation in-
sults us in every way, every morning brings us a
new sadness. The people are poor and the Occu-
pation is pressing them down with taxes; it is
spreading fires and preventing people to rebuild
in wood under the false pretense to beautify the
town. Haitians, let us be firm, let us follow the
example of Belgium. No matter if our towns are
burned. For it is not a vain thought that was
written on the grave of the great Dessalines: 'Upon
the first shot the towns disappear and the nation
rises.' The holy cause which is spreading in the
North has for chiefs men of good sense. The South
is waiting for only one man to follow this sublime
example. No fear 1. We have arms'. Let us drive out
that ravenous people whose ravenousness is represent-
ed in the person of their President Wilson, traitor,
vagabond, rioter, thief, you will die with your
country
.
Hurrah for Independence'. Hurrah for union'. Hurrah
for legitimate war'. Down with the Americans'.
- Caco proclamation, posted in Port-au-Prince, March
15, 1919.
The immediate cause of the resumption of hostilities
v.th the cacos after almost two years of calm has been laid
t> certain abuses in the system of corve'e, inherited from
tie French colonial administration, whereby the Gendarmerie
d Haiti undertook a program of widespread repair and con-
1ruction of roads in Haiti. Under the corve'e Haitians were
r quired to perform unpaid labor on the roads in their dis-
tlcts, and in this manner some 63O miles of road were con-
sructed or repaired by the Gendarmerie at an average cost
$205 per mile.
Prior to the Occupation the corve'e had not been con-
sstently enforced for generations, but in 1916, probably
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t the suggestion of the Haitian Minister of Public Works,
he system was revived. Smedley Butler described it as a
ort of "barn raising" with dances and games in the eve-
rLngs, and prizes of little flags to hang on gate posts
nere the roads were particularly well done. With Presi-
fent Dartiguenave he inspected the work from an emblazoned
I>rd touring car, and the President gave talks of encourapre-
|nt to the laborers. Men, women and children kept holes
i the roads in their district filled with stone and gravel.
January 1, 1918, a caravan of 2? motor cars and trucks
laded by the President's Ford, made the 180 mile trip to
:pe Haitian from the capital at Port-au-Prince, in 13 hours
*d 50 minutes, stopping enroute for receptions at six towns,
[lis was probably the first time wheeled vehicles had ever
::aveled that distance, for in French colonial days there
R3 a gap of about six miles across a swamp that had to be
•]Dssed by raft or on horseback.
Initially there had been few complaints about the cor-
ii, but as the work spread into sparsely populated areas
oorers were required to work outside their home districts
n competition among the various Gendarm units supervising
to work at times resulted in men being pushed beyond their
nurance, and some were required to exceed the hours of
ok established by the law. Enforcement of the corvge
.
U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
t-te Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
ttement of Brig. Gen. Smedley Butler to Select Committee




ras a made to order issue for opponents of the Occupation,
nd stories of its excesses, often greatly exaggerated,
pread wildly with dark hints that the corve*e was but the
pening manifestation of an American desire to restore
lavery as an institution in the Black Republic. Those
ho fled to avoid work on the roads joined the remnants
<f caco bands in the hills and isolated incidents of terror-
ism began to be reported. In these circumstances the cor-
i*e was ordered abolished on October 1, 1918, though either
I a misinterpretation or disobedience of the order it con-
tnued in the Maissade-Hinche district of the North until
hrch of the following year.
A very rare commodity in Haitian society during the
priod under discussion was leadership. The leadership of
tose opposing the American Occupation was immeasurably
srengthened, however, when, on September 3, 1918, a con-
let persuaded his Gendarme "chaser" at a work project to
company him in an escape to the hills. This convict was
Jlarlemagne Massena PSralte, a man of great charisma and
fLritual intensity who quickly rallied all the cacos of
r-h north under his banner, while vowing to drive the Ameri-
£i invaders into the sea.
The Brigade Commander, Colonel Russell, first reported
*;agements with Charlemagne in October, 1918, when 35 cacos
e>e killed along with 2 Haitian Gendarmes. In what was for
ii a rare miscalculation, he wrote that "this affair has no
oitical or military significance whatsoever, and repetition
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»f such raids by bandits hidden away in the hills on the
'rontier may be expected for some time to come." 2 He
stimated the strength of the guerrilla bands at this
ime to be about 2,000 poorly armed men, whose weapons
ere mostly machetes, knives, pikes, a few pistols, and
erhaps 200 to 300 rifles. They were very short of ammun-
tion, their rifles being almost entirely old German Krags,
or which they adapted captured or stolen Gendarmerie
mmunition by wrapping goat skin or string around the bases
<f cartridges. Russell accordingly issued very strict
crders concerning the accounting of Gendarme and Marine
inmunition
.
In spite of their great handicaps, the forces under
Oarlemagne's command continued to grow. His personal mag-
tttism was such that even prior to the bizarre circumstances
wich attended his death he assumed the robes of a Messiah
i. the eyes of the credulous Haitian peasants. By the spring
I 1919 his strength had grown to between five and ten
thousand, and later in that year it would peak at more than
ffteen thousand. At first he was opposed only by the
Gndarmerie, but the growing seriousness of the revolt
Bused the Marine Brigade to be ordered into action be-
jnning in March, 1919. Total Brigade strength at this
bme, however, was only approximately 1,000 officers and
U.S., Marine Corps Records, Correspondence File of First
^visional Brigade in Haiti, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington,Em Colonel J .H
.




en, and this meant that after garrison and logistics
emands were met only a few hundred marines were available
:or field operations. Further, few Gendarmerie units
ould be spared to carry the fight to the cacos, for they
i3re organized to function as an urban and rural police
J)rce
.
In these circumstances the Brigade Commander made an
i-gent request in March, 1919, to increase the Brigade by
a; least one Battalion of Marines. Secretary Lansing, then
a; the Paris Peace Conference with President Wilson, con-
sdered such action politically inexpedient, however. Haiti
3d already become something of an embarrassment to America
y. the world stage.
In early October, 1919, Charlemagne with a sizeable
oy was encamped 15 miles north of Port-au-Prince, and on
)(tober 7 a small band of cacos invaded Port-au-Prince and
1 fire to buildings in the business district and near the
c?eign legations. The self-styled "Chief of the Revolut-
ciary Forces against the Americans on Haitian Soil" addressed
1 ultimatum to the diplomatic community in Port-au-Prince,
e.ivered through the British Legation, which demanded the
urender of the Haitian Government to his forces. Marines
Jckly drove him and his army back into the mountains of the
3th. A reward of several thousand dollars was placed on
irlemagne's head, and efforts to destroy him were redoubled.
story of his entrapment and death is one of the most




The Commander of the District of Grande Rivie*re in
the north of Haiti in August, 1919 » was Herman H. Hanne-
ken, Captain, Gendarmerie d'Haiti, and Sergeant, U.S.
Marine Corps. One other American served at that post with
him, William R. Button, Lieutenant, Gendarmerie d'Haiti,
and Corporal, U.S. Marine Corps. Early in the month,
Hanneken made an arrangement with a Haitian "ex-General,"
Jean Conze, a Gendarme named Jean Francois ( the "Secretary ")
,
and a third Haitian, Cherubin Blot, to effect the capture
of Charlemagne. The scheme was this: the Haitians would
establish a camp at Capois, near Grande Riviere, stage
mock raids on Gendarmerie outposts in the vicinity, and
having established a reputation, invite Charlemagne to par-
ticipate in a large-scale attack on Grande RiviSre. Charle-
magne would then be ambushed by Gendarmes brought in from
the Cape for that purpose.
As a result of their activity and numerous invitations,
Conze and his friends were visited by many minor chiefs in
September and October. They entertained lavishly, Hanneken
thoughtfully having provided the camp with $7$ worth of
tafia (native rum) and $10 worth of cola. These and other
sxpenses, including blue cloth for caco "uniforms," he paid
Tor from his own pocket.
Early in October the real cacos became suspicious of
the camp at Capois, and to save the situation Hanneken made
i simulated attack there, during which he pretended to be
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rounded. This action and a $200 subscription to the re-
olutionary cause, allegedly contributed by sympathizers
n Grande Rivie're but actually coming from Hanneken' s own
unds, had the desired effect. On October 26, 1919, Charle-
agne and his brother, St-Remy Pgralte, with many other
hiefs and perhaps 1200 cacos, arrived at Capois.
It was arranged that the attack on Grande Riviere would
ake place on the night of October 31, and that Charlemagne
ould await the results of that attack at a place called
azare, about three miles from the city. Due to the un-
ocpected size of the attacking force, Grande Rivie're was
ecretly reinforced with an additional marine machine gun
«rew. Early in the evening on October 31, Hanneken and
atton, their faces blackened, and wearing old, ragged
tLothes, took up positions at Mazare with 20 hand-picked
Ondarmes. Hanneken was armed with a ^5 caliber automatic
ad a 38 caliber revolver. Button carried a Browning auto-
ntic rifle. The other men had carbines.
At about 10 o'clock some 700 cacos passed enroute to
Oande Rivie're. From their ranks dropped Jean Francois,
tie "Secretary." He informed Hanneken that Charlemagne had
hd a change of mind and instead of coming to Mazare would
erait news of the attack at his mountain-top camp, a hard
tree hour march away. The Secretary had the countersign
(General Jean") and information that Charlemagne had
^ranged with the attacking force that they would send a
itachment up the mountain to inform him when the city had
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^allen. Hanneken decided that he and his men would be
;hat detachment. With the Secretary in the lead, they
3tarted off and after three hours of difficult mountain
climbing they arrived at the first of six outposts guard-
.ng the camp. They were halted there while the Secretary
lurried on to inform Charlemagne that the detachment from
Irand Rivie*re had arrived, Charlemagne ordered that they
•eport directly to him, and the Secretary returned to tell
anneken this. He warned him that it would be extremely
angerous to proceed, in view of the numerous posts they
ould have to pass. Nevertheless they continued, the
ecretary still in the lead, followed by Hanneken and then
utton, with the Gendarmes bringing up the rear. The first
utpost was passed without any trouble, the countersign
eing given by each man as he hurried by. After walking
bout five minutes, they were stopped at the second out-
ost and scrutinized very closely by the caco in charge,
anneken and Button acted as if they were nearly exhausted,
nd their act must have been pretty good, for they under-
tood some of the cacos to say "My! but those niggers are
Lred."
They passed right through the third and fourth out-
Psts, but at the fifth they were halted by a man with a
isvolver. Hanneken, still pretending to be exhausted,
daggered through, but Button was seized by the arm and
*;ked where he had gotten such a nice rifle. He jerked
i'ee, however, narrowly avoiding detection, and muttering
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ome choice Haitian oaths hurried on after Hanneken.
The sixth and last outpost was the immediate guard
round the Supreme Chief of the Cacos, who stood next to
camp fire about thirty paces distant when Hanneken entered
he camp. The Secretary pointed out Charlemagne to Hanneken
nd then stepped aside. The two marines moved to within
bout fifteen feet of their quarry before they were stopped
y the sound of bolts working in rifles. They immediately
pened fire, Hanneken taking deliberate aim at Charlemagne,
nd Button clearing the camp with his automatic rifle. The
endarmes sprang into action and took up positions to repell
ny counter-attack.
Charlemagne fell with one of Hanneken' s 45 caliber
ounds in his heart. Nine other cacos were killed and an
ndetermined number wounded. Nine serviceable rifles, three
evolvers, 200 rounds of ammunition and seven swords were
eized, as was a large amount of correspondence .3
Hanneken and his men delivered Charlemagne's body to
rande Rivie're at 9 o'clock the next morning, after a terri-
ying but on the whole uneventful journey down the mountain,
f they saw spirits and goblins behind every tree, they may
e excused. It was, after all, Halloween.
At Grande Rivie're the body of the caco chief was laid
. This account was drawn principally from the action reports
iled by Hanneken and his superiors in the Gendarmerie d* Haiti,
hey are found in the U.S. Marine Corps Records, Correspondence
ile of the First Provisional Brigade in Haiti, HQ, U.S. harine




out on a door, arms outspread, and photographed. Prints
of the photo were widely distributed by the Gendarmerie in
order to convince the cacos that their mystic leader, who
had claimed to be immune from marine bullets, was actually
dead. These photos were responsible for the story which
later circulated in Haiti that Charlemagne had been cru-
cified by the Americans, a story believed in many Haitian
circles to this day, and one which enhanced the Christ
image Charlemagne had actively cultivated in life. These
photographs of the body spread-eagled on a door eventually
reached the United States and gave impetus to atrocity
stories coming out of the war.
To thwart voodoo necromancy, Charlemagne's body was
juried in a great block of concrete. After the Occupation
snded it was disinterred and the remains were given a state
"uneral. The ceremony became the subject of a famous paint-
.ng by one of Haiti's most renowned artists.
For their part in the slaying of the caco chief, Hanne-
:en and Button were awarded the Medal of Honor. Sergeant
[anneken was later commissioned in the Marine Corps and re-
hired as a Brigadier General.
The death of Charlemagne virtually ended the war in the
orth, but his successor, Benoit Batraville, rallied the
acos in the rest of the country and continued the struggle.
a the early morning hours of January 15, 1920, he led a
arge force into Port-au-Prince itself and burned more than
city block in one of the poorer suburbs, Belair. The
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larine garrison routed the cacos, however, killing perhaps
}00 in the process. In the weeks that followed the attack
>n Port-au-Prince the back of the caco movement was broken,
ind more than 3200 prisoners were taken. Benoit managed
;o evade his pursuers for months, and in April, 1920, he
md his band ambushed a Gendarme patrol and captured its
eader, a Marine Sergeant commissioned as a Lieutenant in
he Gendarmerie. The marine's fate at the hands of Benoit
ras reported by a caco defector, an eye witness to what
ollows
.
The marine, Sergeant Muth, was wounded in the ambush
ut still conscious when examined by Benoit who determined
hat he was alive. He then nearly severed his head with a
ar machete. At his direction, a Dominican chief named Fran-
ique removed the Sergeant's brain, which was then smeared
n the sights of the cacos' rifles, the idea being that this
ould increase their accuracy. Muth's heart and liver,
elieved to be the seats of courage and sagacity, were taken
lit and eaten . There were at least three confirmed reports
'f cannibalism of Marines during the caco war.
Efforts to track down Benoit were redoubled, and on
lay 20, 1920, acting on an informer's report, a Marine patrol
ornered and shot him in his mountain camp, in circumstances
<ily a little less dramatic than those attending the death
C Charlemagne. This signaled the end of the Caco War. The
^maining chiefs quietly surrendered and peace was restored
1' the entire country.
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The Marines and the Gendarmes had defeated the cacos
.n a guerrilla war by adopting a plan of operations which
:ept their field forces broken up into patrols, 20 to 40
len in strength, which methodically tracked down their
nemies in their own terrain. It was the hardest sort of
ampaigning imaginable. Though greatly outnumbered by the
acos throughout the two year period of hostilities, the
arines and Gendarmes had the decided advantage of better
rms, better discipline, and better training. They op-
rated on the cardinal principle of never losing their
eapons to the enemy, and consequently there was never any
raestion of being shot with one's own arms. They never
dienated. the people who lived in the battleground, and in
ill of the atrocity stories later circulated against them
nne purports to describe acts of violence taken against
i village, or a peasant's shack, or his crops. In retro-
£>ect the Caco War seems to have been a remarkably "clean"
vir. The casualty figures, however, almost defy rational
e:planation. Seven Marines and twenty-seven Gendarmes were
tiled in action as opposed to a conservatively estimated
to thousand cacos. Could all of this be attributed to
sarp-shooting on the one side, and under-size ammunition
wapped in goat skin on the other? Body count in this war,
a it would later in Vietnam, generated a great controversy.
Late in 1919, at the height of the war, the Major Gen-
ml Commandant of the Marine Corps requested that the Haiti
-•npaign Badge, previously awarded for service in Haiti from
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uly 9 to December 6, 1915. be awarded to those Marines
hen engaged in operations against the cacos
. On November
,
1919, Secretary of the Navy Daniels replied as follows.
It is not considered that the services renderedin Haiti since the limiting date in General Order
305, namely, December 6, 1915, have been sufficient-
ly hazardous or of the military importance necessary
to justify an extension of that date.^
Haiti already had all the makings of a class "A" polit-
ical issue, and the Wilson administration had ample reason
1) play down military operations there.
4 U. S., Marine Corps Records, Correspondence File of FirstFoyisional Brigade in Haiti, HQ., U.S. Marine Corps, wash-Lgton, D.C., Secretary of the Navy to Major General Command-
at of the Marine Corps, November 6, 1919.
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II , Occupation Diplomacy .
The Haitian Government was painfully surprised
at hearing that, in the existing differences be-
tween it and the American Minister to Haiti, the
Government of the United States only regretted the
reason which compelled its representatives to arrive
at the grave decision of stopping payment of the
salaries of the President of the Republic, the Sec-
retaries of State, and members of the Council of
State
.
And what is that reason? The non-cooperation of
members of the Haitian Government with American
officials ....
The Haitian Government, much to its regret, can
only consider the suspension of payment of the sal-
aries of the President of the Republic and of other
members of the Government as an unwarranted coercive
measure intended to compel it to adopt financial
and other schemes which it regards as absolutely
antagonistic to the well considered interests of the
Haitian people ....
- President Sudre Dartiguenave, Republic of Haiti,
to President Woodrow Wilson, United States of
America, August 19» 1920.
The adoption of the new Constitution did not, un-
ortunately, usher in a new era of cooperation between the
aitian Government and Occupation officials. Public works,
ublic health, public safety, the customs, and to a large
xtent the administration of public finance were now firmly
."i American hands, but officials frequently found themselves
rustrated by Haitian courts and a balking Haitian Govern
-
i3n t which as often as not refused to provide the enabling
^gislation necessary for the proper carrying out of "treaty
^ligations ."
Within a few days after the proclaiming of the Con-
stitution, Bailly-Blanchard called on the President of the
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tepublic and informed him that in the future all legis-
lation bearing in any way on the objects of the treaty
mst be cleared in advance through the American Legation
"urther, the American Legation reserved to Itself the
Ight to introduce legislation deemed necessary for the
roper observance of the treaty.
In October, 1918, the Financial Adviser, Addison T.
uan, incensed over persistent irregularities in accounts
dministered by the Haitian Minister of Finance, demanded
hat the Council of State enact a law forbidding the Min-
ister to approve vouchers which did not have the Financial
.Iviser's prior authorization. The Council refused, on
he grounds that such was in violation of the Constitution,
ad the Marine Brigade Commander thereupon ordered the
Kitional Bank of Haiti to stop all payments to the Haitian
Overnment. This impasse continued for three months, and
i ally only ended on the resignation of Mr. Ruan and the
arival of his successor, Mr. John A. Mcllhenny. During
te disagreement American officials even refused to pay the
fheral expenses of the Haitian Minister in Washington, who
fid died there.
Under Mcllhenny financial relationships with the Hait-
ti Government creaked along on more or less an ad hoc basis,
lb American patience with an evasive and uncooperative ad-
Ikistration wore increasingly thin. Things came to a head
* August 1920, when, after discussions with Washington, the
''i.ancial Adviser abruptly suspended the salaries of senior
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aitian officials, including the President. Dartiguenave
ppealed directly to President Wilson, and received in
eply a lecture delivered by the American Minister in which
t was regretted that the close cooperation previously ex-
sting between the two governments had recently unfortun-
ately been lacking. Bailly-Blanchard emphasized the 1 in-
stance of strict adherence to treaty agreements, and
ided by offering to resume payment of the suspended sal-
lies providing the Haitian Government repealed eleven laws
ad enacted four. The laws which the United States Govern-
fent wished to have repealed dealt with such matters as
cmership of real estate in Haiti by resident foreigners,
tie return of sequestrated property to Germans, pensions,
cities on motor vehicles, trade-marks, mines and mining
concessions, preparation of primary school teachers, manual
t-aining schools, railroads and tramways, and firearms and
ammunition. The laws desired concerned currency reform and
te leasing of state lands.
The Haitian Government ultimately surrendered, and there-
iter American control of Haitian legislation was assured.
During this general period various financial and com-
ircial arrangements were made. National City Bank assumed
pal control of the National Bank of Haiti, buying out
tnch interests for $1.4 million dollars. A claims commiss-
k was established to settle foreign claims against the
iLtian Government and a' bond issue of $40 million dollars
<
be serviced by a first claim on internal revenue and a
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:econd claim on customs receipts, was approved but not
mmediately placed, due to unfavorable market conditions.
concession for oil exploration was granted to the Sinclair
orporation. A logwood contract negotiated with American
Interests was rejected by American officials because of its
onopolistic features. In all of these matters, great pains
ere taken to protect the interests of Haiti, and there is
Irtually no evidence to support the claims that Americans
feed their positions for personal enrichment, claims that
ftre freely mouthed but ill-substantiated by both Haitian
ad American critics of the Occupation.
In April, 1921, Edwin Denby, the new Secretary of the
N.vy, toured Haiti and was, like Franklin Roosevelt before
hm, favorably impressed with the signs of progress. At
te town of Maissade he was surprised to find the village
sreet decorated in his honor with flowers and palms and
a triumphal arch bearing the inscription "Vive 1' Occupation!"
delegation of local officials, citizens and school teachers,
timed out to give him a most cordial welcome. The children
sag the Haitian anthem, and then one verse of "America"
r English. Flowers were presented to the Secretary, along
jth a written request for continuance of the Occupation.
& same ceremony, with a greater or lesser degree of form-
Ity, greeted the Secretary at a number of other towns. 1
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st it should be noted that the triumphal arches, the songs,
he speeches, and the petitions were but reproductions and
ohoes of those prepared in the past for a Dessalines, a






From enthusiasm to imposture the step is peri-
lous and slippery; the demon of Socrates affords
a memorable instance how a wise man may deceive
himself; how a good man may deceive others; how
the conscience may slumber in a mixed and middle
state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud.




The Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps in
-919 was George Barnett, an extremely hard-working and
onscientious officer. In September of that year while
eviewing the records of courts martial convened by the
irst Provisional Brigade in Haiti, he was struck by cer-
ain allegations made by the defense counsel, one Lieu-
enant F.L. Spear, in the trial of Privates Walter E.
ohnson and John J. McQuilkin, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps.
ie two men were charged and convicted of having struck
hitian prisoners in their custody, and their defense was
hat they had done so in obedience to the orders of their
aperior officer, a Lieutenant Brokaw, Garde d'Haiti, who
vis a Sergeant in the U.S. Marine Corps. Brokaw had later
siot and killed the prisoners, but was not tried due to
rasons of insanity, for which he was then confined in a
mntal institution.
The allegations by Lieutenant Spear, who had been in
Hiti but a few months and in the Marine Corps less than
ayear, were that "practically indiscriminate killings of
Hltians" had occurred over a period of years. General
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Barnett accepted this at face value because, as he later
explained, "in all my experience of kk years in the serv-
Lce I have taken it as a matter of course that a statement
aade to me by a commissioned officer was true. 1 ' 1
The General immediately drafted an official letter to
;he Brigade Commander in Port-au-Prince, Colonel John H.
iussell. Colonel Russell had recently returned to Haiti,
it the express request of Secretary of State Lansing, for
i second tour as Brigade Commander. By virtue of his prior
ixperience he was considered the most knowledgeable officer
in Haitian affairs then in, the service, and what was more,
le was known to have the confidence of the Haitian Govern-
lent. General Barnett's letter ordered Russell to take
mmediate steps to end "unlawful executions of Haitians,"
nd to make a thorough investigation of the charges made
y Lieutenant Spear in his argument as defense counsel in
he John son- Kc Qui llin court martial. This letter was
ollowed up by a second letter marked "personal and con-
idential" on October 2. Parts of that letter are re-
roduced below.
My dear Colonel:
Since you left here several things have come to
my notice with reference to the affairs in Haiti,
especially in relation to the duties of the Gendarmes
in the interior. The court-martial of one private
for the killing of a native prisoner brought out a
.
U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
tate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
tatement of Ma j
.
Gen. George Barnett, USMC, to Select'com-
ittee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, October 24, 1921, fticro
spy 610, Vol. 10.
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statement by his counsel which showed me that prac-
tically indiscriminate killing of natives has gone
on for some time....
I was shocked beyond expression to hear of such
things and to know that it was at all possible that
duty could be so badly performed by Marines of my
cJias s . . .
.
I want personal instructions sent to every officer
and non-commissioned officer, both with the Marines
and Gendarmerie, that conditions as shown by the
evidence in the trial of the private above referred
to must be corrected, and such action cannot be tol-
erated for a moment; and I want every case thoroughly
sifted and the guilty parties brought to justice.
I think this is the most startling thing of its kind
that has ever taken place in the Marine Corps, and
I don't want anything of the kind to happen again.
I think, judging by the knowledge gained only from
the cases that have been brought before me, that the
Marine Corps has been sadly lacking in right and
justice, and I look to you to see that this is cor-
rected and corrected at once. 2
Though the letter had been marked "personal and con-
fidential," General Barnett had a copy of it placed in the
>fficial files of the Marine Corps Headquarters in Wash-
ngton, along with a copy of his earlier official letter.
Colonel Russell acknowledged receipt of both letters
nd began a thorough, but due to certain inherent diffi-
ulties in such matters, lengthy investigation. Sworn
tatements had to be secured from personnel no longer serv-
ng in Haiti, transportation arranged, etc. As a conse-
uence, when General Barnett was relieved as Major General
ommandant on June 30, 1920, Russell's report of the in-
estigation had still not been received in Washington.
.
U. S., Marine Corps Records, Correspondence File of First
rovisional Brigade in Haiti, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps, Wash-




By then, the performance of American Marines in Haiti,
nd the Wilson Administration's responsibilities associated
herewith, had become a first class, front page, political
ssue. Wilsonian idealism, of which the country was per-
aps growing a little tired as his second term neared an
nd, was dragged gleefully through the mire of Haiti. The
ost lurid tales, the most baseless charges, circulated as
ospel. People seemed prepared to swallow anything, pro-
ided it was damning to America, or to America's armed
orces. But then, even General Barnett, with his 44 years
f service, had been quick, to believe the worst.
The summit of irresponsible journalism was probably
eached by Mr. Herbert J. Seligman in his article "The
inquest of Haiti," which appeared in The Nation on July
p, 1920. Mr. Seligman had made a brief visit to Haiti
arlier in the year and he returned to the United States
iBarly rabid on the subject of American Marines.
The history of the American invasion of Haiti is
only additional evidence that the United States is
among those Powers in whose international dealings
democracy and freedom are mere words, and human lives
negligible in face of racial snobbery, political
chicane, and money. The five years of American Occu-
pation, from 1915 to 1920, have served as a comment-
ary upon the white civilization which still burns
black men and women at the stake. For Haitian men,
women, and children, to a number estimated at 3,000,innocent for the most part of any offense, have been
shot down by American machine guns and rifle bullets;
black men and women have been put to torture to make
them give information; theft, arson, and murder have
been committed almost with impunity upon the persons
and property of Haitians by white men wearing the
uniforms of the United States In this five years'
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massacre of Haitians less than twenty Americans have
been killed or wounded in action....
The Haitians in whose service United States mar-
ines are presumably restoring peace and order in
Haiti are nicknamed "Gooks" and have been treated
with every variety of contempt, insult, and brutal-
ity. . . .
This militarist, imperialist burlesque on the
profession with which the United States entered the
war in behalf of weaker states leaves the Haitians
little to do but to wonder what the United States
intends.... In the absence of any plans for Haiti's
regeneration except through "development" of the
country by exploiters, the Haitian may derive what
spiritual nourishment he can from the Wilsonian
phrases with which the United States thuggery dis-
guises its deeds.
3
"The Conquest of Haiti" created a sensation. The
Jtate and Navy Departments were flooded with demands for
nformation. The National Association for the Advancement
if Colored People denounced the administration's policy in
[aiti. It being an election year, and Senator Harding know-
ng an issue when he saw one, a chorus of Republican demands
or investigation of the "Haiti Scandal" soon filled the
and. General Barnett was recalled to Washington from his
ome at Huntley, Virginia, arriving on the night train early
n the morning of September 18, 1920. In obedience to orders
rom Josephus Daniels, he spent the day compiling a report
f Marine activities in Haiti during his tenure as Major
eneral Commandant. Documenting that report were copies
f his correspondence with Colonel Russell, including the
.
Herbert J. Seligman, "The Conquest of Haiti," The Nation,
^ly 10, 1920. '
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'personal and confidential" letter of October 2, 1919. The
complete report was delivered to the Secretary of the Navy
;hat evening, in the presence of the Assistant Secretary,
General Lejeune, and Mr. Daniel's public relations assistant,
i Mr. Jenkins
.
It appears now that Mr. Jenkins was one of those in-
.ividuals who recognize higher duty when they see it. It
ras his responsibility, of course, to read the report and
ielp prepare the Secretary to adequately field the questions
f journalists. What he thought when he stumbled across
eneral Barnett's "practically indiscriminate killing of
atives" is not known, but on the basis of circumstantial
vidence, opportunity, and philosophical inclination, he
s a prime suspect in the mystery of who leaked the Gen-
ral's letters to The New York Times
.
When the story broke, in the middle of October, just
j
few weeks before the election, General Barnett was en-
:3ute to the West Coast. Secretary Daniel's summons reached
Urn in Chicago, and he caught the next train east. The
feting between the Secretary of the Navy and the late
Ujor General Commandant was a memorable one.
"Mr. Daniels, I see in the morning papers that youhave stated that you never saw my letter until it
was published."
"I never saw it."
"Excuse me, Sir, but you did see it."




"Of course, General, if you say I saw it I must have
seen it, but I forgot it."
"You did not say that you had forgotten it, but
you had never seen it."^
A Naval Court of Inquiry, headed by Rear Admiral Henry
'. Mayo, was immediately appointed to investigate the per-
ormance of the Marines in Haiti. It met in Washington in
•ctober and journeyed to Haiti shortly thereafter, arriving
n Port-au-Prince on November 8, aboard the USS Niagara.
Republicans and editorialists in The Nation charged "white-
rash" before the first witnesses appeared before the Court,
'he Findings of the Inquiry, when they were released, after
he Republican victory at the polls, were interpreted as
early complete vindication of American military conduct
n Haiti. The Court found that two unjustifiable homi-
ides and sixteen other serious acts of violence against
itizens of Haiti had occurred during the period 1915-
920, and that in every case those responsible had been
irought to trial before a general court martial, convicted
nd sentenced. It further found that there were no proper
;rounds for the statement that "practically indiscriminate
lllings of natives has been going on for sometime." Gen-
;ral Barnett, perhaps properly, took this last as a rebuke
. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
state Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
statement of Ma j . Gen, George Barnett, USMC, to Select Com-




;o himself, and later petitioned Mr. Daniels to state pub-
.icly that he had not been reprimanded. The Secretary of
he Navy, however, was terrible in his righteousness and
;here is no record that he ever again addressed himself to
he General after their little disagreement.
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XIV. The Mistreated Missionary
.
While Haiti's fertile soil now needs,
Keen human skill to till it;
What Haiti needs above all things,
Is Christian love to fill it.
God give thee health, and strength and grace
And favor with the Nation;
And never hide thee from His Face,
But show thee His salvation.
Go brother, tell them of the Light,
And of the Life Eternal;
That's offered unto black and white,
In the bright world supernal
.
We know, God shall be glorified
Whatever the condition;
With such a servant, true and tried,
Out in the Haiti Mission.
And if you'll not return to tell
The thrilling Haiti Story,
May God "who doeth all things well"
Grant us to meet in Glory
.
- Cynonfardd, "Prospectus for Proposed Evan-
gelization of the Over Six Million Christless
Negroes of Haiti and Liberia."
On October 25, 1920, the Republican National Committee
stained a lawyer to assist a Baptist Missionary in his
efforts to "prevent any further suppression of the facts
>y Secretary Daniels or any other board which the present
•dministration may create in its efforts to meet the charges
f Senator Harding. "1
It is doubtful if anyone was a greater thorn in the
ide of the American Occupation in Haiti during the last
ozen years or so of its existence than the Reverend L.
:>n Evans, missionary in the Welsh Baptist Church. His
'
j|h e New York Herald
, October 25, 1920.
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letters, and newspaper accounts of public appearances paint
a picture of a man who, in the latter stages of his life,
was Irrational in the extreme, a fanatic who became almost
Lncoherent when he spoke or wrote on the subject of his
iaitian "ordeal" at the hands of Americans in the Occupat-
.on. Yet for all this, he managed to fill a file of cor-
respondence and reports at the Navy Department, and another
it the State Department. In 1931 a bill, S.2359, "For the
•elief of L. Ton Evans, General Missionary, and family,
aiti Mission, and proposed American Christian Industrial
Uskegee," was considered by the United States Congress,
ad it passed, he would have received $300,000. Through-
ut his long life, he wrote and talked to anyone and every-
ke who would listen concerning his Haitian experiences.
•
public figure who made the mistake of replying to his
notgun correspondence would thereafter be listed as not
lly a close personal friend of the pastor, but irrevocably
signed with him on every conceivable issue. David Lloyd
::orge, Theodore Roosevelt, several American Secretaries of
late, and numerous Senators and Representatives found them-
'Ives in that embarrassing position, often for no other
'ason than that a courtesy had been paid in acknowledging
|e of Mr. Evans 1 communications.
L. Ton Evans was born in Wales, in I863, the son of a
tlthy saloon keeper. After graduating from the Haverford-
fct Baptist Seminary in 188?, he became the organizing
ketary of the District Gospel Temperance Council in his
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iome town. What his father (who by then had prospered to
;he extent of owning a brewery) thought of his son's
iberration, is not known. After various short-lived
issignments in Wales, during which he made a name for
ilmself as a booze fighter, his Church allowed him to
;ravel in the Holy Land. He returned from that journey
;o accept, in 1892, the position of General Missionary of
;he Jamaica Missionary Board in Haiti, and for two years
e performed missionary work in the Black Republic, at
acmel
.
From 189^ to 1902 he "was again in Wales, engaged as
efore in Temperance activities. He then received a call
the First Baptist Church, in Edwardsville, Pennsylvania,
hile there, "believing in a Republican form of government,"
e took out United States citizenship papers. His aversion
alcohol almost provoked armed conflict in the small
ennsylvania town, and at one point his church was actually
et on fire, presumably by the pro-whisky crowd. In 1908
e resigned his charge to become Field Secretary of the
aptist Mission in Haiti, spending four years in that post
sfore returning to another small church in Pennsylvania,
-iring this period he began his career as an avid letter
riter on the subject of Haiti, and he consistently spoke
'-it in favor of American intervention "in the name of
iimanity" to end the senseless bloodshed he was witness to
lere.
He returned to Haiti for a third and last time on

-186-
Thanksgivlng Day, November 29, 1917, as the Superintendent
of the Lott Carey Convention, a Baptist missionary group
affiliated with and supported by an association of southern
negro churches. On landing in Haiti, Evans was immediately
struck by the great changes wrought by the Occupation. As
ne later testified before the Select Committee on Haiti and
Santo Domingo, these changes went beyond roads and sani-
:ation projects. The restoration of order, he believed,
lad actually transformed the life of the people, so that
rtiere once there had been terror and bolted doors and shutters
:here was now peace and quiet, and pleasant, placid faces.
About six months after this return to Haiti, Pastor
vans made an inspection trip to certain churches in the
orth of Haiti, and one afternoon as he was leaving St.
aphael with two Haitian churchmen he encountered two white
en on horseback, who appeared to be experiencing some diffi-
lllty in maintaining their seats. One of the horsemen was
lentified by Pastor Evans' companions as the Gendarmerie
(lief in St. Raphael. The renowned temperance fighter was
Drtified that a fellow representative of the United States
siould be seen in public in such a disgraceful condition.
I said as much to the Brigade Commander, Colonel Russell,
sveral weeks later during the course of an office call on
te Colonel. His disclosure brought three quick results:
O reprimand of the Gendarmerie officer, Second Lieutenant
Asel H. Haug; (2) an order directing that the sale of al-
lelic beverages to Marines in Haiti be forbidden; and (3)
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i complaint filed in the Haitian Court of First Instance
it Cape Haitian by Lieutenant Haug charging the Reverend
j, Ton Evans with "slanderous denunciation."
On July 13, 1918, Evans wrote to the Haitian judge
jho had issued a summons that he appear in court to answer
;he charge
.
Judge P.J.M, Obas, Juge d* Instruction au Tribunal
Civil, etc.
Dear Sir:
I received your "mandate" to appear at your court
on the 29th instant, to be interviewed and questioned
about somebody, etc.
I shall be very glad if you will be so kind as to
inform me definitely as to the name of the person and
the exact nature of the complaint, or alleged charge
to have been made in reference to myself which is a
United States Citizen and also in my position as Gen-
eral Secretary and Superintendent of the Baptist Miss-
ion Work in Haiti and representing some 3,000,000
negro Baptist and practically something like 6,000,000
more white Baptists of America as I do - I am entitled
to this definite information from you and your Court.
I must say, however, that I have already planned
to leave with my wife if possible by a Panama Steamer
leaving Port au Prince by the end of this month on
official business to see my Missionary Board in the
States as well as to visit our President, Woodrow
Wilson, at Washington, it will be impossible for me
to visit the Cape at the time you mention.
I should also add that I have planned for a con-
ference at Port au Prince with the Minister and our
United States Superintendent of Instruction, who will
arrange with Colonel Russell of the Occupation and
probably the President of Haiti, if not, National
Council Remy, explaining to them the project of a
proposed "National and Industrial College," the petit-
ion for which I took to the United States seven years
ago, as, perhaps, the Judge knows.
After the definite information asked, I may arrange
what steps and when, I shall take on the return which
I expect will be in October of this year. 2
.
U. S., Marine Corps Records, Correspondence File of the





The letter was signed "yours very sincerely, L. Ton
ivans, (For Christ and Haiti)." The busy missionary then
lade his visit to the United States, and apparently forgot
ill about the summons to appear in court.
On December 28, 1918, Evans having returned from the
nited States, the Haitian wheels of Justice took another
urn, and a warrant for his arrest was issued by the Court
f First Instance at St. Marc, where he then resided. what
appened next is described in the missionary's own words
i a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated November
Pi 1922.
1. ... This arrest took place Saturday afternoon,
of December 28, 1918 - by a ruthless invasion of
Missionary's private study, at the home of MadameOnus Paultre (widow of late President Judge Paultre)
and family at Saint Marc, by the armed Corporal(native) of Saint Marc, Gendarmerie - at the command
of his white Captain Fitzerald Brown, and while the
Missionary Superintendent was peacefully pursuinghis sacred Mission, and planning for native Churches
and their Evangelical Schools, in ile Gonave - and
other places in Haiti, and while being in the very
act of typing addresses on envelopes to be distrib-
uted to members of Churches, and branch mission
stations the following Sabbath morning.
2. The mere request of Missionary, to the armed nativeCorporal as to his Authority, and Right of forced in-trusion upstairs to his private Study, and for pro-duction of his warrant showing cause of his arrest
was subsequently at the Gendarmerie headquarters con-
strued by the excited American white Captain, underinfluence of liquor into a Rebellion against PublicAuthority.
3. Following the negro armed Corporal, who was also
excited and somewhat savage - through liquor - the
Missionary descended the stairway stepping to the
open street, to find himself instantly surrounded bya heavy armed guard, of about a dozen Gendarmes. Thelittle negro Corporal roughly snatched the shade(parasol) from the hands of the missionary super-
intendent - as he opened it to protect himself under
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a broiling tropical sun - amid the cries of SHAME
from the other armed natives who said "Let the
Missionary have his parasol." He was immediately
hurried through the public streets, past his Church,
exposed to the scorching sun before the terror
stricken natives, who fled to hide in fear, and
trembling; many of whom were sobbing aloud. His
further Request on passing his Church and in front
of the door of the house of one of his native Deac-
ons (and by this convinced he was being led to
prison, if not to be shot) to hand over the key to
his locked study, so as to return same to native
Dr. Hector Paultre (Clerk of local Church and Gonave
mission) for the distribution of his addressed en-
velopes on Sabbath morning (next day) was not only
savagely denied, but intentionally DISTORTED (as
declared by Haiti's Superior Court) at the same
Gendarmerie headquarters, and by the same white,
excited, cursing, and liquor-soaked American Captain,
and United States Marine officer into AN ATTEMPT of
the Missionary TO ESCAPE FROM JUSTICE.
4. On arrival at headquarters of Saint Marc's Gendarm-
erie, Captain Brown, who had hurriedly drawn up the
so-called two CHARGES, excitedly, and rapidly read
and hurled them (amid oaths, and threats of being
shot, repeatedly aiming to lay hold of his loaded
rifle) at the American Missionary as he stood in front
of the Captain, and surrounded by the armed negro
Gendarmes. After further insults, threats, and curs-
ing him for his efforts to Christianize, educate and
industrially and morally develop "the low down, dirty,
and damned niggers of Haiti" this United States Marine
Officer, assured the American Missionary - they (Cap-
tain Brown, General Alexander Williams, Major Welles,
Lieutenant Haug, and other conspirators, it was under-
stood) would not only discredit, but degrade, and
absolutely crush him, and after an additional volley
of oaths, and while raving like a drunken maniac, all
the while laying hold of gun declaring I should be
shot - he finally yelled "Away with the villain, to
prison." The Missionary was dumbfounded at such a
treatment, and sad humiliating spectacle - in striking
contrast with that of Captain Brown ' s immediate pre-
decessor - Captain Kinney, who himself had not only
personally complimented the Missionary on his excellent
work, and splendid influence among the natives, and-
Gendarmes - but as an expression of gratitude per-
sonally and voluntarily gave a special Official permit
for him, and his trained Missionary wife, to conduct
Sunday Religious services to prisoners at Saint Marc
old prison.
5. No sooner than the prison was reached, than the
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American Missionary was searched, every article
such as Bible, glasses, photographs of wife, and
little boys, photograph of United States President
with official document from U .S . PRESIDENT and
State Department, etc., were taken from him after
which he was thrust - that same Saturday afternoon -
into a small, narrow, negro, slave, death-cell (of
old French Colonial days) the heavy bar drawn with
a tremendous thud, so, as to strike terror no doubt
into the poor superintendent Missionary's heart.
6. Here, now he remained cut off from Family, Native
Christians and the whole world - for 13 days, and
12 longest and darkest nights of his life, with armed
negro pacing constantly before the small thick door
of his dark dungeon, lying on hard bare floor of the
old death-cell, hat in hand - panting for a breath of
air; and amid the heart-breaking groans, and yells of
something like 180 negro prisoners, (including the
females, mothers, and even babes), many of whom be-
ing beaten, and tortured to death; then would follow
scuffing, marching, and heavy trampling as if wounded
and dead were hurriedly and secretly carried away in
the dark; and all the while the Missionary startled
as the flash of the armed guard's small lantern was
turned upon the narrow and tiny aperture (called
window) near top of his cell-door, and he heard the
tramp of his feet - believing that the American Cap-
tain, and United States Marine officer in one of his
drunken orgies, while entertaining his reputed drunken
superior officers (General Williams, Major Welles,
etc.) had at last given the stern command to drag the
Christian Missionary from his dungeon before a firing
squad as done with other prisoners in Saint Marc,
and other Haitian prisons at this time without any
pretense of trial...
^
The above tale, embellished and re-embellished, with
»me details added and others dropped, became the Reverend
I Ton Evans* standard sermon, and no doubt the poor old man
blieved the horror he had conjured up for himself. Cer-
liinly, many of his readers and listeners believed it. The
U.S., Marine Corps Records, Correspondence File of First





records of the St. Marc Gendarmerie show that he was in
'act confined in civil prison there from December 28,
L918 to January 9> 1919» and that he was provided with
i mattress, a pillow, and a blanket - conveniences not
'urnished other prisoners or required to be furnished by
Haitian law.
While in prison his sponsor, the North Carolina Mutual
ind Provident Association of Durham, discontinued its support
)f his missionary activity, citing his political activity
ind threatening letters he had written to President Wilson,
unong other things, the As'sociation wrote "we want you to
understand that the American Negro stands loyally behind the
resident and his action in shaping the destiny of Haiti,
rhich is under our protection, and it places us in a very
imbarrassing position as a convention to be called in ques-
lon as to our loyalty to the nation in a time like this....
t is not in the minds of the American negroes to under-
ake to shape the political policy of an independent country
f which they know very little, especially in opposition to
he American nation."^
At his hearing before the Court of First Instance at
ape Haitian on January 20, 1919. Pastor Evans recounted
is story with the aid of an interpreter. After many years
f missionary work in Haiti, he could speak neither French
.
U. S., National .Archives, Records of the Department of
tate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
orth Carolina Mutual and Provident Association to Rev. L.
on Evans, Micro Copy 610, Vol. 7.
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or the native Creole. Lieutenant Haug, perhaps influenced
iy his superiors, dropped charges against him and he was
•eleased. He left Haiti shortly after and never returned,
he story he later told that he had been awarded a judge-
.ent by the Haitian Supreme Court in the amount of $100,
00 for false imprisonment had no basis in fact, though
e enlarged and pressed that claim for years and, as pre-
iously stated, eventually saw it carried to the floor of
he United States Congress.
He was violently anti-Catholic, and in speeches and
rinted material he often compared the influence of the
rench clergy in Haiti to that of Rasputin in imperial
Russia. His prejudices were so open and so frequently ex-
ressed that it is difficult to see how his testimony on
aything could be accepted at face value, and yet on Haitian
utters he became a "resident expert" for those attacking
ae Occupation
.
The Reverend L. Ton Evans never realized his dream of
(stablishing in Haiti his "American Christian Industrial
'iskegee." His obsessed hatred of the Marines of the Occu-
]ttion probably contributed to the physical and mental
ollapse which forced his early retirement from the serv-
le of his Church. His last years were spent in Wyoming,
Innsylvania, and he died there a bitter and broken old
in whose longed-for martyrdom had somehow managed to elude
I'm in that narrow prison cell at St. Marc.
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)? . The Senate Select Committee.
My dear Sir:
Some days ago I overheard the following conver-
sation:
A. What do you think of the Hayti business?
B. Oh, I don't know.
A. Well, I will tell you this. A few years ago
on a trip East, I met in the Broad Street Station
at Philadelphia, an old friend of mine, an officer
in the Marines, In reply to the question, as to
what he was doing there, he said: "I am about to
entrain a battalion of Marines for Hayti. There
is some trouble down there, and official orders
are to go down there and straighten things out.
Unofficial orders are to kill every G..D... nigger
that comes in sight .
"
Later I approached "A" telling him of what I over-
heard and asked if I might quote him. His answer
was "Not by a d . . . sight .
"
This may or may not have value to you, I send it
as it may be of some use.
The remarkable letter quoted above, which might be
escribed as hearsay thrice removed, was forwarded to the
ijcretary of the Navy by Senator Medill McCormick on Oct-
oer 21, 1921, with a terse "I think this is of enough
nment for you to read it through," The Senator had re-
ceived it from James Weldon Johnson, Secretary of the Nat-
3»nal Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
*io in turn had received it from a Mr. James Harold Coleman
H New York, not otherwise identified.
James Weldon Johnson had been meddling in Haitian
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Dolitics for more than a year. In April, 1920, he visited
Dort-au- Prince in company with Mr. Herbert J. Seligman, an
issociate in the NAACP, a Socialist, and a contributing
jditor with The Nation , whose article "The Conquest of
[aiti" has already been referred to. In Port-au-Prince
Ir. Johnson and Mr. Seligman closely associated themselves
1th the political opposition to the Dartiguenave Govern-
ent, and especially with a newly organized group called
he Union Patriotique , which was headed by George Sylvain,
.
Pauleus Sannon, Stenio Vincent, and Percival Thoby
.
he Union Patriotique claimed to represent virtually all
f the Haitian people, but it is doubtful if it ever counted
ore than 10,000 adherents at the most. Its leaders were,
owever, articulate and literate men, and it is not sur-
rising that they found in Mr. Johnson and Mr. Seligman
Indred spirits.
On their return to the United States, Mr. Johnson
lid Mr. Seligman persuaded friends at The Nation , Oswald
drrison Villard and Dr. Ernest H. Greuning, to aid them
I welding together the resources of The Nation , the NAACP,
tid the Union Patriotique , into the Haiti-Santo Domingo
^dependence Society, an organization whose purpose it
>'uld be to lobby and agitate for the immediate withdrawal
c marines, the re-establishment of constitutional govern-
nnt, and the negotiation of equitable treaties in those
t fortunate republics
.
Moral and limited financial support began to flow to

-195-
bhe Union Patriotlque from this organization in the United
States, and President Dartiguenave, believing his political
>pposition to be subversive in character, complained. There
/as little, however, that Occupation authorities could do,
;iven the current atmosphere in the United States.
In December 1920, and again in February 1921, demands
rere made in the United States Congress for a congressional
nvestigation of affairs in Haiti. The elections were over,
owever, and it seems likely that a grumbling acceptance of
he in-house Navy Department inquiries would eventually have
ome to pass (Rear Admiral Knapp and General Lejeune, USMC,
ad made reports separate from that of the Mayo Court),
ad it not been for the arrival in May 1921, of a dele-
ation representing the Union Patriotique
. The avowed pur-
ose of this delegation was to present a ,'Memoire ,, to the
merican Government reviewing the history of the inter-
vention as seen through its eyes, and enumerating certain
smands the United States was expected to meet forthwith,
•l tone the memoire was such that it might have leapt from
Jie typewriting machine of the Reverend L. Ton Evans, with
ditorial assistance from the staff of The Nation
. A few




The American officers of the Gendarmerie are
privates (in the American Marine Corps) who have
been made officers in Haiti, and who have had no-
thing but a most elementary education, which nat-
urally renders them incapable of any military
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training. The ghastly mortality in the prisonstogether with confirmation by survivors reveals a
r^°r<iof atrocities, of brutality, and cruelty




The delegates of the Union Patriotioue were refused a
f.rmal hearing by the State Department, which was of course
|e proper and diplomatic thing to do, the recognized Hait-
jn Government already being duly represented in Washington,
lis refusal, however, brought strong protest from pre-
ictable sources. The complete text of the "Memoire" was
Pblished in The Nation, and the lead editorial in that
he issue asserted that "no impartial reader of the Hait-
-i memoire will doubt the truth of its charges," and
|ned that "Haiti must not become either America's Belgium
»: America's Ireland. "2 Echoes of this sentiment converged
* Washington from Church Federations, Negro Groups, and
*ious Pacifist Organizations.
On August 5, 1921, pursuant to a resolution of the
late, a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo be-
* hearings in Washington. The Committee was chaired by
Un ion Patriotln iiP.
"Memoirs • Th c M0f</(
. Tho m^+-7 a—- iiciiiuxre, me Nation. Mav 2 *> iqpi
•ii^JLation, editorial, May 25, 1921.
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ledill Mccormick (Republican, Illinois), and initially its
lembers were: Philander C. Knox (Republican, Pennsylvania),
?asker Oddie (Republican, Nevada), Atlee Pomerene (Demo-
rat, Ohio), and William H. King (Democrat, Utah). Before
t appeared virtually all the leading figures of the Am-
erican intervention. Admiral Caperton came, his mind not
s sharp as it once had been, repeatedly finding it nec-
ssary to refer to his voluminous notes and records. Mr.
oger L. Farnham, rich, successful, recently made a senior
ice President of the National City Bank, put in an appear-
nce to explain the tangled web of Haiti's pre-Intervention
inances. The Reverend L. Ton Evans, eyes flashing, voice
uavering, read into the record his Haitian sermons, and
xasperated the Chairman on more than one occasion when
e could not be made to give an intelligible answer to
aestions of fact. Smedley Butler regaled the Senators
Lth his little bits of Haitiana, disguising the steely
nderside of his character that had earned him the nick-
nme "Old Gimlet Eye" in the Corps. General Barnett tried
ad failed to make himself look something other than a
l>ol over the "practically indiscriminate killing" state-
nnt. Hundreds of pages of testimony were taken. Those
vio appeared before the Committee were subjected to quest-
i'ning not only by the Committee itself, but, remarkably,
a lawyer, Mr. Ernest Angell, representing the Haiti-




On November 16, the Hearings adjourned in Washington,
nd the Committee journeyed to Port-au-Prince. When the
enators arrived there, on November 29, they were greeted
y carefully staged demonstrations, and banners and posters
ere displayed which asked, in English, "Shall Haiti Be
our Belgium?" and "Shall Haiti Be Your Ireland?" These
emonstrations were almost certainly a tactical error on
he part of the Union Patriotique
, which took credit for
heir organization, and Medill McCormick, for one, was
•penly angered by them.
Hearings were held in Port-au-Prince and in various
«ther Haitian cities through the first week in December,
j?21, after which the Committee traveled on to Santo Dom-
:igo. Senator McCormick, who spoke fluent French, often
aspensed with the services of an interpreter at sessions
h chaired, and found occasion to criticize the almost
Dtal absence of French-speaking officers in the Occupat-
In forces. The case against the Occupation presented by
1le Un ion Patriotique was in general a very weak one, with
£ great deal of the Committee's time taken up by witnesses
>io gave obviously coached and frequently hearsay testimony
R such subjects as stolen mules, drunken marines, and the
ccline in public morals. Much of the testimony presented
sbtly backfired. Dr. George Sylvain, President of the
Lion Patriotique. made certain remarks concerning the
filure of the Occupation to adequately support the Haitian
eucational system, and stated with some degree of pride
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hat Haiti had practiced compulsory education since 1864.
uestioned further, however, he agreed that only two per-
ent of Haiti's people were able to read and write. What
. commentary on Haitian administration'.
Also in Haiti at this time was Dr. Ernest Greuning.
|b called on Colonel Russell, who noted in the Brigade
ommander's Daily Diary Report that "Mr. Greuning, I am
ifraidf has come to Haiti with the idea of not seeing any-
ling good, but only looking for something sensational to
rite up for his paper. "3 From informers it was learned
iat at the homes of opposition leaders Dr. Greuning made
a ti-American and incendiary speeches during his stay in
he Haitian capital. On his return to the United States
h put together a documented narrative titled "Conquest
C Haiti and Santo Domingo" which was published in The
hw York Times Current History
. The article followed Mr.
Liligman's line and was equally as sensational.
When the Committee returned to Washington, about the
n.ddle of December, 1921, a preliminary report of its flnd-
igs was released in the form of a brief statement to the
pess
.
The members of the Committee are unanimous in
the belief that the presence of the small American
force in Haiti is as necessary to the peace and
U.S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
Sate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
tily Diary Report, First Provisional Brigade of Marines in
£iti, November 10, 1921, Micro Copy 610, Vol. 8.
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developraent of the country as are the services to
the Haitian Government of the American officials
appointed under the treaty of 1915 . There can be
no abrogation of the treaty, and at this time nodiminution of the small force of marines.
It is important that steps should be taken forth-
with to co-ordinate the labors of the represent-
atives of the U.S. Government in Haiti, and of the
so-called American treaty officials. There shouldbe appointed a Special Representative of the Presi-dent, a High Commissioner, in whom should be vestedthe usual diplomatic powers of an envoy extra-
ordinary, and to whom, furthermore, all the American
officials appointed under the treaty, as well as the
commandant of the Marine Brigade, should look fordirection and guidance. The members of the CommitteeKnow of no reason why the duties of the Financial
Adviser and the Collector of Customs should not bedischarged by one person.^
Senator McCormick expanded on these recommendations in
(letter to the Secretary of State, Mr. Charles Evan Hughes,
(i December 14, 1921. Stating that from his observations
lie Haitian people were "wretchedly poor" and that their
ferchants were suffering, he urged that the long pending
]>an be concluded without further delay. He suggested that
iierican assistance was necessary in both the administration
Haitian justice and the support of education, while re-
cgnizing the silence of the treaty in these areas. He
tought that tariff advantages similar to those granted
Cba were justified for Haiti, in view of the responsi-
bilities and authority assumed by the United States there.
3 concluded by asserting that "any policy which we lay
W^-?" National Archives, Naval Records Collection,
ttZlt\ fn 1 ' 1911 " 1927 ' Reco^ ^oup 45 , Press Rel





lown in all probability cannot bear full fruit in Haiti
Luring the lifetime of one or two administrations in Wash-
.ngton . It is for this reason that the members of the
Senate Committee hope that their report when it is pub-
ished will serve to remove American policy in Haiti from
he field of partisan controversy . "^
The preliminary report was not well received by the
aiti-Santo Domingo Independence Society, especially in
iew of the fact that additional hearings in Washington
ad been promised so that its counsel might sum up the
rgument for the "prosecution." These were held, and a
ist of nine immediate and five ultimate "demands" were
ead into the record. If met, these demands would have
ssulted in the immediate termination of the American Occu-
ation, punishment of individuals found guilty of dere-
liction of duty, and restoration of that democratic form
t government presumed to have been functioning in Haiti
rior to the landing of American marines. "By sheer force
C arms, unjustified by any wrong committed or threatened
t> our own country, or to any other country, we have crushed
tie independence of another people, stamped out by force,
£.d by clever devices bearing the pious sanctity of law,
eery vestige of native self-government, every possibility
effective opposition to alien intrusion and domination.
5 U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
Sate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
Snator Medill McCormick to Secretary of State, December 14,
121, Micro Copy 610, Vol. 9.
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<le have made of Haiti a vassal, a stepping stone under our
southward marching absorption of Central America.''^
The Committee's final report, when it was published
.ate in 1922, contained over 1800 pages of transcript,
ts conclusions were relatively brief, and its recommend-
tions did not go much beyond those put forth in the pre-
iminary report. It was stated that the Committee believed
hat American officials had exercised undue influence in
he choice of a Haitian Government and in the ratification
f the 1915 treaty. The Committee expressed its chagrin
t the improper or criminal conduct of some few members of
ae Marine Corps in Haiti, but then went on to take a de-
eded swipe at the Haiti-Santo Domingo Independence Society
ad The Nation » by saying that it found it to be its duty
bo condemn the process by which biased or interested in-
c.viduals and committees and propagandists have seized on
isolated instances, or have adopted as true any rumor how-
rer vile or baseless in an effort to bring into general
c srepute the whole American naval force in Haiti. The
Cmmittee wishes to express its admiration for the manner in
vich our men accomplished their dangerous and delicate task."?
6 U. s., National Archives, Records of the Department of
Sate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 191O-I929,
Satement of Ernest Angell before the Senate Select Committee
Haiti and Santo Domingo, June 15, 1922, Micro Copy 610,
7 iPld.. Report of the Senate Select Committee on Haiti andi>ito Domingo, Micro Copy 610, Vol. 11,
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On July 7. 1922, Mr. Moorefield Storey of Boston, an
)ld friend of Secretary of State Hughes, wrote a personal
Letter to the Secretary in which he castigated him for his
support of the Administration's Haitian policy. In a post-
script to the letter he added something which expressed
-,he remarkable sentiment shared by those who remained un-
convinced by the Senate Select Committee's report.
If you quote to me the report of the Senate
Committee I can only say that it was composed of
Republicans and Democrats, that both parties are
equally responsible for what has been done and is
doing in Haiti, and that in these circumstances
neither could criticize the other, and such a re-
port as they made was inevitable, but from reading
the evidence before the Committee it seems to me
unwarranted.
8
Presumably, the only unbiased investigation possible
ould have to be that conducted by non-Republicans and
on-Democrats (the editorial staff of The Nation ?) . Mr.
ughes replied sharply to this letter, thus alienating
he first of many left-of-center friends and former assoc-
ates who tried to use their personal acquaintanceship with
he Secretary to influence him in political matters.
Senator McCormick's wish for an end in partisan poli-
Lcs concerning the Haitian policy was not to be. Senators
bran and King soon found that Haiti was an issue that was
•ainently political, and they proceeded to take advantage
I U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
l;ate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
I.cro Copy 610, Vol. 9.
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>f that fact. Their role in keeping the Haitian contro-
rersy alive will be taken up later, after an examination











fi Russe11 as a virtual dictator
r£-M u« i
fc n0t he wh0 carried out the WilsonPolicy which you so uncompromisingly condemned?Is it not he whom the Haitians hold responsiblenot only as the agent of higher authorities injamming alien rule down their throats, but formuch oppression and cruelty in the process? Icannot but feel that to the Haitians this' appoint-
Sr:J.rUif? al1 y ° Ur eff°rts *™ ^tSafunderstanding. I am therefore taking the liberty
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Mk^ ^ t0 f« ^ican
" lilc^h192 S2 .^ Ppesldent Warren G - Harding,
It had been the unconcealed hope of the Haiti-Santo
*igo Independence Society to have one of its own named
|e High Commissioner to Haiti, and an active campaign
Parted to boost James Weldon Johnson for that post.
isappointment that was felt when Colonel John H. Russell
romoted to Brigadier General and designated High Com-
moner is therefore understandable. what The Nation
{*t know, however, was that none other than Smedley
% had been the Harding Administration's first choice
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bo act as High Commissioner. At the urging of Senators
*ho had served on the Select Committee, Colonel Russell's
lame was substituted at virtually the last moment. At no
:ime did there seem to be serious consideration given to
'illing the post with a civilian appointee. It was not
;hought proper to insert a civilian in the military chain
»f command running from the Brigade Commander to the Navy
lepartment
.
Colonel Russell, who was On leave in the United States
hen his appointment was announced, spent some weeks in
he Department of State prior to returning to Haiti and
articipated in the drafting of a new scheme of organizat-
ion for the treaty services and the Haitian Government.
his new plan was designed to enhance American control, but
t the same time make it possible for the Occupation to be
Lthdrawn with the minimum disruption in the functions of
pvernment. Essentially, two parallel organizations were
onceived, with all connections between the two made through,
ad only through, the High Commissioner. Haitian cabinet
i.nisters would be limited in their functions to giving
avice to the President, who would then, if he saw fit,
t'ansmit that advice to the Commissioner. The position of
t.ese ministers would be made one of great honor and dignity,
tt of little power and authority. The American officers
atually conducting the affairs of the Republic of Haiti,
fom the Commissioner to the junior, would be kept in the
tckground and their Haitian counterparts pushed to the

i'ore . It was thought that at least at the outset, Ameri-
can influence in those areas not touched upon in the treaty,
specifically the courts and public education, should be
exercised through the President.
Russell's appointment as High Commissioner was announced
)y President Harding on February 11, 1922, and exactly one
lonth later he arrived in Port-au-Prince on a battleship
>rovided at the express request of the State Department.
He immediately issued orders which implemented the plan
orked out in Washington, and which gave the treaty organ-
zation something of the character of a military commander's
taff . All correspondence addressed to either the United
tates Government or the Haitian Government, or to other
reaty departments on matters other than routine, were hence-
orth to be transmitted through the office of the High Com-
issioner. All policy statements would come from him alone.
11 projects of law and budgetary proposals had to be cleared
y the High Commissioner. He assumed responsibility for
esolving matters in dispute between either the Haitian Govern-
pit and a treaty official or between different treaty de-
artments, with the American State Department reserved as a
ourt of last resort. Inevitably the new system tended to
dvorce advisers from their respective Haitian ministries,
ad made it impossible for an American official to line up
u the wrong side of a dispute with the Haitian Government.
'ie treaty organization was thus immeasurably strengthened,




Other changes growing out of the Senate Committee's
recommendations were made in Washington. The Navy Depart-
lent's Bureau of Insular Affairs, which previously exer-
dsed a strong voice in Occupation matters, was abolished,
nd the Department's role was for all practical purposes
•educed to the detailing of personnel and administration
f the First Provisional Brigade of Marines. Authority
as thus almost wholly centralized in the State Department's
ivision of Latin American Affairs. In January, 192^, the
wo offices of Financial Adviser and General Receiver were
ombined
.
In the meantime, President Dartiguenave, taking ad-
antage of the transitory provisions in the Constitution
<f 1918, had failed to name the date for legislative elect-
:dhs in the even years 1920 and 1922. He was encouraged
n this policy by the American Government, which recog-
Hzed that under existing conditions in Haiti not only was
'.: improbable that any truly free election could be held
oecause of the ignorance and illiteracy of the majority
W the electorate), but that legislative elections, if
bid without the exercise of undue influence by the Haitian
Overnment and/or the Occupation, would almost certainly
•suit in the election of a legislative body largely anti-
Aerican in sentiment. On September 3, 1921, Secretary
Pghes had therefore informed Dartiguenave that the American
Cvemment would interpose no objection should he decide to
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>ermit the election of his successor by the Council of
State, which was authorized to do so in the absence of a
.egislature
.
After certain parliamentary maneuvers, the President
nnounced his candidacy for re-election, and though General
ussell reported that there were strong feelings against
im, it was pretty generally assumed that the Council of
tate, wholly appointed by Dartiguenave, would return him
or another term of office. Thus it came as something of
surprise, especially to the opposition, when not Darti-
uenave, but Louis Borno was elected President on April
0, 1922. The successful candidate, who ran virtually
^announced, had apparently succeeded in bribing sufficient
:embers of the Council behind the incumbent President's
ack.
The new President had a long if not distinguished
•areer in the Haitian Government, had served three times
13 Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was the signer of
bth the Treaty of 1915 and the protocol extending its life
|>r an additional ten years. Most importantly, he was
onsidered strongly pro-American.
Immediately upon entering office, President Borno
hd enacted the long-deferred legislation necessary to put
lie Haitian Claims Commission into operation. After com-
R U.S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
£ate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
Uretary of State to Bailly-Blanchard, Despatch, Sept. 3,
121, Micro Copy 610, Vol. 8.
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>etitive bids, a six percent loan of $16 million was awarded
;o the National City Bank at a rate of 92.137. Of the funds
;hus realized, more than $4 million went to the National
lank of Haiti (re-chartered in 1921 as a Haitian corporat-
on wholly owned by the National City Bank) and more than
,2 million was paid to the National Railroad in liquidation
f their large claims . The three French loans were re-
unded at the cost of something over $6 million, taking
dvantage of the depressed state of the French franc. Re-
aining funds were applied to public works and amortization.
n additional issue of $5 million in bonds was floated by
he National City Bank on the same terms as the $16 million
oan . These funds were used to repay the unpaid balance
n previous internal loans and additional awards of the
laims Commission. More than 73»°00 claims totaling just
ider $30 million were considered, and settlement was made
t a rate of about 12 percent. Thus, Haitian finances
ere at last put in reasonable order, and at reasonable
spense to the Haitian State.
These financial negotiations, however, occasioned
"Ltter attacks in the opposition press, which leveled
•Lldly irresponsible charges against the Bomo Govern-
J3nt and the American treaty officials. In August, 1922
Ussell issued a proclamation reminding the Haitian people
I
s the nature of United States treaty obligations and
^-stating the still existing responsibility of the military
uthorities under martial law to punish those found guilty
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t seditious or libelous acts. Particular attention was
ailed to the penalties attached to violation of the press
iiws. Under his authority as Brigade Commander, Russell
hd, on May 26, 1921, declared that "while the freedom of
tie press and of speech are practically unrestricted, articles
c speeches that are of an incendiary nature or reflect ad-
^rsely upon the United States Forces in Haiti, or tend to
sir up an agitation against the United States officials who
a'e aiding and supporting the Constitutional Government of
Eiti, or articles or speeches attacking the President of
Hit! or the Haitian Government are prohibited and offenders
aainst this order will be brought to trial before a Military
Tibunal."2 The language here was of course quite similar
t that used by Admiral Caperton years before.
Prior to the Occupation, Haitian newspapers were or-
iiarily held in check by fear of the existing government.
Aticles offensive to the government would result, under
a«st regimes, in the persons responsible being imprisoned
I shot. After the American intervention, however, such
icion was impossible. The protection afforded to the
mspapers resulted, however, not in a free press, but in
ar unlicensed press which was characterized by the most
-responsible attacks on the Haitian Government, the treaty
>*'icials, and American forces in Haiti. These attacks




Sade Commande^ Port-au-Prince,to, 1921, Micro copy 610, vol. 12.
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were often of an offensive, personal nature, and redress
through the Haitian courts could ordinarily not be expected,
because in cases where American officials or the Haitian
}overnment were involved the outcome of a trial by jury
jas a foregone conclusion.
Though General Russell's action in this instance was
indoubtedly justified by the existing situation, it was
•ecognized in Washington as a dangerous maneuver. When
everal Port-au-Prince editors were arrested for trial
efore the provost court, cries for help went out to the
aiti-Santo Domingo Independence Society which found in
he alleged suppression of a free press the ammunition it
ad been looking for. The greatest damage to the Occu-
ation growing out of this incident was the alienation of
ledill McCormick, who was angered by the continued appli-
ation of martial law long after the need for it, in his
<?inion, should have disappeared. After the death of Presi-
ont Harding, the Senator openly broke with the Administrat-
is over its Haitian policy. On January 13, 1924, he wrote
£ long letter to President Calvin Coolidge in which he re-
c.ted his grievances and recommended the sending to Haiti
H a Presidential Commission to investigate and report
vat had occurred there in the two years since the visit
1 his Committee. No satisfactory response being made to




Martial Law in Haiti.
Whereas martial or military law was proclaimed in
the territory of the Republic of Haiti by the Com-
mander of the American military forces landed there
in 1915; and
Whereas such military law continues effective
throughout the territory of a friendly Republic
by the authority of the President of the United
States; and
Whereas under such military law citizens of Haiti
are liable to arrest by the armed forces of the
United States and to trial before military tri-
bunals of the United States nine years after mil-
itary law was first proclaimed to the end that
anarchy might be checked and civil order restored:
Therefore, be it
Resolved, that continuance of such military or
martial law, and the liability of Haitian citizens,
throughout the Republic, to trial before military
tribunals of the United States, is undemocratic,
unrepublican, and contrary to American ideals and
the policies of Warren G. Harding, late President
of the United States.
3
The phrase "undemocratic and unrepublican" caught on,
ad was cited countless times by delighted opponents of the
(icupation. Martial law remained in effect in Haiti, but
fes application throughout the remainder of the Occupation
vis extremely rare
.
General Russell proved to be a skilled diplomat and
s innovative administrator in the office of High Commiss-
iner. In his supervision of the various treaty depart-
nmts and in his negotiations with the Haitian Government,
te budget became his principal tool. Budgetary proposals
U.S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
Sate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
ffcro copy 610, vol. 13.
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and special appropriation projects were submitted simul-
taneously to the High Commissioner and to the Financial
Vdviser. Where differences of opinion existed between the
lepartment head and either or both of the reviewing offic-
.als, these differences were hammered out in "executive
session." General Russell, however, is never known to have
tuthorized an expenditure not agreed to by the Financial
dviser, and his legal right to do so under the terms of
he treaty was at least questionable. When agreement on
he terms of money projects was reached, the respective
reaty official took the matter up with his opposite in
he Haitian Government. Disagreements at this stage were
ormally resolved by conference between the High Commiss-
oner and the President. When they failed to agree the
ssue was sometimes referred to Washington, but this was
are
.
By his aggressive leadership, General Russell succeeded
:i uniting the treaty officials as never before in a pro-
gram which slowly but surely seemed to be achieving the
t.ms of the 1915 treaty. The Haitian public debt was stead-
i.y reduced and a cash surplus was maintained in the public
t'easury for the first time in the country's history. By
e.most any other standards than Haitian, however, the country
imained bitterly poor, even in the relatively good econonic
yars between 1926 and 1929. -And there was, inevitably,
fiction with the Haitian Government.
The core of the difficulty lay in the feeling on the
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part of Americans that money allocated for expenditures
under Haitian administration was by and large money wasted,
a feeling not completely without justification. Conse-
quently, there was a tendency, since Americans controlled
the collection and disbursement of public funds, for Ameri-
can projects to expand at the expense of Haitian projects.
Nowhere was this tendency more evident and nowhere did it
stir up more acrimony than in the area of public instruct-
ion
.
In April, 1923» a protocol was signed which provided
Tor the establishment of a technical bureau under American
administration within the Haitian Department of Agriculture.
This bureau was called " Service Technique de 1* Agriculture
?t de l'Enseignement Professionel , " a title ordinarily
shortened to " Service Technique ." In February, 1924, the
Council of State passed a law assigning to the Service
technique responsibility for improving Haiti's agriculture
md for establishing a program of vocational education,
n succeeding years increasingly larger appropriations
rere provided the Service Technique at the expense of
orrespondingly smaller sums voted for the Haitian ad-
Inistered Ministry of Public Education. As touched upon
arlier, Haiti's educational system since the foundation
f the Republic had been a disgrace. There were schools
ith no pupils, teachers who were illiterate, and, on the
art of the educated 5lite, absolute disdain for the needs
f the children of the peasant class. Consequently, there
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had never been any attempt to provide vocational schools
even though countless critics had cited the crying need in
Haiti for a skilled, working middle class. What public
education there was under Haitian administration, was edu-
cation for children of the e"lite, and the schools nominally
provided in rural areas were little more than sources of
petty graft for their administrators. Schools for the city
Slite concentrated on the liberal arts and preparation for
;he professions, particularly lav;. Port-au-Prince during
;he American occupation probably had a greater proportion
)f lawyers for its population than any other city in the
jorld. Manual labor was looked down on, and no self-
respecting citizen would be caught dead carrying so much
is a package in the street. It is scarcely an exaggeration
;o say, as Occupation officials frequently did, that there
'ere in Haiti few men who could saw a board straight or
ush a wheelbarrow correctly until shown how to do so by
he Americans.
How deliberate the e*lite policy of keeping the Haitian
easant in ignorance was, is of course debatable. That it
as deliberate, however, had been suggested by some Haitians
or years
.
Ah, if he could speak, our peasant'. He would
say very sensibly, "I want light, I want progress,
I want happiness. I am tired of my African super-
stitions from which you have done nothing to free
me.... Do not pen me up in the isolation of ignor-
ance and distress which have made of me a veritable
serf. I am the true force, the real force which
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can save all. Have the loyalty, while it is yet
time, to permit light, progress, and civilization
to come to me . "
^
Another source of friction between American officials
and the Haitian e*lite was the judicial system of Haiti.
The courts of Haiti at this time were of four classes.
At the lowest level were the Tribunaux de Paix , or police
courts. These were about 125 in number, notoriously venal,
corrupt, and inefficient, A favorite story of the Occu-
oation concerned the case of a man who had been arrested
Tor stealing the door off a house. Even though he was
ipprehended with the door in his possession, he was ac-
quitted by the Juge de Paix , who by chance happened to
>e the man's cousin. Above the Tribunaux de Paix were
.1 Courts of First Instance, and over them 2 Courts of
appeal. The Haitian equivalent of the United States Sup-
reme Court was called the Cour de Cassation . The common
omplaint of American treaty officials was that it was
bsolutely impossible for an American or an American ad-
inistered department of the Haitian Government to get
mpartial treatment in a Haitian court. The judicial system
as blamed for discouraging the investment of capital in
aiti
. The courts were condemned for awarding excessive
nd unwarranted judgements in suits against the govern-
'. Frederic Marcelin, "Une Evolution Ne"cessaire, " a pam-
ilet emprinted in Paris, 1898..
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menti judgements which the Financial Adviser often re-
fused to pay. This, while it doubtless saved the Haitian
Government funds, did not do very much to improve respect
for law.
President Borno followed the lead of his predecessor
and failed to name the date for legislative elections in
1924 and 1926. In the latter year, again with the blessing
Df the American State Department, he was elected to a second
four-year term. As opposed to his first election, when a
scuffle broke out and the voting urn was turned over and
lestroyed, the balloting in 1926 was uneventful. His re-
flection by the Council of State did occasion renewed attacks
>y the opposition, which will be discussed later.
In 1927 General Russell determined that for the ulti-
late success of the Occupation, certain revisions in the
[aitian Constitution were necessary. It was considered
;oo risky to have the revisions considered by a specially
lected National Assembly, such as provided for in the
onstitution, for this would only result, it was thought,
n the bringing together of active obstructionists. There-
ore, it was decided to employ the procedure followed in
918. The Council of State would consider the amendments
nd then they would be presented to the people in a re-
erendum
,
The changes desired by the High Commissioner concerned,
laturally, the Haitian judiciary. It was proposed to sus-
:^nd, for a period of one year, the irremovability of judges.
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This, combined with the President's appointive power,
would permit replacement of those judges who were con-
sidered antagonistic to the government. The terms of
judges were reduced from life appointments to seven years,
except for the Cour de Cassation , where a ten year term
;as specified with life tenure after a judge had served
;here for twenty-five years. The Cour de Cassation would
ilso function as a Court of Appeal, and thus provide the
;overnment with an avenue of redress from unfavorable action
n the lower courts
.
President Borno and the Council of State suggested
ertain amendments of their own. The Gendarmerie would be
enamed the Garde, a more descriptive title in view of its
xpanded functions. Trial by jury would no longer be
uaranteed to violators of the press laws. The terms of
ffice for senators would be changed from six to four years,
id the President from four to seven years. The legis-
ative bodies (including the Council of State in the ab-
;2nce of a legislature) would have the exclusive power to
iiterpret the Constitution.
The last two recommendations were strongly opposed by
1 ie American State Department. After considerable dis-
cission it was agreed that interpretation of the Constitut-
}>n, and the laws, would be a function of the Cour de Cassat-
in, following the American model, and that the presidential
trm of office would be fixed at six years, with no eligi-
bility for re-election. It was understood, however, that
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the incumbent President Borno would be eligible for re-
election to a final term of six years in 193^. This was
extremely important, for the man thus elected would hold
office in the crucial final years of the American Occu-
pation, due to expire under the terms of the treaty in
1936. This point was not missed by the opposition.
On January 10, 1928, the proposed amendments to the
Haitian Constitution were adopted in public referendum by
a vote of 177,436 to 3,799. The referendum was under-
standably jeered by those who wished to know why, if the
people were capable of voting on amendments they were un-
ible to read, they were not considered capable of electing
representatives to the national legislature.
As the decade of the twenties drew to a close, the
'orces supporting the American Occupation had shrunk to
1 skeleton Brigade of Marines numbering scarcely $00 men.
nother 100 Marines served in the Garde d'Haiti. The
reaty organization under the High Commissioner consisted
f five departments: the Garde, the Financial Adviser-
eneral Receiver, Public Works, Public Health Service,
ad the Technical Service of Agriculture. Americans em-
loyed in the various departments numbered about 250.
The Haitian public debt, the structure of which had
sen a prime factor in the intervention of 1915 » had been
educed by half and the balance re-financed on favorable
i;rms. Foreign claims had been settled. Steps had been
Uken to disentangle Haiti from its disastrous railroad
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concessions. In all of these complicated financial arrange-
ments, no breath of scandal had attached itself to American
officials, to the deep chagrin of those who searched care-
fully but in vain for a Haitian "Teapot Dome" or a new
"Consolidation Affair." Economic progress was slow, pain-
fully slow, for with the exception of salaries paid to
laval and marine personnel serving in Haiti, the United
States shared in no costs of the Occupation and gave no
financial aid. Visible improvements occurred in sanitation,
roads, hospitals, prisons, water systems, and schools. The
annual reports of the High Commissioner were filled with
statistics and photographs documenting material progress,
ind to those who were privileged to know Haiti both before
ind after the intervention, the transformation was said
;o be remarkable
.
The prolonged failure to institute representative
;overnment in Haiti was painfully evident to all, however,
t was clear that the Haitian people in 1°29> almost a
hole generation after the intervention, were no more pre-
ared to govern themselves than they had been on that day
n 1915 when Admiral Caperton arrived to see them parading
he body of their President through the streets. The






"The true philosophy of history consists of the
insight that, throughout the jumble of all these
ceaseless changes, we have ever before our eyes
the same unchanging being, pursuing the same





yil , The Occupation Under Attack .
The United States invaded the Republics of Haiti
and Santo Domingo and is holding them in subjugation
through martial law for no other reason than to allow
American corporations to grab the rich resources of
the two republics and to exploit them, according to
Senator Borah of Idaho. The Senator spoke last night
at a mass meeting in Carnegie Hall called by the
Hayti-Santo Domingo Independence Society in protest
against the continued occupation of the island re-
publics by the United States....
The auditorium was crowded from stage to topmost
balcony and Senator Borah was applauded and cheered....
"There is no politics in this," announced Sen-
ator Borah. "The Democrats went in and the Repub-
licans are staying in.... If I had thought that this
occupation was only a temporary affair I would not
be here to talk to you tonight. I am firmly con-
vinced that we are there to stay for all time unless
public opinion rises to a pitch to change conditions...
"Not only are we concerned with the welfare of the
natives of these republics, but we are concerned with
the honor and integrity of our country and of our
people."
- The New York World , May 2, 1922.
In April, 1922, the Foreign Policy Association of New
Irk published a pamphlet entitled "The Seizure of Haiti by
m United States," which was endorsed and distributed by the
Clonal Popular Government League of Washington, D ,G . The
Jsiphlet was signed by 24 distinguished lawyers, including
eix Frankfurter, a future Associate Justice of the United
>ttes Supreme Court
. In the pamphlet it was argued that
>h continued presence of American military forces in Haiti
• a violation of well-recognized American principles,
a< that the actions of those military forces were not only
oitrary to international law, but to the United States
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:onstitution. The pamphlet concluded with a call for the
mmediate abrogation of the treaty of 1915, the holding of
ree Haitian elections, and the negotiation of a new treaty
upon such terms as shall be mutually satisfactory to both
oun tries and by the methods that obtain between free and
ndependent states. m1
The legal brief was a strong one, and the qualificat-
ions of those endorsing it impeccable. The intervention
us defended, however, by a respected scholar, Dr. Carl
hlsey, in a paper presented to the American Academy of
hlltical Science in 1922, entitled "The American Inter-
ration in Haiti and the Dominican Republic." In effect,
D. Kelsey told critics to "check their premises."
There never has been any election in HaitiThere never has been any democracy in Haiti 'itis a perfectly foolish use of language to talk
as if there had been. Haiti traded a slave sys-tem under white slaveowners for a slave system
under mulatto owners, and they have run under aslave regime from the first up to the presenttime
....
A century ago men, sensing an idea a little be-
£2 h,*??1? powers of expression, spoke glowinglyof "individual rights" as if they irose*anS[existed
?£J™ ^
on\ s°ci ?ty - We know today that rights flow
££V2? ^ f1? are determi*ed by it. To societythe individual is responsible and when the commands
tLl il L areJi°,lated\ the indivi <iual is punished!hat s, his rights are limited. Society judgesthe individual by his actions and not by his file
JiirhJc ?1izJ s, that individuals differ and that ther ghts granted must be proportionate to the senseof responsibility developed by the individual. Theinsane man must have a guardian. When we deal with
•Foreign Policy Association, "The Seizure of Haiti by the*ted States," Pamphlet No. 8, New York, 1922.
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defective persons we do so not to punish them but
to assist them and to protect others , that is,
society. .
..
The individual is most affected by the actions
of his neighbors. If a man on the adjoining place
begins to shoot indiscriminately with a high-
powered rifle I am immediately involved regardless
of whether he intends to do me harm or not. In
an organized society I invoke the law. Under
frontier conditions I handle the problem myself.
In the present state of world organization we must
follow the program of the frontier.
2
The philosophical battle was joined. The "24 lawyers"
elied on the letter of the law and testimony in the pub-
ished transcript of the Senate Select Committee to show
hat the United States had broken the law. Dr. Kelsey
rovided much-needed support for the State Department in
ts attempt to justify admittedly "illegal" actions in
aiti on the grounds that it was dealing with not the
onstituted Government of Haiti, nor with the represent-
tives of the Haitian people, but rather with irresponsible
Dlitical leaders who had come into prominence as the leaders
f armed uprisings. In all such battles, however, the ad-
•antage lies with the side which has the initiative, and
le initiative never left the opponents of the Occupation.
On April 29 » 1922, General Russell informed the Sec-
tary of State that Dr. Gruenlng in behalf of the Haiti-
ianto Domingo Independence Society had asked the Union
jitriotique to raise the sum of $12,000 gold as its share
3, Carl Kelsey, "The American Intervention in Haiti and the




f the expenses associated with the holding of a mass
:eeting in New York, jointly sponsored with the Foreign
blioy Association, to protest the election (by the Council
f State) recently held in Haiti. Dr. Gruening promised
Hat Senator William E. Borah would be one of the speakers,
inscriptions were in fact taken in Port-au-Prince, and the
l.gh Commissioner was told that outgoing President Darti-
gienave had contributed $50 and his Cabinet $250*. Press
r.ports of Senator Borah's speech in Carnegie Hall were
Kdely circulated in Haiti.
Certain members of the National Civic Federation
wre in the audience to hear Senator Borah's May Day speech
ad Louis Marshall's declaration that Germany did nothing
1: Belgium to equal the atrocities committed by the Ameri-
3 is in Haiti and Santo Domingo. Mr. Ralph Easley, the
:.airman of the Federation's Executive Council, which
Eluded such well known figures as Marshall Field and
3<nuel Gompers, wrote immediately to Secretary of State
Ithes for material on which to base a reply to the charges
rt.ch had been made. "It goes without saying," he said,
•tat a policy originated by the late Administration, con-
;lued and defended by the present one and sustained in a
•e-ort made by a commission of democratic and republican
eators cannot be open to any such vicious charges as are
i3e by thls Foreign Policy Association and its radical
dunct, the National Popular Government League. In fact,
h Public would generally assume that such a policy must
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De fairly just. "3
In the same mall with Mr. Easley's letter was another
)f a completely different character from an old friend of
Ir. Hughes, Louis Marshall, who complained of the treatment
ifforded the "2k lawyers" at a meeting with the Secretary
:t the State Department
.
... I was therefore not only astounded, but stunned,
when you began your remarks with the announcement
that you regarded the statement that had been made["The Seizure of Haiti by the United States"] as
most inadequate and one-sided, and closed with the
paragraph: "You need not for a moment suppose that
any of these matters are not engaging the attention
of the Department? we have very full information,
in the light of which I am bound to say that the
statements you have made here are extremely inade-
quate .
"
I had always fancied that the right of petition
existed; that it was the privilege of a citizen to
present facts, as he understood them, in an orderly
and respectful manner? that he was not to be sub-jected to public contumely because of that fact,
nor that an oral pronouncement such as yours was,
would be followed by the publication of the full
text in the newspapers
. . .
.
It is quite certain that those who believe in
the doctrine of manifest destiny will contend that
our Government has a moral right to dominate over
inferior nations, that those who desire an oppor-
tunity to exploit the rich lands of Haiti and to
attend to her finances, will agree that we have done
no wrong. That may be the other side of the quest-
ion. But I mistake the American people if they will
ever accept such doctrines.
. .7
Mr. Marshall may or may not have been prepared for the
U.S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
Sate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
Ntional Civic Federation to Secretary of state, May 2. 1922.M^ro copy 610, vol. 9. * ' '
7 I£id. • Louis Marshall to Charles Evans Hughes, May 2,J-22, Micro Copy 610, vol. 9.

-228-
reply fired back by the Secretary. The rebuttal of Mr.
Marshall's supposed grievances was devastating in tone,
aid the principles expressed might well be considered by
my person holding high public office.
... I said that the statements which you and others
made to me with respect to the relations of the
United States and Haiti were inadequate and one-
sided. I described these statements in this way,
first, because I thought this was a just descript-
ion, and, second, because the circumstances made it
necessary that they should be thus described.
Of course you have the right of petition. I
recognized it in receiving you, and certainly you
fully exercised it. But this does not mean that
a public officer is to be deprived of the right
to put in a caveat against the assumption on the
part of the public that statements submitted should
be accepted. If you bombard a public officer in
this way, he is at least entitled to avoid the mis-
interpretation which might easily be placed upon
his silence.
I confess that I am amused at the humor, appar-
ently unconscious, of your complaint that my re-
marks were made public. Your brief, which I had
already read, and the striking extracts from the
oral statements made, had already been given to the
press, as I knew at the time, subject to release
after the interview. In short, you staged a public
demonstration in order to insure publicity for your
assertions and demands, and surely you have no right
to object to my publishing my rejoinder that I thought
your statements inadequate and one-sided....
I recognize your rights, although I do not commend
your attitude. If you were really desirous of aiding
the Administration in its handling of a difficult
and highly important situation, you would have come
to me - and our old friendship would seem to have
suggested that course - in order to secure such in-
formation as could properly be given to you. You
might have learned that the Administration had been
devoting itself with the utmost earnestness and sol-
icitude to this problem. Instead you sai? fit, ex-
ercising your undoubted right, to present your per-
emptory demands
.
I shall continue to deal with this matter and to
advise the President according to my best judgement,
as fully conscious of the demands of justice and of
the Nation's honor as you yourself can possibly be.
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We shall, of course, seek in every possible way
to conserve the welfare and the independence of
the people of Haiti and to end the military occu-
pation as soon as can properly be done. We shall
make such public statements from time to time as,
in this position of grave responsibility, may be
deemed compatible with the public interest,
5
That letter quieted Louis Marshall and the Zk lawyers
'or a time, but the pot was definitely boiling from fires
;et on a dozen sides. In 1922, Senator William H, King,
•ecently a member of the Senate Select Committee, intro-
luced an amendment to the military appropriations bill
)rovlding that no funds could be used for the maintenance
>f Marines in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. The amend-
lent was defeated, but Senators King and Borah took the
•ccaslon for a ringing denunciation of American policy in
;hose two countries. On April 26, 1922, the Joint Committee
•f the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America
.elivered a memorandum to the President in protest of Ameri-
an policy in Haiti. This was but one of many church groups
rhich took a stand on the issue.
Protest in the United States encouraged more open action
n Haiti, and the Gendarmerie had its hands full in keeping
he situation under control. "Macandalism" entered the vocab-
lary of the opposition in Port-au-Prince. It referred to
black man named Macandal who in the time of the revolution
.
U. S. f National Archives, Records of the Department of
tate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
harles Evans Hughes to Louis Marshall, May 5, 1922, Micro
opy 610, Vol. 9.
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igainst the French, being skilled in the use of herbs and
x>isons, had succeeded in killing many whites by subvert-
ng their servants. Thinly veiled threats appeared in the
^position press, and some, such as the following, were
pen invitations to murder. "Louis" refers, of course,
o the President of the Republic, Louis Bomo.
... Louis the Pious is crazy. Even his most in-
timate friends can no longer hide the fact. We
must add that he is not just crazed - he is fur-iously and dangerously insane. Modern medicine
administers poison to those furiously and danger-
ously insane.
. ..Has not the moment arrived to feed
a sausage to Louis?6
Dozens of examples could be drawn from the opposition
ewspapers in Port-au-Prince in this period which encouraged
iolence against the Americans and Government officials,
id yet the Occupation was virtually helpless to suppress
uch scurrilous activity, not only because of the already
entioned disinclination of the Haitian courts to convict,
it because of the anticipated reaction in the United States
3 any "tampering" with Haiti <s "free" press.
In October, 192*1-, a campaign was launched in the French
ress criticizing the American occupation of Haiti. The
'>casion for this was an address by a member of the Union
.itriotique, Dantes Bellegarde, before the International
'Hon of Associations in favor of the League of Nations in
I
Courrier Haiti en
. Port-au-Prince, June 12, 192*+.
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!yons. The address used the principle of self-determin-
ltion for small peoples as a point of departure. When
Ir. Bellegarde returned from France he bore a mandate from
;he "Ligue des Droits de 1* Homme et du CI toy en " to form
i local branch of that association in Port-au-Prince. In
larch, 1925, the French Prime Minister was petitioned by
he parent organization to bring up the question of the
ilitary occupation of Haiti by the United States before
he next session of the Council of the League of Nations.
The "Universal Negro Improvement Association, M accord-
ig to Port-au-Prince newspapers, asked in a resolution
lanimously voted by "the negroes of five continents" that
ie last Sunday in October, 1924. be celebrated as "Haiti
^dependence Day." Widespread support for Haitian in-
cidence flared in the Latin American press, and rumors
I imminent American withdrawal circulated in Haiti. At
lie town of Gonaives, a General of the old Haitian Army
i»de into town to take charge as "Commandant of Arron-
dssement." He had heard out in the hills that the Ameri-
cans were leaving, and he was dressed in his old uniform.
In the United States, Marcus Garvey of the Universal
Ngro Improvement Association, whose "Negro World" was a
sheme for a new colored nation in Africa, joined forces
Nth James Weldon Johnson, Dr. Greuning, Oscar Garrison
'Hard, and other charter members of the Haiti-Santo
&ningo Independence Society in an attempt to use planned
Eruptions in Haiti as an embarrassment to the Coolldge
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Admini strati on during the American national elections in
1924. Instructions were sent to the Union Patriotique
to commence an active propaganda throughout Haiti, and to
print in the opposition press abusive and defamatory art-
Lcles against the President and the Occupation, with a
riew to securing arrests for violation of the press laws.
Ihese arrests would then be used as political material in
the American presidential campaign.? These instructions
'ell into the hands of the High Commissioner, and arrests
fere not made, though the abuses were many.
In May, 1925 » Senator King called at the State De-
)artment with a prominent representative of the Union
tetriotlque
, Pierre Hudicourt, and expressed himself at
;reat length concerning his views on Haiti, stating that
f he were President the Marines would be withdrawn the
ext day, and that if the Haitians desire bloodshed and
•evolution, that was their privilege, as much as he con-
sumed such practices himself. He went on to say that
merican policy in Haiti would bring about a revolution
here, and when it happened it would have his full support,
r. Hudicourt listened to this with undisguised satisfact-
on.° Senator King thus stole a march on Senator Borah,
.
U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
tate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
assell to Secretary of State, No. 435, October 30, 1924,
Lcro Copy 610, Vol. 14.
.
Ibid., Internal Memorandum of Division of Latin American
"fairs, May 22, 1925, Micro Copy 610, Vol. 16.
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and became the American patron saint of the Union Patrio
t
-
lque . A photograph of the Senator, seated in the midst
Df a half dozen leaders of the Haitian opposition, was
Later sold in the streets of Port-au-Prince to raise funds
to fight the Occupation. In March, 1927, the Senator
announced that he would visit Haiti, and this caused Presi-
lent Borno to issue instructions to the Gendarmerie to
prevent his entrance into the Republic. The President
characterized Senator King as an agitator who had identi-
fied himself with the very worst Haitian elements, and
le stated that the proposed visit could only produce re-
mits detrimental to the interests of Haiti and the United
States. The High Commissioner silently agreed, and Senator
ing had to content himself with grumblings from across the
>crder in the Dominican Republic. The opposition press,
lowever, headlined a letter from the Senator to the Union
'atriotlque on March 31, 192?, which was extremely critical
f the President of Haiti, the American State Department,
nd the High Commissioner.
In the summer and fall of 1925 there was considerable
gitation both in Haiti and in the United States concerning
he subject of Haitian elections, 1926 being an "even
umbered year" and also the year which marked the end of
resident Borno 's first term of office. Not even Mrs
.
oolidge was spared an influx of mail urging that Haitian
lections be held. In Port-au-Prince one Dr. Tribie, a
sading spirit of the Union Patrlotique, announced his
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>andidacy and a platform calling for "fifteen thousand
)rimary schools; one thousand forts in the mountains and
;renches provided with high caliber and long range cannons;
m aerial and naval fleet; purchase of the contract of the
lanque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti, in order to be
elivered from the control of the National City Bank of
ew York; negotiation of a loan of four or five billion
old on the Belgian market; diminution of expenses and in-
rease in salaries. "9 The High Commissioner commented that
t would be difficult to find a platform which would more
ppeal to ignorance and prejudice. As already noted, how-
rer, President Borno did not name a date for legislative
lections and he was himself re-elected to a second term
? the Council of state. In the wake of his announcement
lat there would be no legislative elections in 1926, the
resident's popularity dipped to a new low. On January 3,
^26, he presided at the disinterment and reburial together
the remains of Dessalines and PStion. There was no
oplause following his speech, and the claque's shouts of
"
rive Borno V were actually met by laughter.
On February 19, 1926, a committee sponsored by the
'[omen's International League for Peace and Freedom" (W.I.L.P.F.)
liled for Haiti to "look into conditions there." The committee
*s nominally headed by Miss Emily Greene Balch, a well
Ltl I'i
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known sociologist, and it consisted of two representatives
of the American branch of the W.I.L.P.F., two representat-
ive colored women, a representative of the Fellowship of
Reconciliation, and an economics professor at Amherst
3ollege representing the Foreign Service Committee of the
Society of Friends. This last was Mr. Paul H. Douglas,
the only male in the group, and later a decorated combat
narine and distinguished United States Senator.
On their arrival in Port-au-Prince, February 2h % they
*ere warmly welcomed by the Union Patriotique
. They called
>n the High Commissioner and informed him that their mission
ras purely philanthropic and had no political significance,
teneral Russell, however, sized them up as "internationalists
nd pacifists," and later reported that while in Haiti they
howed little interest in present constructive achievements,
ut were eager to uncover past mistakes. The High Commiss-
oner informed them that the Occupation's work in Haiti was
n open book, that he had nothing to conceal, but was on
he contrary exceedingly proud of what had been accomplished
i assisting a backward nation; that if they came with open
lnds they too would be proud as Americans, but that if they
*me with fixed principles and preconceived ideas, they might
3 well return home at once. 10
Though friendly assurances were given during the call
->. U. S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
'-ate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
Uro
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)n General Russell, Miss Balch soon thereafter angered
lim when she literally flew into the arms of Jane Adams,
rtio made an overnight stop in Port-au-Prince on the cruise
5hip Mount Royal , with a wholly unsubstantiated story that
;he American High Commissioner had prevented her party from
-egistering at Haiti's Hotel Montaigne because of the
jommlttee's colored members. Jane Adams, of Hull House
'ame, was also the international president of the Women's
international League for Peace and Freedom. General Russell
summoned Miss Balch and Mr. Douglas to the American Legat-
on and extracted an apology for their error, but apparently
:ot no retraction.
While in Port-au-Prince the committee called on foreign
epresentatives in Haiti to secure their views on the Ameri-
an Occupation, and at no time seemed to take special pains
o conceal their own attitude on the subject. Prior to
eturning to the United States they called a second time
n the High Commissioner and urged him to use his influence
n ending harassment of the press, and in securing free
rid open elections.
In the United States the committee collaborated on a
sport, edited by Miss Balch, entitled "Occupied Haiti?
eing the report of a committee of six disinterested Ameri-
ans representing organizations exclusively American, who,
iving personally studied conditions in Haiti in 1926, favor
ie restoration of the negro republic." The report urged
iat an official commission be sent to Haiti to begin the
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/ork necessary for a transition to Haitian control of the
;overnment, and the eventual withdrawal of the Occupation.
)n the whole, "Occupied Haiti" presented the most balanced
aid rational attack on the American Occupation of any pro-
ceed in this period. It found that from the point of view
if selfish American interests, there was little to Justify
ontinuance of the Occupation. American investments in
aiti were unprofitable. The American military presence
here was damaging to American relations with Latin America.
llitary control of civilian affairs was the worst possible
odel for Haiti. The by then standard criticisms were
eveled - Marine rowdyism and drinking, the drawing of
the color line," "brutal contempt" for elections, and
titerference with the freedom of the press. The committee's
ajor recommendations, however - withdrawal by 1936, a
Dmmission to investigate and report, legislative elections,
^militarization of the American administration while it
^sted, "Haitianization," gradual withdrawal of Marines -
ure those eventually put in practice by the American
Overnment. It was only when the report lapsed into the
Hritanical that it seemed a trifle ridiculous.
Disquieting rumors are abroad of pressure in
favor of establishing gambling places as an attract-
ion to tourists. We emphatically protest against
such a plan. 11
I. Emily Greene Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti
, (New York,




Working drafts of "Occupied Haiti" and a separate
article prepared by Paul Douglas for publication in
Foreign Notes were sent to the American State Department
for comment and possible correction. None was provided.
On May 13, 192?, the enlisted strength of the Marine
3rigade in Haiti was reduced to 452, when a battalion of
Marines was withdrawn for service in Nicaragua. General
iussell requested their return or replacement at the earliest
>racticable date in view of possible disturbances when the
)lanned constitutional changes were announced in the fall.
Srlgade strength was left at about the 500 mark, however.
No elections were held in 1928, but the High Commiss-
oner reported that President Borno finally and definitely
greed to the holding of legislative elections in January,
93°. By that time, it was estimated, all important laws
ould have been drafted and voted upon (by the Council of
tate) and the entire governmental machinery, with the
cception of the legislature, would be in full operation.
?on receipt of this optimistic report, Secretary of State
fellogg wired President Borno his personal congratulations
«i the electoral decision.
A crucial year lay ahead, however, and it was a year
1 iat would prove decisive for the American Occupation.
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KVIII . The Disorders of 1929 .
If you hear the politicians groan, it is because
they are expiating their lack of humanity, presumpt-
ion and bad faith. They never loved you, they never
wished the best for you. They who forged all your
miseries, all your troubles, now mention you out of
the purest hypocrisy in their desperate appeals to
the misguided philanthropy of the Kings and Borahs.
All the philanthropists of the world could not save
a nation in disorder, whose children close their
ears to every word of reason ....
In this country it is almost impossible to do
good. Our most distinguished men, for the most
part ? have apparently sworn to spend their lives
lying, deceiving and leading into error the thous-
ands of illiterates purposely kept in that degrad-
ing condition for a century....
Let the whites withdraw tomorrow and the day
after tomorrow the country will be put to fire and
sword. In spite of the lesson of fully fourteen
years, are we able to put our hands on fifty Hait-
ian Statesmen?
- L*Essor , editorial, Port-au-Prince, April 5, 1929.
President Borno's "decision" to hold legislative elect-
ions in 1930 was not publicized and was known only to him-
self, the High Commissioner, and the State Department. In
:he spring of 1929 he began to have second thoughts on the
(latter, stating that he had not adequately realized the
'tremendous upheaval" which would undoubtedly be caused by
.egislative and presidential elections in the same year,
these sentiments were shared by General Russell and certain
'fficials in the State Department. The Haitian Administrat-
on elected in 1930 would be the administration in office
'hen negotiations for a possible renewal of the Haitian-
merican treaty, due to expire in 1936, were held.
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In March, 1929, the Head of the Latin American Affairs
)lvision, Mr. Dana G. Munro, informed the Under Secretary
f State, Francis White, that any election held would be a
arce in existing circumstances in Haiti, and that "any
ongress which might be elected, even though the Borno
dministration dominated its selection, would inevitably
e a serious obstacle to further progress." 1 Mr. White
greed, and so advised the new Secretary of State, Henry
..
Stimson, who stated that the calling of legislative
(Lections was a Haitian responsibility.
The opposition was thus left in the dark about the
J'esident's intentions (he had until October 10, 1929, to
bounce the date for the election if he decided to hold




On April 22, 1929, three opposition journalists were
tied and convicted for violation of the press law, specif-
Lally for denouncing President Borno as a traitor and
stacking the Archbishop of Haiti for racial prejudice and
?:>-American sentiments. In the poisonous atmosphere of
^t-au- Prince, extraordinary precautions were taken at the
!U1 to prevent the outbreak of violence. One American
>i'icer, one Haitian officer and a detective were placed in
*-rge of the prisoners with additional instructions to
•U. S
,
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-emain in the immediate vicinity of the Judge for his
)rotection. Ten Gardes, unarmed except for police clubs,
ind ten plain-clothes men were stationed in the court-
room. The Gardes were placed at all exits and entrances,
nd the plain-clothes men were distributed throughout the
udience. Three American officers, two non-commissioned
ffleers and sixteen privates, all members of the Garde,
ere posted in the street in front of the building. One
merican officer was at the front entrance, one at the
ear, and a third circulated on a motorcycle. The officers
ad non-commissioned officers carried revolvers, and the
en carried police clubs.
Underneath the building, and not in view, one non-
ommissioned officer and ten privates armed only with police
lubs, were held ready for any emergency. The Fire Depart-
isnt had a steamer in reserve at the Garde Garage, 200 yards
iLstant, under the command of an American officer. This
;recaution was taken with the idea of dispersing a crowd
i.th a stream of water if necessary, and to obviate the use
<* any other force.
Four American officers were stationed in the hallway
utside the courtroom.
At the Police Station, 400 yards distant, a detach-
int of five non-commissioned officers and fifteen privates,
e-med respectively with revolvers and rifles, were held in
i serve under the command of an American officer. The




The Commandant of the Garde stated that "of this
entire force only twelve uni formed members of the Garde
fere actually in the courtroom. Twenty-one were in view
mtside of the building, but all others were held in re-
serve and out of sight. This was done so that the charge
)f intimidation could not be entertained."2
The journalists on trial were Jacques Roumain, George
'. Petit, and Elle Guerin. The defense attorney gave a
•inging speech in which, to the cheers of the spectators,
ie denounced President Borno as "an ass with three heads."
.t the conclusion of his speech, the prisoners embraced
heir lawyer by leaning over the prisoner's box, and one,
oumain, made as if to step over the box. He was restrained
y an American officer, and in the struggle the box broke
nder their weight and they both fell to the ground.
At this point the courtroom was in extreme disorder,
art of the audience surged toward the platform. People
are shouting at a high pitch of emotion. The Commissaire
p Gouvernement fled from the room. The Presiding Judge
Dught refuge under his desk, and later disappeared, re-
irning when quiet had been restored. Three women in the
uddle of the room were shrieking at the top of their voices.
The American officer who had fallen, struggled to his
j
U.S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
'•ate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929,
I:morandum for the High Commissioner from Commandant, Garde
« Haiti, May 1, 1929, Micro Copy 610, Vol. 26.
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feet, only to be rushed by Roumain, who attempted to
throttle him. The Haitian Chief of Detectives finally
subdued the irate journalist by striking him twice on
;he head with a night stick, resulting in bloody scalp
pounds. American officers carried Roumaln to the side
)f the judge # s desk and wrapped his head with their hand-
:erchiefs. An angry crowd closed in on the Chief of
)etectives, but he quieted them by drawing his revolver.
II three prisoners were then led out of the courtroom
o a police camion.
The version of this affair circulated in the opposit-
on press stated that Roumain had no intention of starting
demonstration, and that his sole idea in trying to leave
he box was to kiss his sister farewell.
On October 5, 1929, President Borno announced that
iiere would be no elections for the legislature in 1930
id that consequently the Council of State would elect the
uxt President. A storm of protest was raised both in
hiti and the United States. A "National League for
Institutional Action" was formed in Port-au-Prince, and
I Washington "The People's Lobby" ("To Fight for the
J'-ople We Get and Give the Facts") demanded that the
leretary of state take action. The State Department
ceadfastly maintained, however, that it was a "Haitian
dclsion" whether elections were to be held or not.
It is possible that this storm also might have blown
c er, had it not been for a "strike" of students at the
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lervlce Technique's Central School of Agriculture, at
lamien, on October 31, 1929. The facts concerning the
isturbances there are as follows.
It had been traditional in Haiti to provide promis-
ng students at the secondary level with a "bourse " or
cholarship in order to encourage them to continue their
tudies. The vast majority of these scholarships were
aid to the children of the urban <flite, who enjoyed a
ustly superior primary education in addition to other
ovious advantages over the country children. In 1929,
bwever, it was decided to reduce the $10,000 appropriat-
3>n for bourse money by 20 percent, and to use the $2,000
aved to pay wages to country students working on Service
Ihchnlque demonstration farms and experimental stations,
le new program was quite naturally welcomed by the country
sudents, but it enraged the city students who, trained
fom childhood to regard manual labor as degrading, saw
prt of their class privilege eroded. The strike at Damien
sread into other schools, including those at the primary
lvel. At Cape Haitian it was reported that the children
n longer saluted the national flag at morning ceremonies,
ai that they were openly disrespectful to their teachers.
A Jacmel, in a school children's parade, the only colors
crried was a flag of red with a green serpent. When the
u;ional air was started by the school band, student leaders
Pi; a stop to it.
Opposition politicians fanned the movement and slowly
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sonverted it into a general protest against the Borno
Administration and the American Occupation. On December
!t, 1929» the Customs House employees at Port-au-Prince
became insolent and attacked their American supervisor,
throwing typewriters and inkwells on the floor. A mob
'orced its way into the office of the Financial Adviser,
Lemanding higher wages. In these circumstances General
iussell felt compelled to issue the following proclam-
ition on the afternoon of December 4.
The United States Forces in Haiti are engaged
in aiding and supporting the constitutional govern-
ment of Haiti and are your friends. By their
efforts and those of the Garde d'Haiti, peace and
tranquility have been established throughout your
land for many years, permitting you to conduct
your business and earn an honest living.
Certain agitators are now endeavoring to foment
trouble. It therefore becomes necessary to again
place in towns the power and authority of martial
law, which has during the past few years been in-
operative.
You are also informed that articles or speeches
of an incendiary nature or those that reflect ad-
versely upon the United States forces in Haiti or
tend to stir up agitation against the United States
officials who are aiding and supporting the con-
stitutional government of Haiti, are prohibited
and offenders against this order will be brought
to trial before a military tribunal.
From the promulgation of this proclamation, allinhabitants of the cities of Port-au-Prince and
Cape Haitian will remain in their houses from 9
o'clock P.M. until daylight.
3
General Russell followed up this proclamation with the
E U.S., National Archives, Records of the Department of
•-ate Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929joclamation of the First Provisional Brigade of Marines
1 Haiti, Dec. 4, 1929, Micro Copy 610, Vol. 2?
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lrgent request for an increase In the strength of the
terine Brigade by 500, until after the inauguration of
;he new president in 1930. This news was received with
;he greatest dismay in Washington, and Secretary of State
Jtimson sent Russell a Rush, Double Priority wire re-
questing that he withhold his proclamation pending receipt
»f the Secretary's full views on the matter. By then,
owever, it was too late, even if circumstances would have
•ermitted less drastic action by the High Commissioner.
Stimson e s long personal message to General Russell
rrived a few hours after .the proclamation of renewed
artial law and curfew. The Secretary stated that the
lavy Department had been instructed to place the USS Gal-
;eston and its marine detachment, then at Guantanamo, at
bssell's disposal, but that he hoped it would not be
iscessary to land additional forces.
Having said that you will be supported in yourfinal responsibility of protecting life, I never-
theless think it proper to say that from this dis-
tance it does not seem that the situation requires
or will be best served by a display of marine forcesin the outlying portions of the island. It seems
to me that the nub of your situation rests in thequestion of the loyalty of the native constabulary
and I hope you will be careful not to discourage
'
that loyalty by an appearance of distrust or of
supplanting it with white forces. Under white
officers such as you have the general loyalty ofblack troops is usually proven against even localdissatisfaction or mutiny. In whatever manner you
ultimately decide upon I trust you will give theloyalty of your constabulary a thorough and fair
test. Even if you deem it necessary to use more
actively than hitherto the present force of marines,
I seriously question the wisdom of the proclamation
yesterday as to martial law. To me it seems that
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the benefit of such a proclamation in an illit-
erate population like Haiti is outweighed by the
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SGd piaces , rather than by extending the
oJ^Sf ? pre f ent marine forces or calling foradditional marines. The responsibility is? howeverupon you and will be respected «# n ,
Russell's attempt to meet Secretary Stlmson's desires
I the crisis seemed to be overtaken by events, for the next
h a skirmish between a Haitian mob and a marine patrol at
ix Cayes left 6 dead and 28 wounded, all Haitian. Four of
be wounded later died. In these circumstances, the 500
urines Russell had requested were immediately dispatched
':m the United States.
The situation at Aux Cayes had begun building in late
Member when opposition emmissaries from Port-au-Prince
lived to organize a school children's strike. Stevedores
le persuaded to join in the disturbances, and a small de-
ahment of marines arrived to quiet things down. Agitation
nreased, however, and spread to the peasants in the sur-
ging countryside, who were already restless due to a
le
^•National Archives. Records of the Department of
-e Relating to Internal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929




-ecent drastic fall in the price they received for their
joffee crop (caused by world market conditions). A mob
If about 1500 gathered on the outskirts of the town and
idvanced on the center. It was met by a patrol of 20
larines armed with rifles and one machine gun. Leaders
f the mob requested and were given permission to enter
he town to confer with opposition politicians there. They
hen returned to demand the release of three prisoners from
he Gendarme jail. This was refused, and the marines began
be pelted by rocks. In what may have been the first
merican use of air power for psychological effect, an old
:arine scout plane flew over the mob and dropped several
.nail bombs in the harbor. This had only a momentary success
:i halting the Haitian advance. Shots were then fired over
ie heads of those in the front ranks. When this too failed
j>
stop their approach, fire was directed into the ranks,
suiting in the previously mentioned 3^ casualties, and
Jistant dispersal of the mob.
|
The affair at Aux Cayes made headlines in the American
less, and evoked yet another round of demands from the
*ti-Occupation lobby for action by President Hoover to
>vestigate and end the "mess" there. At an "off the record"
:ess conference, Secretary Stimson referred to the Haitian
Nation as "another baby he found on his doorstep. "5
U S., National Archives, President's Commission for Study1 Review of Conditions in Haiti, Record Group 220, Memo-ldum of Press Conference by Secretary of state, Dec. 6, 1929
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le went on to say that the whole affair had started before
le took office and that consequently he was not very fam-
liar with it.
The next day, December ?, 1929, The New York Times
eported that the President was preparing a special message
o Congress concerning the relations of the United States
ith the Republic of Haiti.
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IX . The President's Commission .
Sur la vaste mer un bateau est ballotte" par la
tempete. Le patron envoie le mousse en haut du mat
pour plier une voile. Le mousse crie MJe vais tom-
ber, la tete me tourne." Le patron lui dit» "Ne
regarde pas en bas, regarde les e*toiles."
- Francois Dalencour, MLe Sauvetage National Par
le Retour a" la Terre."
A veritable flood of protest and advice concerning the
ituatlon in Haiti converged on Washington even before the
orst of the news from there became known in December, 1929.
11 October 3t the Union Patrlotique addressed an open letter
President Hoover criticizing past American influence in
1) President Borno's election and re-election (said to be
^constitutional because he was not born of a Haitian father),
2) the electoral laws enacted, (3) the reform of the jud-
2iary, (4) taxes, (5) immigration, and (6) the budget.
ne letter ended with a fervent demand for immediate legis-
lative elections. A telegram from the "Save Haiti League
<f America" quickly echoed the Union Patrlotique'
s
letter,
ud urged that the President force Haiti to have elections.
'ie "Labor Open Forum of Rochester" protested the continued
;?esence of American Marines in Haiti.
The "American Friends Service Committee" of Philadelphia
Vged the appointment of a commission to investigate affairs
1 Haiti, and recommended that Paul H. Douglas serve as a
limber. Mr. Douglas advised the President that no appoint-
int to the proposed commission should be made from resi-
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dents of Haiti, for they would be unable to give unbiased
statements for fear of reprisal from President Bomo. He
also warned that American officials in the Occupation would
show only the favorable side of affairs.
On December 6. Dr. Gruening, then with the Portland
*eniniUIews, warned that the fate of commissions is usually
=0 be taken in by those they are investigating, and he de-
dared that the first step toward a satisfactory solution
f the problem in Haiti must be the removal of the military
igh Commissioner, General Hussell, and the installation
f a civilian in his place. The American Civil Liberties
lion stated that the facts were already known, and that
t was unnecessary to send a commission to investigate.
-- urged a number of recommendations to alleviate the in-
tlerable conditions alleged to h.„ v„„_ ,xx a have been imposed on Haitian
ctlzens by the American Occupation.
The "Greater New York Federation of Churches" petitioned
te President, expressing concern lest the United States
"late the pledges made in the Kellogg Pact in its dealings
Jh Haiti. The "colored Unity League of Jersey city" accused
J
President of complicity in the muzzli„g f free speech,
lawful imprisonment, and probable murder then being inflict-
ion patriots in Haiti. Teachers should be sent there, it
j*. not Marines. Professors and students of New York's
J«
Theological Seminary addressed a letter protesting
African occupation of Haiti as a violation of American
l<ials of liberty and justice, and charging that "American
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prices" were responsible for killing Haitians and prevent-
ing the growth of democratic government there.
On December 8, 1929» President Hoover requested the
Congress to authorize and fund a presidential commission
:o study and review American policies in Haiti. The Con--
;ress responded on December 18, by passing a Joint Resol-
ition (H.J. Res. 170) providing for such a commission and
appropriating $50,000 for its expenses. No policy guidance
ras attached to the resolution.
The President's request had left the door open for
ongressional representation on the proposed commission,
ut the offer was rather studiously ignored. The attitude
f most members of Congress seemed to be that Haiti was a
roblem generated by the Executive branch, and that there-
ore it should be resolved by the Executive. There was
emarkably little debate over the proposed commission in
Lther House.
Announcement that a commission would be formed brought
b another flurry of White House mail concerning the makeup
f that commission. Great pressure was applied to place a
ngro on the commission. The National Association for the
jlvancement of Colored People sent a telegram stating that
'.2,000,000 American citizens of negro descent" felt that
1iey should be represented on any commission appointed.
(:wald Garrison Villard of The Nation "demanded" represent-
£ion not only by American negroes, but by Haitians as well.
1'ny other similar recommendations and demands were made.

-253-
In response to a State Department request, General
Russell forwarded President Bomo's views on the matter.
The Haitian President stated that he was not averse to a
negro serving on the commission, but that he had not changed
His views to the effect that Haitians in general looked down
apon the American negro. He further stated that he most
iefinitely did not want to see an American negro sent to
laiti in a Treaty or U.S. Government position. 1
The question of appointing a negro to the commission
*as given serious consideration, but it appears that the
'ollowing confidential memorandum from Dr. L .S
. Rowe, Dir-
ector General of the Pan American Union, was decisive in
nfluencing the President against the naming of a negro.
I beg to recommend that no negro be includedin this Commission. The practice of appointing






en wel1 received in that country and nowthat this practice has been abandoned, I hope thatit will be possible to avoid a negro on the Com-
mission. Rightly or wrongly, the educated Hait-ians regard themselves as far superior to the
American negro.
2
On February 7, 1930, President Hoover announced that
he Haitian Commission would be comprised of w. Cameron
Drbes as Chairman, Henry P. Fletcher, Elie Vezina, James
I U
.
S., National Archives, President's Commission for Studyd Review of Conditions in Haiti, Record Group 220, Resell
y Secretary of state, December 25, 1929.
tJT^"t DP ' L 'S# R°We t0 ActlnS Secretary of State, Memo-indum, January 21, I93O.
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Kerney, and William Allen White. He further announced
that "in cooperation with Mr. Forbes, I have requested
far. R.E. Moton, President of Tuskegee Institute, on be-
lalf of the Institute and such other educational affli-
ctions as he may suggest, to undertake an exhaustive
.nvestigatlon into the educational system of Haiti, with
t view to recommendations for the future. "3 Dr. Mo ton,
f course, was one of America's most distinguished negro
ducators.
W. Cameron Forbes, a wealthy Boston lawyer, had served
it the American administration of the Philippines from 1904
1913, the last four years of that period as Governor-
juieral. In 1921 he had been a co-chairman on the Wood-
:>rbes Commission to the Philippines. When Senator Mc-
ormick recommended, in 1924. that a commission be sent to
Mti, Forbes* name headed his list of recommended appointees
Overnor Forbes was a long-time friend of President Hoover.
Henry P. Fletcher had a long and distinguished career
i government service behind him. In I898 he was a private
i Colonel Roosevelt's Rough Riders, and he later saw millt-
ay service in the Philippines. His diplomatic career in-
cuded assignments in Cuba, China, Mexico, chile, Belgium,
Ialy and Luxembourg. He was Chairman of the United States
legation to the Fifth Pan-American Conference in Santiago,
^"Hevi^of'^^f1Vf 8 ' ?resident,s Commission for Study
<Xut7^ Z Editions in Haiti, Record Group 220, Presi-a«itial Press Statement, February ?, 1930.
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?hile, In 1923 , and was a delegate to the Sixth Pan-
American Conference in Havana, in 1928. For a brief
Period during the Harding Administration he had served
is Secretary of State.
Elie Vezina was a self-made man, who had made his
loney in newspapers. He was born in Canada, was active
.n Roman Catholic organizations, and he described himself
is a "student of Haitian affairs."
James Kerney was a respected newspaper man, editor
md author, who had written among other things a book
sntitled The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson
.
William Allen White was the best-known of all the
.ppolntees, through his prolific writing. He was the
editor and publisher of the Emporia Gazette, and a bio-
rapher of Woodrow Wilson. He was renowned as a champion
f "the common man."
The inclusion of three newspaper men on the five
ember commission was probably no accident. In the winter
f 1929-1930, Haiti was a topic of frequent concern in
he American press. Most, but not all, editorial comment
as negative concerning American policy there, and it may
ell have been the Administration's hope to lower the
ournalistic voices raised against it by the character of
ts appointees to the commission.
On February 13, 1930, the Union Patrlotique wrote to
snator Borah requesting that he use his influence to have
lie United States Government pay the expense of legal counsel
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•) represent the opposition in hearings before the Com-
Lssion. Senator Borah forwarded the request to Mr. Forbes,
no replied that "the Commission is not taking any counsel
f.ong and proposes upon arrival in Haiti to give all ele-
naits an opportunity to offer a fair presentation of their
?ews. We understand that there are many very competent
Ritian lawyers in Haiti. "^
Advice and recommendations poured in to the Commission
dring the two-week period between the naming of the members
ad their departure for Haiti, including a long memorandum
fom Emily Greene Balch, Miss Balch warned the Commission
Tt to be led astray by those whom the Occupation would
pish forward, but to seek out those of whom the American
ail Borno officials were most hostile and contemptuous.
Armed with this and other good advice, and a box of
aoks and official reports concerning the Occupation, the
Amission, accompanied by four correspondents representing
* ! Associated Press. The New York Times
. The Baltimore
it and the National Catholic Welfare Conference
f sailed
Im Miami on February 25, 1930, on board the USS Rochester
.
* Rochester, during Spanish-American War days, had been
I battleship New York
, and had served as Admiral Sampson's
Igship at the battle of Santiago, when the United States
Ut established its utter dominance in the Caribbean.
jM. S., National Archives, President's Commission for Study
* Review of Conditions in Haiti, Record Group 220, Forbes
Q Jnlon Patrlotique
. Feb. 22, 1930.
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XX. The Occupation on Trial.
What has the Department of Horticulture donefor the development of our Important native fruitslike citrus, mangoes, avacadoes, coconuts, and
vegetables? Why the present head of this depart-
ment Mr. Leonard spends 95% of his funds in land-
scaping and pays no attention on industrial fruits
and vegetables? How many mules have been born infive years? What happened to the flock of whiteLeghorn and Rhode Island chickens brought in fromthe States? Who can patronize the dairy at theprice milk is sold? How many among the Americanpersonnel can talk French enough to make themselves
understood?
- Anonymous complaints registered with the Presi-dent's Commission.
The weather on the trip south through the Bahama
hannel was good, and the Commissioners were entertained
y the Commanding Officer of the Rochester at dinner and
t motion pictures shown on deck. They seemed to enjoy
he relaxing voyage, but nevertheless they spent a great
oal of time reviewing the material they had brought with
•iem, and in preparing the press release they Intended to
like on arrival in Port-au-Prince. With so many strong-
tiled and articulate individuals on the Commission, this
tst was no easy task. The President's charge to them had
ten that "the primary question which is to be investigated
i when and how we are to withdraw from Haiti. The second
qestion is what we shall do in the meantime."! The press
1 U. S
,
National Archives, President's Commission for Study1 Review of Conditions in Haiti, Record Group 220, State-
nit by President Herbert Hoover, February 4, I93O.
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release they eventually agreed upon was cabled, apparently
Bore as a courtesy than anything else, to the State De-
partment several days prior to the scheduled arrival in
laiti. It took the President's charge as a point of de-
parture, and stated that the purpose of their investigation
;as to determine the progressive steps necessary for (1)
)lacing all activities of government in the hands of persons
;hosen for the purpose by Haitian authorities, (2) the with-
xawal of United States officers and employees from the
aitian service, and (3) the termination at the earliest
ossible moment of the American Military Occupation. The
ommission's draft concluded with a promise to hear all
ides of the controversy, in public or private hearings,
great deal of evident labor went into careful choosing
p words, and the Commissioners were undoubtedly angered
•ien, the day prior to arriving in Port-au-Prince, Acting
iscretary of State J ,P
.
Cotton (whom Forbes probably con-
J.dered his junior) cabled that the Department did not de-
J.re to have their suggested statement released, and pro-
vded instead one of its own. In a huff, Forbes replied
tiat no statement would be released to the press on arrival.
The Rochester anchored at Port-au-Prince at I13O in
te afternoon of February 28, 1930, firing a 21 gun salute
wth the Haitian ensign at the fore. Fort National returned
te salute. In top hats and tail coats the Commissioners
1ft the ship accompanied by the firing of another salute
19 guns (for their ambassadorial rank) and the playing
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of the national anthem by the ship's band.
The pier where the Commissioners landed had been roped
kff and was clear of all persons with the exception of the
official welcoming party. Outside of the pier enclosure
aid lining the route taken by the official automobiles
thousands of people were massed. The Commissioners were
heered and there were many cries of "Vive le President
cover!" A parade formed in their wake and huge banners
ere displayed which read: "Down With the Council of state!"
Long Live Senators Borah, Blaine, King, Shipstead and All
riends of Haiti'." "No More High Commissioner!" "jesus
ave Haiti!" and "End the Occupation! "2
The Haitian press gave extensive coverage to the arrival
<r the Commissioners and to all their subsequent activities
|
the country. Biographies and pictures of each Commissioner
Ire published in almost all of the papers, and in La Presse
c. March 3, 1930, a large front page picture showed the Com-
nssioners in a formal pose in front of the American Legation.
I spite of the dust and heat of the Haitian capital, all
wre wearing top hats, tails, and high-collared shirts. All
crried canes.
During the Commission's presence in Haiti, attacks on
te Borno Government and the American Occupation continued
Abated in the opposition press. Editorials quoted every-
2 The Baltimore Sun . March 1, 1930.
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»ie from Abraham Lincoln to Senator Borah, and the de-




lent d'Haiti elu par le peuple!" "Election legislatives*."
A bas le Martiniquaist" (Referring to Borno, whose father
ras supposed to have been born in Martinique.) "A bas la
isSre!" "Respectez notre souveralnte* 9. ••
The first hearings before the Commission were held
n March 1. Typical is the following statement made in
'Pposition to the Occupation.
not^J^f is ., not *trQns enough, my words areot sufficiently strong, to express to you all




0hap£d !**? healing^Sie which y






in ba^uptcy and closefkers t Haitian industries. The true citizensare discarded from public affairs; public offices
ions^^Sou^L^ ^V*^ of a*y capituiat!iSJ^i'VT^ W? fP Suided by the laws of thescarry flag, in the name of humanity and of th*
n^ili^f Pe°Pi e ' kindly rem0ve us frSS the highly
derives us IfLll ithls °di °US ^cupation wKifn^
l« fhlH? I fc is most sa°red and most dearlVhiLlllLlLt.rple ' that ls its **»*>£
On Sunday, March 2, the opposition staged a parade
ot Haitian women for the benefit of the Commissioners, but
fr Mr. White „as present to observe it, the others being
* of Xiamen H. AlTS
. March 1,' l^oT ^ ™' ^^2
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away to observe a polo match or at tennis. Mr. White
stood with uncovered head outside the Commissioners' hotel,
bhe Excelsior, while the women filed by. More banners were
lisplayed, inscribed* "Sacred Heart of Jesus, Save Haiti'."
aid "Women of Haiti, Pray for Justice and Liberty for Haiti."
One of the marchers, dressed all in black, stepped in
'ront of white and said* "Please, Commissioner, deliver us."
£ she spoke, she bowed. Mr. White took her by the hand,
owed himself, and as she backed away, touched his fingers
o his lips and wafted a kiss to her. This act was followed
y wild cheers and cries of "Long Live the Commission'." and
Long Live President Hoover'."^
Illustrating that in reporting as in so many other
lings the point of view of the observer is everything,
Uliam Allen White's gesture was interpreted in the Hait-








Sed by a Wember of the Commiss-n. Lafayette, here we are', shouted the American
SS2K ^dinS *? FranCe * The forgetfutoesfofavannah is nearly redeemed* yesterday afternoonbefore the Commissioners' Hotel, one of its membersrespectfully touched his lips to our Flag presented












! ?lrou^out the Republic the Haitian
he^hfS'gesLre'r^^^ in leai*inS *• *"••"
The "forgetfulness of Savannah" refers to the Haitian
^
The New York Times. March 4, 1930.
5 Le Nouvelllste. Port-au-Prince, March 3, 1930.
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owever. In an early but undated interview the following
xchange took place between Mr. Constantin Mayard, ex-
resident of the Chamber of Deputies, and Mr. Fletcher.
fe_Jletcher. Have the representatives of theUnitea States tried to change the language and thereligion of the people?








in'FrencfaSd in^Lhf^3 n0t Witten b0th
M^Mayard. The General's report is in both languages,but it is easier to obtain an English copy than a
fnS^d^l'Fr^h^110 SCh°0lS ' ^Slish L ^




tne/are^so^dier^ ^ "° ^°»^° tact because
^Mavard.




On March 3, 1930, the editor and publisher of Le Kou-
Stiv'J;'/^
10









I would like to know if you enjoy
freedom of the press.
M. Chauvet
. Absolutely not. Though we have been
able to print something since the Commission arrived.
Mr. Kerney
.
So we have done something for Haiti
already
....
M^Leger. [Haitian counsel for the opposition] Howlong did you stay in jail without any trial?
M. Chauvet. Once 40 days, another 16 days, and an-
other 7 or 6 days.
Mr. Kerney
.
Don't you have the right by habeas corpusto get out?
M. Chauvet. Not under martial law. The bond forpressmen is set at $5,000, that is the lowest bond,but for any other criminal, murderer, and all, thehighest sum is #300 - any criminal and any murderer
can get out for that but we have to put up $5,000.
Mr. Kerney.. They must think that newspaper men are
rich.
. .4
French Catholic priests testified during the first week
hearings in Port-au-Prince, and stated their dissatis-
faction with the amount of public support given the Church
drlng the period of the American occupation. They charged
tat the funds provided were inadequate to pay the salaries
1 Priests, particularly those outside the principal cities.
C<aplaints were lodged concerning taxes. Recently the govern-
not had begun to levy import duties on goods brought into
7.U. s., National Archives, President's Commission forNdy and Review of Conditions in Haiti, Record Group 220.
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the country by the Church, and this was a particular
Lrritant. There were statements expressing distrust of
the instruction given in the Service Technique schools
predominately protestant American teachers.
The Commissioners heard from spokesmen from literally
dozens of opposition political groups, each claiming to
present
-all the Haitian people." A frequent warning
laced in the transcript was that if the forthcoming presi-
ential election was accomplished by the Council of state,
merlcan machine guns would have to sink Haiti in blood.
he activities of the opposition were not confined to speech
Ulng before the Commissioners, however. Police reports
:>r the city of Port-au-Prince tell of frequent political
^etings and rallies. A typical program was that of the
hitian Young Peoples Patriotique League on March l> 9 where
vcious personal attacks were made on President Borno and
Gneral Russell, interspersed with the reading of poetry.
A the conclusion of this meeting, a colored American news-
n and his wife stood on a table for the purpose of count-
ig the crowd. They were roundly applauded. 8
Le Nouvelllste paid frequent tribute to sympathetic
rpresentatives of the American press in Haiti to cover the
brings. One such was Helena Weed Hill, of The Nation .
h addition to attacking Marines for drunkeness and other
- Review of C^di^o T' ?reSldent
' S Commission for Study
*ic Port au P^ ^
Haiti
'
ReC °rd Gr°Up 220
>
Chief ofce, - -Prince, to Connnandant, Garde d •Haiti. March 5.
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mmoral behavior, she went after civilians in the treaty
ervices as well.
The country is teeming with merry young strip-
lings, "technical experts," who are receiving double
and treble the amount their qualifications would
ever bring them at home, while the real work is be-
ing done by underpaid Haitians. The native resent-
ment at seeing the Important positions filled by such
whipper-snappers with Haitians tolerated only in thelowest grades is easy to comprehend.
9
From the record it appears that no treaty official
e>peared before the Commission in the first week of its
harings in Port-au-Prince. Except, therefore, for what-
eer mitigating influence informal conversation with American
Ocupation officials might have had, the picture painted for
te Commissioners was somber, threatening, and decidedly
ati-Occupation. Letters poured in from all sorts of strange
o:$anizations
- from "Haitians Resident in Cuba," "The Stu-
4ats National Association of the Dominican Republic," "La
l±yie de la Jeuness e Patrio te ." and many others. All carried
th same message. The United States had failed to prepare
If.ti for self-government after I'* years of occupation.
9, Quoted in The Baltimore Sun , editorial, March 16, 1930.
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XI. A Political Settlement
.
We informed the opposition leaders that we had
been assured that M, Bomo was not seeking re-elect-
ion and was willing to accept a neutral non-partisan
as his successor. We said we were willing to help
find such a man. They all doubted that he could be
found. K. Hudicourt asked with an air of finality:
"Where are we to find this white blackbird?" But
they agreed to think it over and return the next day
with their answer. They returned the following day
and said they were willing to try to reach a com-
promise and asked us what we had to propose. We then
suggested that, as they were the leaders of the com-bined opposition and claimed to speak and act for
their followers, they should prepare a list of five
neutral men, any one of whom they would accept as
Provisional President. M. Borno would be asked toprepare a similar list. If one man's name appeared
on both lists, he would be the merle blanc
.
- Henry P. Fletcher, "Quo Vadis Haiti?" July, 1930.
On March 6, 1930, General Russell sent a confidential
mmorandum to Chairman Forbes in which he made reference to
te adamancy and belligerant attitude of the opposition pol-
iicians, and warned of the danger of violent outbreaks and
P-ssible bloodshed. He then outlined a compromise plan
>:Lginally suggested by Colonel Frank E. Evans, USMC, the
2comandant of the Garde d'Haiti. The plan essentially called
the election of a Provisional President, a political
jitral satisfactory to both the opposition and the govern-
et, who would then be responsible for the calling of legis-
aive elections. The Provisional President would agree in
•dance to step down in favor of a president regularly elected
ythe new legislature.
The Commissioners seemed favorably inclined to the plan
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nd General Russell then took it up with President Borno
.
ie Haitian President agreed to give it a try, but stated
lat for psychological reasons the Commission should make
le proposal to the opposition politicians. He assured
(meral Russell that no difficulty would be encountered
jl the Council of State.
Adopting the plan as its own, the Commission drafted
e long message to Washington on the evening of March 7 . The
i ugh draft of the message was addressed to "The Secretary
State, for the Confidential Information of the President."
lis was lined out, however, by Forbes, who wrote in its
pace "The President, Washington, D .C ." Apparently the
I airman was not taking any chances on further interference
L] the Commission's work by the Acting Secretary of state,
ns text of the message follows. Its classification* "Strlct-
i: Confidential."
Your Commission finds the situation here critical,
the public greatly inflamed and representatives oflarge groups of people organized in various patrioticleagues have appeared in public sessions and without
exception stated that they would not accept any elect-ion of president by the Council of State, an appoint-ive body which has acted as a legislature here for
about twelve years and which has elected and re-elected
President Borno. The demand made by practically all
those who have appeared and supported as advisable bythe Archbishop speaking for the church, is for the
restoration of representative government by a legis-lature elected by the people and their choice of a
President, which they say is the only way of satis-fying the popular demand, and that any other course
will not be accepted by the people and will be op-
posed with acts of violence. Officers of the Marines,
the High Commissioner himself and General Evans re-
presenting the National Guard, which is the Haitian
police force, all agree the situation is tense and
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likely to result in bloodshed! In the present state
of the public mind some small incident might pre-
cipitate serious consequences. With the approval
of General Russell, your Commission has convened agroup of five leaders representing the various pat-
riotic leagues, and represented to us as likely tobe able to control the situation, and at our suggest-ion they have issued a statement calculated to calmthe public mind.
Further, it was suggested to them, after consider-
able discussion, that a compromise candidate for thePresidency be found - some man wholly out of politics
neutral and satisfactory to both sides, and willing'to accept the election as President until a duly
elected legislative body can be convened.
On one hand the objection of representatives ofPatriotic leagues, that they and the public would
not recognize the election by the Council of state,has been met by their proposal to convene delegatesfrom the country at large who will endorse and se-lect the candidate agreed upon. On the other hand,
after this has been done, the plan is for PresidentBorno to secure the election of the compromise can-didate by the Council of State. The new Presidentis to agree to call the election of the two legis-lative chambers as soon as possible and then pre-
sent his resignation, permitting the National Assemblyto elect the new President. This program has the
S?
m
r-^ e endorsement of General Russell, who believesthat President Borno will accept it. The five rep-
resentatives we have talked with are confident they
can find the necessary candidate satisfactory to both




?uld be ^cognized by the United States
as the President on the understanding that the plan
will be carried out in its entirety.
In endeavoring to effect a compromise which will






ter tha* ^ are acting entirely un-officially. Commission understands that General Rus-sell approves and is wiring the Department to this
ei feet
.
wmn5 «™ S P^ meets y0Ur aPPr°val, the Commissionould appreciate a reply at the earliest moment, be-
cause of the danger of premature publicity which isimminent. Time is very short, because the leadersdesire to submit and receive from the public assem-blies throughout the Republic the endorsement and
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approval of the compromise candidate before the
fourteenth of April.
The Commission is leaving for a tour of the Re-
public on Sunday morning but arrangements have been
made to receive your reply promptly. Please reply
through USS, Rochester
. Forbes, Chairman. 1
The next day, March 8, the President of the United
bates wired Forbes as follows » "I entirely concur in the
scommendations of your telegram on March seven th."2 Coi
,.mday morning, March 9, the Commissioners left Port-au-
.rince by motor car for a trip across the country, believ-
!ig that the political compromise had been accepted by both
{.des. Arrangements were made to release details of the
I.an to the press in the afternoon of March 9, and this was
one. On Monday morning when they arrived at Hinche, they
vre completely taken by surprise when they learned that
Resident Borno had sent a telegram to all Prefects in the
cuntry branding as false the reports that a provisional
gvernment would be formed, and stating that no legislative
eections would take place prior to the nearest date fixed
b the Constitution (January 10, 1932).
A series of frantic telegrams and telephone calls passed
btween Chairman Forbes and General Russell, and after some
iiiecision the Commissioners continued their trip to Cape
H'ltian. Under pressure from General Russell, President
J U. S., National Archives, President's Commission for Study
^Review of Conditions in Haiti, Record Group 220, Forbes
« President Herbert Hoover, March 7, 1930.
"IM^., President Herbert Hoover to Forbes, March 8, 193O.
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orno capitulated late in the evening on March 10. Thus
t may be seen that not only did Occupation officials pro-
ose the compromise plan eventually put into effect, but
hey negotiated its acceptance by the Haitian Government,
ais was carefully concealed from the press, which gave all
iredit to the Commissioners. General Russell and his treaty
Cficials were pictured as completely taken by surprise when
lie plan was announced.
3
The Commission's reception at Cape Haitian was marked
t more parades and more slogans. An organization of Haitian
wmen presented Governor Forbes with a red silk banner in-
sribed: "God Bless President Hoover." Several of the Com-
mssioners found time to visit Christophe's Citadel. In
Wshington, however, in spite of President Hoover's prompt
aproval, receipt of the plan for a political settlement
taohed off a flurry of activity in the State Department.
Objections were raised to what was interpreted as a
":Bcret promise" to support the compromise candidate in ad-
vice of his election, and to the plan's failure to take in-
<* consideration the constitutional requirements concerning
H£tlan elections - particularly the requirement for the
ising by the President of "an even numbered year" for the
lOding of legislative elections. These objections were
-aled to the Commission, and the Commission replied in a
L°5 message marked "Confidential for the President and the
4
1« The Baltimore Sun
, March 10, 1930.
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cting Secretary of State,"
The Commission argued that it was not making secret
romises, but merely taking action to redress grievances
f long standing. The prompt restoration of representative
overnment was held to be essential if fresh violence was
d be avoided.
For our own protection, we wish to know, before
going any farther whether or not our government is
going to insist that the new President of Haiti must
wait until next year to call legislative elections
to be held in 1932. If the Department intends to
insist on this interpretation the Commission is
unanimously of the opinion that the compromise plan
will be jeopardized and measures which the President
would be reluctant to order may become necessary.
We must earnestly submit that the Haitian con-
stitution was written and adopted to secure repre-
sentative government and that no technicality affect-
ing merely the time set for elections should deprive
the people of their fundamental constitutional rights.
Further action awaits your reply... *4
The message was signed by all members of the Commission.
I Washington it was discussed at length by President Hoover
ad Acting Secretary of State Cotton. Final approval was
cbled to Port-au-Prince on March 14. The Commission then
sit a message expressing its gratification and stating its
iitention to leave Haiti on March 16. The Acting Secretary
r guested that the Commissioners delay their departure until
d^initive agreements were secured from all political ele-
cts in Haiti. Forbes replied that he considered the work
•U. S., National Archives, President's Commission for Study
ar. Review of Conditions in Haiti, Record Group 220, Forbes
tc the President and the Secretary of State, March 14, 193O.
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f the Commission in Haiti to be at an end, that farewell
alls had been paid, and that a delay in the Commission's
eparture would only hurt the situation. He stated that
If special documents or signatures were desired, General
Jissell was in a position to secure them. The Commission
eparted as planned.
In the meantime, General Russell had secured the names
C five provisional candidates from the opposition, and from
tds list President Borno selected Mr. Eugene Roy. His
eection by the Council of state was scheduled for April Ik,
130.
Editorial comment in the American press concerning the
sttlement varied. The Washington Post was not persuaded.
... The politicians of Haiti are a bad lot, and will
never be satisfied until American influence has been
wiped out. Since the treaty remains in effect until
1936 the United States must continue to exercise
authority in Haiti, whether the native legislaturefunctions or not. It remains to be seen whether the
restoration of the legislature will improve the Hait-ian situation.-?
The New York Telegram took a more sanguine view.
The Haitian settlement is one of the quickest and
most brilliant examples of diplomacy in our history.
In method and aim it represents a reversal of fifteenyears of Yankee imperialism there.
Unwilling to take on his shoulders responsibilityfor undoing the diplomatic and administrative blunders
of preceding administrations, President Herbert Hoover
J. The Washington Post
, editorial, March 16, 1930.

•c, ( «+ —
appointed a commission to investigate and advisehim.
That In itself was enough to show the breakdown
of the State Department and the Marine Corps regime,
which is subject to the President but upon whose
advice he apparently could no longer depend To





^? ea*J UP the mess ' lt dld s0 with the help
«L ^^f1/^dePendence leaders and despite the trick-ery 01 Dictator Borno,
For better or worse, a political compromise had been
truck which in effect gave the Haitian opposition virtually
irerything it had demanded. While the compromise itself was
aggested by the Occupation, the decision to meet the demands
C the opposition was taken by the Commission, and after
baring in depth but one side of the Haitian controversy. The
hlk of the testimony and written reports of American treaty
cficials and the Haitian Government, replying to the charges
Ivied by the opposition, was presented to the Commission
ater its return from the overland trip to Cape Haitian.
Sortly before the Commission left Haiti, some 18 spokesmen
fir the government party, the National Progressives, appeared
bfore Governor Forbes and one other Commissioner. One
umber of the group, Colonel August e Nemoures, later informed
Gueral Russell that Forbes told the group that it was un-
noessary to make any statement, since the Commission "had
a>eady made up its mind."?
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In all, the Commission spent 15 days in Haiti. Hear-
ngs at which the opposition stated its grievances were
efore the entire Commission and anti-Occupation forces
ere permitted to appoint counsel to conduct their attack
n American officials. Those officials were not permitted
o cross-examine their accusers or publicly refute the
liarges that were made. This was particularly unfortunate
lasmuch as the attacks of the opposition and what was
.iterpreted as the Commission's concurrence therein, were
jLven wide publicity in both the Haitian and the American
]ress. The High Commissioner's well constructed and lengthy
s;atement answering the charges made against the Occupation






XII . The Case for the Defense.
Never in the course of our history has there been
so much liberty, so much humanity, so much general
safety, so much guarantee of life and property than
under the present regime. No one dares dispute this
fact.
- Memorandum by the National Progressive Party, Port-
au-Prince, March 7, 1930.
The "other side of the story" in Haiti, what might be
ailed the defense of the Occupation, does not appear in the
sport later issued by the President's Commission for Study
nd Review of Conditions in Haiti, nor was there ever any
("fort to make that defense public. As previously shown,
tie defense was not permitted to influence the basic findings
J
the Commission, and this was, perhaps, as it should have
ben, given President Hoover's charge to the Commissioners.
'ie decision to withdraw was made in Washington prior to the
riming of the Commission, and in that respect the "study
£d review" was purely pro forma. There is no doubt, how-
eer, that in failing to give Occupation officials an equal
oportunity to place themselves on public record, a serious
i justice was done to them and the public was misled both as
t the record of the American Occupation and the probable
efects precipitate withdrawal of that Occupation would have
o: the Haitian people. Not logic and not humanitarian in-
stnct governed, but political expediency. This was recog-
nised and acknowledged, privately, In Washington, when Gen-
e:il Russell's reclama on the Commission's report arrived
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ifc the State Department it was sympathetically received,
j memorandum from the Under Secretary (Mr. Cotton) to the
distant Secretary for Latin American Affairs (Mr. White)
expressed that sympathy. Mr. Cotton concluded, however,
tat "I think this report should go to the Secretary and
ten be locked up as under the present state of affairs I
d not know of anything we can do about it." 1
A common theme in the testimony of pro-Occupation
sokesmen concerned the peculiar social conditions exist-
tk in Haiti both prior to and after the intervention.
D3 absence of a middle class, the existence of a small
tab voracious Slite, the illiteracy and ignorance of the
^rwhelming mass of the Haitian people, were presented
as virtually insurmountable problems which had no short-
em solution and which vastly complicated the constructive
*>k of the Occupation. Measures taken to build a modern
« Progressive society in Haiti were the very measures
rtich drew the most fire from critics of the Occupation.
The treaty department which suffered the greatest
rfcioism from the Haitian opposition, for reasons briefly
Wished upon before, was the Service Technique, its dir-
t'r, Dr. George W. Freeman, appeared before the Commission
n larch 13, 1930. He spoke of the necessity of creating
aiti a skilled middle class, and of the difficulties
ttho™
N
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le had encountered in attempting to do just that. Fully
)0 percent of the Haitian people derived their living from
igricultural and industrial pursuits. Thus, logic demanded
;hat Haiti's educational system be geared to satisfy the
eeds of that 90 percent. This was where the controversy
aged with the elite, however, for the limited resources
f Haiti did not permit the establishment of industrial and
gricultural schools without some decline in the support
Xven the existing school system.
In 1930 the Service Technique had more than 11,000
:iudents enrolled in its schools, almost 8,000 of whom
i*re in some 65 rural schools. The problems in supporting
|en such a modest school system in Haiti were enormous.
lere was an almost total lack of trained teachers. At the
tme the Service Technique was established, only two Haitian
culd be found in the entire country who had ever studied
i an agricultural school. Malnutrition and absenteeism
i: the student body were serious obstacles, staff members
a:nost without exception had to be trained from the ground
UJ, for educated Haitians would have nothing to do with
th new system of schools. In spite of this, at the time
oi the Commission's visit to Haiti, the staff of the Service
s
Tehni^ue was composed of 436 Haitians, 24 Americans, and
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Dr. Freeman, burned in effigy, slandered in the Haitian
ress, his work in Haiti, which he believed in deeply, about
o be demolished, died in Port-au-Prince shortly after the
ommission's departure. .
Another treaty service which came in for more than its
nare of criticism was the Garde d 1 Haiti. The charge most
ten heard here was racial discrimination. Opposition
;)liticians, particularly when addressing themselves to
roups such as, for example, The Nation , or the NAACP,
t>ok the position that racial discrimination was unheard
c in Haiti before the arrival of the Americans. Seeking
v brant chords, they claimed that Marine personnel serving
wth the Garde were overwhelmingly recruited from the south-
en part of the United States and were therefore racially
"ainted." Other criticism centered on the Marines 1 alleged
tfck of education end knowledge of the local language.
As previously cited and documented by numerous examples
d:awn from Haitian history, perhaps no people drew the "color
fee" more ferociously than the Haitians themselves. In
U)0, at the time of the Commission's visit, the best Haitian
clibs were organized strictly on the basis of color. Even
in the Garde, light-skinned Haitians refused to compete in
atletic events with dark-skinned Haitians. These feelings
ee deeply ingrained and reinforced by memories of many
lody purges of mulattoes by blacks and blacks by mulattoes
in the past. The treatment afforded Haiti's Syrian com-
WLty is an example of racial discrimination at its worst.
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Che constitutional bar to white ownership of property in
laiti (removed in the American dictated Constitution of
918, but reinstated after the withdrawal of the Occupation)
as another fine example. These things were no secret to
nyone even remotely familiar with the Haitian situation,
et time and time again the myth that it was the Americans
ho introduced the scourge of racial discrimination into
le Black Republic was accepted at its face value. The
:>ugh draft of the Commission's Report contains the follow-
-ig penciled query, later lined outi "The colored line is
cam between the Haitians themselves. Should this be
nntioned, and if so, how dealt with? M3 General Russell
dscussed at length with Governor Forbes the hypocrisy
asociated with racial prejudice in Haiti.
^
On March 13, the Commandant of the Garde d'Haiti, Major
Gneral Frank E. Evans (Colonel, USMC). tried to answer
Ije criticisms directed against the Marines serving in the
Qjrde. He furnished the following data in a "Compendium
oi Information on the Garde d'Haiti. "5
Residence Southern States zkResidence other States 92Education Grammar School 15Education High School n
Education College £o
Average length of Service in Haiti k 09 vrsAverage length of Service in Garde 3.58 yrs.'
HJ . S.. National Archives, President's Commission for Studv^Review of Conditions in Haiti, Record Group 220 *
.••£±S" Russell to Forbes, March 13, 1930
>':bld.,
"Compendium of Information «», *-u \
:a:;h 13, 1930.
miorma on the Garde d'Haiti,"
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Average length of Service in military
organization 13 15 vrsLanguage spoken, French 85
Language spoken, Creole 92Language spoken, both 80
No Knowledge of either 13
In his testimony General Evans defended at length the
Practice of assigning enlisted Marines to the Garde as junior
)fficers, and the record of the Garde in "Haitlanizlng" its
-fficer corps as fast as qualified Haitians could be grad-
ated from the Ecol e Mllitaire
, There were at that time 7?
altian and 115 American officers in the Garde. He also
reduced evidence that showed that though Admiral Caperton's
ecree establishing martial law in Haiti was still technically
ji effect, trials before Provost Courts had practically ceased
f
1923, there being none in 1924, 2 in 1925, 4 in 1926, and
nne since then. In response to a petty complaint, he admitted
iat the six horses the Garde kept in Port-au-Prince were used
ccasionally for polo, in addition to ceremonial duties such
a parades, escort for the President's automobile, etc.
General Evans listed as the Garde's current functions
ad responsibilities: building its own barracks and outposts,
fre protection, running the Ecole Mllitaire
. communications,
a:ns control and licensing, rural police, coast guard, re-
Mling bandits, communal advice, prisons (until the late
1^.0's the insane were also cared for in the prisons), making
it: own uniforms, repairing its shoes, making soap, first aid,
shwing motion pictures in the Interior sections of the country,
euiring attendence of children at schools.

-282-
On March 11, the Financial Adviser-General Receiver,
lr. Sydney de la Rue, presented the Commissioners with a
;eneral report on the operation of his service. In it he
.ttempted to answer in detail all the charges laid before
he Commission by his Haitian critics. The philosophy im-
licit in his report is typical of that expressed by nearly
11 of the treaty officials in formal testimony before the
ommission or in their own written reports.
I desire to record that, in the opinion of this
office, the present political unrest in Haiti has
been very largely caused by one condition, and one
only. The elite politician does not know how to
work, will not be taught to work, and does not desire
to work. The news papers giving accounts of the stu-
dents of Damien in the November-December strike amply
demonstrated this mentality. It is degrading to a
Haitian aristocrat to work....
There is no unrest in Haiti today among the peasants
except as has been artificially stimulated and in-
culcated by political agitation, by false promises,
by wild stories, rumors, lies and definitely subversive
propaganda. Men have come before the Commission,
whose testimony I have read, and stated they rep-
resented thousands of people. This is a falsehood,
and was cunningly stated to deliberately mislead theCommission. No meetings had ever taken place, no
roster of names had ever been prepared, no actual
society had ever been formed....
The fact of the matter is that there are possiblyless than one-third enough jobs in Haiti to support
the elite. This means that once every so often the
elite must change places or starve. There is not
enough money in Haiti to support all of them, without
exploitation of the peasant or robbery of the publictreasury. In this fact you have the explanation of
the present condition, and you have the explanation
of the future unrest which will occur in Haiti. Thedifficulty now is that the out-politician has been
out a long time. He is likely to stay out a long
time unless he can secure an immediate change. It
is the last desperate throw of the dice to win back
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place, or to die* and some of them are old....
6
General Russell's report to the Commission, not pub-
.ished because, as previously stated, it was "controversial, "
;econded the points made by Mr. de la Rue in almost every
nstance. On the basis of the testimony and the documents
iven the Commission, opposition charges of malfeasance
gainst the treaty officials evaporate into unsubstantiated
ad petty gripes. The overall impression gained from the
scord is that the treaty services were in fact doing re-
markable work with the barest of material support and in
he face of open hostility from those they were supposed
1) be aiding and "advising."
The most damning criticism of the Occupation, ironically,
cime from General Russell himself. In a letter to Governor
Frbes on March 13, he stated his conviction that there were
oly two solutions to the Haitian problem - "get in, or get
it." By "get in" he meant the establishment of an American
mlitary government and an end to the hypocrisy of the ad-
fcory system. Only in that way did he see the possibility
i creating in Haiti the political and social conditions
when were the stated goals of the Treaty of 1915. He con-
fided that "while tremendous advances have been made in the
ierial rehabilitation of Haiti, and the happiness and
asperity of the mass of the Haitian people have been
>f S National Archives, President's Commission for Study
* fieview of Conditions in Haiti, Record Groun ??n D
*tha Financial Adviser-General Receiver tlTJ^L?^




ecidedly increased, the Haitian people are, today, but




By then, however, the decision had long been taken to
get out."
'. U. S., National Archives, President's Commission for Study
nd Review of Conditions in Haiti, Record Group 220, Russell
b Forbes, March 13, I93O.
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XIII. The Commission's Report
.
Their sophistication is charming but it is of
the eighteenth century. Their pride has been justi-
fied by its works
, but in the modern world it is
doomed. The existence of this exotic society in
the industrial civilization is a survival lovely
but futile. Naturally, when the husky democracy
of America meets all this caste pride, all this
refinement of a departed French aristocracy in men
and women of negro blood, the race prejudices of
the American whether he be a soldier or civilian
flares up. Instinctively he either sneers at what
he sees or rejects what seems to be the vast amus-
ing pretense of the mulatto rulers of Haiti. Bitter-
nesses are inevitable. Understanding is tremendously
handicapped. The wonder is that with our background
we have done so well. Yet we may do better.
- Deleted material from an early draft of the Com-
mission's Report.
At Washington, the Commission called as a body upon
frst the President, and then the State and Navy Departments.
Oi March 28, 1930 , President Hoover announced that he had
aoepted the recommendations of the Commission as the policy
03 the United States toward Haiti. The Commission's Report,
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as published shortly thereafter, reviewed the situation
in Haiti as the Commission saw it, recorded its high praise
of "General Russell's whole-hearted and single-minded de-
votion to the interests of Haiti as he conceived them,"
deplored the seeming ingratitude of Haitian politicians
for the work that had been done, and stated that the prin-
cipal shortcoming of United States policy in the past had
been "the failure of the Occupation to understand the social
problems of Haiti, its brusque attempt to plant democracy
there by drill and harrow, [and] its determination to set
ip a middle class - however wise and necessary it may seem
to Americans. "1
The formal recommendations and "sequent steps" pre-
sented in the Report follow.
The Commission recommends
s
(1) That the detail of Naval and Marine officers for
all Haitian services be made for a minimum of four
years and that an effort be made to secure Americans
who will agree to continue employment in these ser-
vices, so that upon the expiration of the treaty a
force of American doctors, engineers, and police offi-
cers will be available for continued assistance to the
Haitian Government should it then desire it}
(2) That, if possible, some form of continuing appro-
priation for roads be urged for expenditure by the
Haitian Government, with a policy that will provide
enough funds to keep all existing roads in suitable
repair before any new construction is undertaken; alsoin regard to further construction, that only roads most
urgently needed to develop regions now settled and under
cultivation be undertaken until the present economic
Report of the President's Commission for the Study andjvlew of Conditions in the Republic of Haiti . (Washington,




(3) That the United States Interpose no objections
to a moderate reduction of the customs duties, in-
ternal revenue taxes, especially those imposed upon
alcohol and tobacco, or to a reduction or eliminat-ion of the export tax on coffee, if the condition ofthe Treasury so warrants;
(JO That it be suggested to the Haitian Government
that it employ one American adviser in each admin-istrative department of the Government to perform
such work as the respective Cabinet Minister maydelegate to him, these officers to give expert ad-
vice and assistance to the Haitian Government, sim-ilar to that given by American officers in China,
oiam, and Nicaragua, for naval matters in Brazil
and for educational matters in Peru?
(5) That, as an act of graciousness on the part ofthe United States, a moderate appropriation be made
available during the continuance of the treaty todefray the cost of American civil officials in theHaitian Government service;
(6) That an appointment of a military attach^ be
made to the Legation when the time shall have arrivedfor a Minister to replace the High Commissioner, asthe question of the preservation of order is of firstimportance and the Minister should have the advantage
of his advice on military and police matters;
ill J I f1 fde^uate Legation building be constructedimmediately by the Government of the United Statesin the city of Port au Prince to provide a suitable
residence for the American Minister and appropriate
oifices.
Sequent Steps.
^S^n^fV^M^^'^10118 t0 ™Sgest sequentsteps to be taken with respect to the Haitian situ-ation your commission offers the following!
(1) That the President declare that the United States
riH ?EPf0Ve a P°licy» the details of which the Un-ited States officials in Haiti are directed to assistin working out, providing for an increasingly rapidHaitianization of the services, with the object ofhaving Haitians experienced in every department ofthe Government ready to take over full responsibilityat the expiration of the existing treaty;
(2) That in retaining officers now in the Haitian
service, or selecting new Americans for employmenttherein, the utmost care be taken that only those
free from strong racial antipathies should be pre-ferred;
(3) That the United States recognize the temporary
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President when elected, provided the election isin accordance with the agreement reached by your
commission with President Borno and the leaders
representing the opposition;(M That the United States recognize the President
elected by the new legislature, acting as a NationalAssembly, provided that neither force nor fraud havebeen used in the elections;
(5) That at the expiration of General Russell's tourof duty in Haiti, and in any event not before theinauguration of the permanent President, the office
of High Commissioner be abolished and a non-militaryMinister appointed to take over his duties as wellas those of diplomatic representatives






the new Mni ster to Haiti be charged
with the duty of carrying out the early Haitianlz-
^ S °^ th? services called for in the Declarationof the President of the United States above re-
commended;
(7) That as the commission found the immediate with-drawal of the Marines inadvisable, it recommendstheir gradual withdrawal in accordance with arrange-




1??? the United States limit its interventionin Haitian affairs definitely to those activitiesfor which provision is made for American assistanceby treaty or by specific agreement between the twoGovernments;
(9) That the new Minister be charged with the dutyof negotiating with the Haitian Government further
provfd?^
1?^ ?f thf txlstin% trea*y ^d agreementsi2
«
dins {or less intervention in Haiti's domestic
?*5f? rof1? defin ^ne the conditions under which theUnited States would lend its assistance in the re-storation of order or maintenance of credit.
2
The Commission's Report was received with dismay and
o:tterness by the High Commissioner. In his view "the changes
roommended by the Commission in its report are purely super-
ficial and where they do not redundantly recommend steps
^
Report of the President's Commission for the Study and
^|2IL2£_£^^ (Washington,
-.S. Government Printing OfficlTT9T0l
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already or long since in effect, constitute a weakening
of our Haitian policy ... .Such changes cannot but spell
disaster to Haiti. "3 In regard to sequent step (4) above,
it was General Russell's firm view that no election, be-
fore or after the intervention, had been held in Haiti by
the Haitians without force and fraud, and that unless the
United States Government supervised the election, force
and fraud would certainly be employed again , In the wake
}f the Commission's departure he saw political conditions
Ln Haiti worsening, and at a near-revolutionary state, with
)nly the continued presence of American forces preventing
i return to pre-1915 norms.
The Commissioners had finished their work, however,
[hey had outlined a plan of when and how the United States
should get out of Haiti, and what should be done there in
;he meantime
,
In spite of the speculation of some of the journalists
•ho accompanied the Commission, it seems clear that the
ommission was from start to finish firmly in the hands of
ts chairman, W. Cameron Forbes. The following excerpt from
i
letter to Forbes from William Allen White, written shortly
ter the Commissioners parted company, substantiates such
conclusion
.
. U. S., National Archives, State Department Decimal File,
930-1939, 838.OO/2636, Russell to Secretary of State, No.
>13. May 26, 1930.

In this whole matter I was a bound boy at a
husking? out of my medium. All my life I have
been in politics; but as an agitator for causes.
This Commission was my first official effort. I
could do nothing except furnish one vote out of
five in the Commission, and perhaps have my in-
fluence with two or three others. But the language
of diplomacy, the forms of diplomacy all were not
merely out of my experience but deeply different
from anything I had ever known . It has been ray
job all my life to make myself as plain, as force-
ful, as direct and convincing as possible in order
to effect public sentiment. The weapons for making
and controlling public sentiment are fairly familiar
to me and I have used them with some success during
my forty years in politics. But not one single
weapon, not a rhetorical screw driver in my whole
kit and accouterment was worth a tinker's resin dam
on this job. But I hope I did back up Fletcher and
you, I watched with "wonder, awe, and praise" as
the old song says, the deftness of your touch, the
sureness of your tact, the beauty of your maneuvers.
You can't teach an old dog new tricks. I will never
be of any use as a diplomat. But the look-in I got
was worth the whole trip and I feel that it is al-
most a shame to take my per diem in the face of my
experience ....
I hear everywhere kind things about the work of
the Forbes Commission, It is another jewel in your
crown . I am proud to have been with you in this
enterprise even if I could not contribute as much
as I might have done in another kind of undertaking.
Another letter caught up with the Chairman in the last
:jw days before he departed Washington for his home. It was
uted March 21, 193° » a^d was postmarked from a small town
It western Pennsylvania where an old man, retired from the
i.ssionary service, was living out his final years. The
-itter began:
j
William Allen White to w. Cameron Forbes, April 9, 1930,




How I wished you could have taken me with you
to Haiti; I could have been the very kind of help
you required, absolutely confided in by leading
Natives; yet an admirer of High Commissioner, and
best able to appreciate the special, and valuable
reform brought about ....
We must not leave Haiti to herself , Do call me
down dear Governor? Am positively certain your
plan will be THE REDEMPTION OF HAITI. They are
CHILDREN OF NATURE.
5
The letter was signed by L. Ton Evans.
5. U. S., National Archives, Presidents Commission for Study
and Review of Conditions in Haiti, Record Group 220, L. Ton
Evans to W. Cameron Forbes, March 21, 1930.
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XXIV . Haltlanlzatlon and Withdrawal .
My great Interest in Haiti and the Haitian people,
after spending a quarter of my life in Haiti for the
purpose of assisting it, makes me strongly regret
the tearing dovm of the constructive work which has
been carried on in Haiti by the United States Govern-
ment during the past fifteen years, and which has
materially added to the health, prosperity, and
happiness of the Haitian people.
- Brigadier General John H. Russell, USMC, May 26,
1930.
On March 21, 1930, opposition delegates meeting in Port-
au-Prince nominated Eugene Roy as their candidate for Pro-
visional President of the Republic, in accordance with the
agreement previously made. The Council of State was to have
sleeted him on April 1^, but as that date approached it be-
came known that there was serious opposition to Roy in the
Council. The opposition charged that President Borno was
seeking to upset the agreement reached with the Commission
)y failing to exercise sufficient influence in the Council
>f State. The American State Department warned President
iorno, through General Russell, that the United States would
'ecognlze Roy and no other as Provisional President. On the
ve of the scheduled election, President Borno abruptly
djourned the Council of State until April 21. Postponing
he election created a serious situation. In Port-au-Prince
here was an outbreak of arson, and it continued even after
he eventual election of Roy on April 21. That election
as apparently assured only by the replacement of 10 of the
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21 members of the Council by men pledged to the candidacy
of Roy.
In the interim between the election and the inaugur-
ation, on May 15, 1930 » the disturbances in Haiti deepened.
The homes of American officials, including that of the
Brigade Commander, were damaged or destroyed by fire. The
Parisian Theatre in Port-au-Prince was razed to the ground,
rhreats were made by mail and by telephone to the lives
md property of Americans and officials in the Borno Govern-
aent. The disorders spread to other Haitian cities, and
.n Cape Haitian members of the Garde were attacked by mobs.
d. these circumstances President Borno requested the full
aercise of martial law, but General Russell, aware of the
•eaction such a step would have in Washington, refused.
Intelligence reports linked the Haitian arsonists to
iolshevik groups in the United States, particularly the
rusader News Agency and the American Negro Labor Congress.
1
ore respectable organizations such as the NAACP and the
CLU petitioned President Hoover to force the immediate
mplementation of the Forbes' proposals.
In June, 193°, th © United States Commission on Educat-
on in Haiti, headed by Dr. Moton, arrived in Port-au-Prince,
uring a visit of several weeks, the Commission gathered
aterial for its report to the President. Dr. Moton re-
.
U. S. t National Archives, State Department Decimal File,
^30-1939, 838. 00/2802, Russell to Department of State, No.
>82, April 19, 193°.
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coramended the unification of educational systems in Haiti
under the administration of the Haitian Ministry of Public
Instruction, curtailment of the activities and expenditures
of the Service Technique , and American assistance, primarily
financial, in the establishment of an adequate educational
system for Haiti. This Commission also gave its views as
to the probable cause of what was increasingly recognized
as the failure of the American Occupation.
Had there been less of a disposition to deal
with the island as a conquered territory and more
to help a sister state in distress, less of a de-
sire to demonstrate efficiency and more to help
others to the efficient direction of their own
affairs, less of enforced control and more of
helpful cooperation, the United States might today
have greater reason to be proud of her intervent-
ion in the affairs of a struggling neighbor.
2
The new Haitian Government under President Roy soon
lost the temporary popularity it enjoyed after its coming
to power. The press attacked the President personally for
nepotism, graft, and a reluctance to set the date for leg-
islative elections. Under pressure from the High Commiss-
ioner, however, the President issued a decree on July 11,
calling for elections the following October.
On September 19, 1930, General Russell instructed all
American officials in Haiti, by letter, concerning the
attitude of the United States Government in the forthcoming
I. Report of the United States Commission on Education in
Haiti
,




legislative elections. Noting that neither the Treaty
of 1915 nor any other agreement or protocol provided for
the United States lending assistance at any Haitian elect-
Ion » he directed that strict neutrality be observed. He
also ordered that the Garde d'Haiti not participate in the
elections in any way unless called upon by election officials
to maintain order in the vicinity of the voting booths.
3
Early on the morning of October 14, 1930, candidates
it Port-au-Prince assembled their followers at their re-
spective headquarters, plied them liberally with rum, and
sent them to the polls in charge of selected leaders. This
routine was repeated at voting places throughout the country.
Che elections were conducted without noticeable disorder
aid with American Marines confined to their barracks. The
lajority of the senators and deputies elected were from the
'anks of those who had actively opposed the Occupation
.
On November 1, General Russell tendered his resignation
is High Commissioner, and on November 12, the day his post
ras officially abolished, he left the country. On November
6, Dr. Dana G. Munro, ex-Chief of the Division of Latin
merican Affairs, whose appointment had been announced in
uly, assumed his duties as the American Minister to Haiti.
On November 19. 1930. the Haitian National Assembly
et and elected a new President of the Republic. The man
.
U. S., Marine Corps Records, Correspondence File of First
rovisional Brigade in Haiti, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps, Wash-




chosen was St£nio Vincent, who, Ironically enough, had
been President of the last National Assembly when that
body was dissolved by Smedley Butler during the hassle
over constitutional reform in 1917. The President-elect
was one of the most outspoken critics of the American
Occupation, editor of the foremost opposition newspaper,
one of the founders of the Union Patrlotique , and one of
the authors and signers of the "Memoire" presented by that
organization in 1921.
The popularity of the Vincent Government quickly waned,
as had that of President Roy. Those members of the politi-
cally active £lite who remained without an office in the
mew administration led a chorus of demands for the immediate
dismantling of the Occupation. Instant Haitianizatlon of
the treaty services was the new "cause" almost before the
Did - legislative elections - was fully realized. Early
Ln December, 193° » President Vincent submitted a plan to
the American Minister which called for the complete Haitian-
Ization of Public Works in one year, and Public Health, the
Service Technique
, and the Financial Adviser's Office in two
rears
.
No mention was made of the Garde. The plan was
considered "radical" by Dr. Munro and the State Department.
Against the advice of the American Minister, an attempt
fas made to negotiate a new convention extending American
"inanclal control in Haiti in the interest of foreign bond
olders, but returning the other services to the Haitian
overnment. This received a lukewarm reception from the
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President, but it met with cold hostility from almost
everyone else. Dr. Munro, who learned very quickly the
difference between "being on the ground" and being at a
desk in the State Department, reported that there was
unquestionably a very strong desire that all Americans
should leave Haiti at once, regardless of the effect upon
public order or the efficiency of government. It was
clear that the process of withdrawing from the position
hitherto occupied in Haiti would be an exceedingly diffi-
cult and disagreeable one. He wrote that he looked forward
to the meeting of the Haitian Congress in April, 1931, with
a "feeling of dismay, which is only mitigated by the very
evident terror with which the members of the Government
anticipate this same event. ,,Zf
In the spring of 1931, Senator King and Dr. Gruening,
traveling with the "Committee on Cultural Relations,"
risited Haiti. These two patron saints of the anti-
Dccupation movement were met by enthusiastic crowds. In
their speeches, however, they urged that the Haitians
exercise some restraint in the issue of Haitianization,
and this cost both of them their popularity with the more
radical Slite. There were actually attacks made on them
Ln the Port-au-Prince press as a result of their unexpectedly
iQderate stand. Sic transit gloria munda'.
'. U. S., National Archives, State Department Decimal File,




When the new Congress convened it proved to be as
unmanageable and violently anti-Occupation as had been
feared. One of its first acts was to vote its members
an expense allowance of $100 per month retroactive to
November of the previous year. The American Minister,
backed by Secretary of State Stimson, directed the Financial
Adviser to make no payments under this new law, and this,
as may be imagined, intensified the bitter feelings of
the Congress. Ominously, this Congress began attempts to
control appointments and promotions within the Garde d'Haiti.
Ihis was but the first step toward politicizing the Garde
and it threatened an eventual return to the military oli-
garchy of the past.
A bad and deteriorating relationship with the Haitian
Government made it clear that the United States could not
jxpect any whole-hearted cooperation in a policy to maintain
;he treaty services as efficient working organizations under
laitian control. American policy therefore changed, in the
;ummer of 1931 » to a policy which advocated turning over
onerican directed services as soon as possible, regardless
if the consequences to those services. A disillusioned
lunro wrote* "I cannot see that it is any part of our duty
oward Haiti to assist the Government in power by lending
urselves as a target for abuse."5
.U.S., National Archives, State Department Decimal File,




Pressures In the United States also directed an
acceleration of the Haitianization process. The ACLU
sent a circular letter urging total American withdrawal;
the NAACP demanded the appointment of a new commission
"at least one member of which shall be an American negro"
to devise steps for withdrawal of all American control
in Haiti prior to the expiration of the treaty .6 The
"Unemployed Councils of USA," and the "Anti-Imperialist
League" sent petitions. President Vincent appealed directly
to President Hoover for more vigorous execution of the
Forbes ' proposals
.
In this atmosphere a Haitianization accord was signed,
is an executive agreement, on August 5, 1931 t and martial
Law was formally repealed on that same date . Part of the
iccord provided that Haitian legislation no longer had to
lave the approval of the American Minister, and that pay-
lents no longer required the visa of the Financial Adviser,
n Washington the accord was hailed as a step made possible
y the remarkable progress achieved by the Haitians in the
anagement of their own affairs, a step which put into
ffect the recommendations of the Forbes Commission far
head of the time thought to have been possible. It turned
ver to the Haitians practically all of the treaty services,
ith the exception of the Garde and the Financial Adviser's
.
U. S., National Archives, State Department Decimal File,
?30-1939, 838.00/2996, NAACP to President Hoover, July 9,
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Office. Financial control was reduced, however, to that
considered essential for the protection of bond holders.
Negotiations were even then underway which would lead to
the purchase of the National Bank by the Haitian Govern-
ment and the replacement of United States responsibilities
to the bond holders by those assumed by a civilian director-
ship. The Bank was eventually purchased, for $1 million,
but the bond holders refused to accept the second part of
the plan, and consequently the last vestige of the American
Occupation was destined to be a "fiscal representative"
attached to the Haitian Government who officially represented,
lowever, not the United States, but the bond holders. This
arrangement continued through the 1930 , s.
In the fall of 1931, political activity in Haiti height-
ened, 1932 being another "even numbered year" and legislative
elections being scheduled yet again. In November there were
•eports of political assassinations, and vicious attacks in
he press on not only the Americans, but on President Vincent
s well. Late in November, irony of ironies, the President
rdered the dissolution of the Union Patriotique
. alleging
hat it had departed from the purpose for which originally
rganized and had become a "political association."?
The elections were held on January 10, 1932, in typical
aitian fashion and government candidates were elected in
.
U. S., National Archives, State Department Decimal File,




almost every district. A referendum attached to this same
election restored to Congress, meeting in joint session,
the power to amend the Constitution. Shortly after the
new Congress convened in April, 1932, it exercised that
power in an act of statesmanship extending its own terms
of office by two years.
The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as President of
the United States was accompanied by a restatement of American
policy toward Haiti. It was now the purpose of the United
States Government "to get the Marines out of Haiti as quickly
as possible," because it was believed such a gesture "would
nake a good impression on South America." 8 Withdrawal of
the Marines would also, perhaps, still the clamor of domestic
roices which, interestingly enough, were not lowered by the
ihange of administrations in Washington.
On August 7, 1933» the new American Minister in Port-
iu-Prince, Norman Armour, signed an executive agreement
rhich provided for the complete Haitianization of the Garde,
rithdrawal of all American Marines, and inauguration of the
fiscal representative" by October 1, 1934. Not long after,
resh Haitian demands were made for an immediate withdrawal
f the Marines and an end to all financial control, but to
his not even Mr. Roosevelt was willing to accede.
In April, 193^, President Vincent traveled to Washington
.
U. S., National Archives, State Department Decimal File,
530-1939, 838.OO/3127, Memo of telephone conversation be-
ween Francis White and Norman Armour, April 5, 1933.
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and there, on April 1?, the two Presidents issued a joint
statement concerning "the policy of the good neighbor" as
it applied to Haiti. There were no significant modifi-
cations to the existing plan, though President Roosevelt
did announce that he was requesting the Congress to auth-
orize a gift of Marine Brigade property to the people of
Haiti. This property, valued at a modest #100,000, con-
sisted mainly of the Brigade's weapons in Haiti. The
Congress later approved the gift.
President Roosevelt repaid President Vincent's visit
on July 5, 1934 , when he arrived in Cape Haitian aboard
the USS Houston
.
After brief ceremonies and discussions
ashore, it was announced that, at the request of President
Vincent, command of the Garde would be turned over on
August 1, instead of October 1, and American forces would
oe withdrawn by August 15, 1934.
On August 6, the Marines were withdrawn from Cape
laitian, after an impressive ceremony. The small detach-
lent marched to the harbor side accompanied by the Garde
>and, which played "Semper Fidelis," "The Stars and Stripes
forever," "The Halls of Montezuma," and, finally, as the
iarines embarked on USS Woodcock, "Auld Lang Syne." It was
eported that there were tears in the eyes of many old
aitians as the Marines passed, and that many either took
ff their hats or saluted the American flag as it was
arried by them.
At 5:30 in the afternoon on August 14, 1934, the
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American flag was lowered for the last time at Brigade
headquarters in Port-au-Prince, and the Haitian flag was
raised in its place,
A company of the Haitian Garde faced a company of
American Marines, with the flagpole between the two. As
the American flag was slowly lowered, the Garde band played
the American national anthem. A 21-gun national salute
was fired by Fort National. The Haitian colors were then
run up as the band played the Haitian national anthem. This
was followed by a salute of 21 guns to Haiti. The Marines
then marched in formation from the compound. They sailed









After the impressive ceremony of yesterday after-
noon which took place in a perfect atmosphere of
friendship, I am happy at the moment when the last
marines are embarking to renew to you the assurance
of my gratitude, that of the Government, and of the
Haitian people for your generous and intelligent
policy of the good neighbor which has effectively
aided me in accomplishing national liberation and
which ensures the continuation of the cordial re-
lations now existing between our two countries.
- President StSnio Vincent to President Franklin
D. Roosevelt, August 15, 193**.
In keeping with Haitian political tradition, StSnio
Vincent extended his term of office by unconstitutional
neans until 1941. In 1937 he very nearly had a war on his
lands when large masses of Haitian peasants, starving and
iesperate, crossed the Dominican frontier seeking work,
in estimated 10,000 were slaughtered by President Trujillo
>f the Dominican Republic in turning back this "invasion."
Ater, the two Presidents met and shook hands over the in-
ident
.
Street riots in Port-au-Prince in 194-1 forced President
incent to step down, and the Haitian National Assembly then
lected Elie Lescot. He too tried to extend his term of
ffice by extra-legal means, and in January, 1946, the Garde
orced him out. A new National Assembly was convened and
t elected Dumarsais Estime*, the first black President Haiti
ad had since the dismemberment of President Sam in 1915.
stime* presided over the adoption of a new Constitution,
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which restored the pre-191? ban on foreign ownership of
real property in Haiti. Under his leadership the Garde,
renamed Armie d' Haiti in 19^9, became the recognized
political arm of Haiti's blacks. President Estime* spon-
sored a world's fair in Port-au-Prince in W9 which drew
many visitors to the island, but unfortunately left the
country with a staggering debt. Denied re-election by
the National Assembly in 1950, Estime* called in black mobs
to clear the Chambers. Terrible riots swept the capital,
and finally 'the Armie d°Haiti removed the President and
restored order.
Not unexpectedly, the next President of the Republic
*as the Commandant of the Armie d'Haiti, Colonel Paul Mag-
-oire. He insisted upon election by the people, however,
md in a festive spirit the people, encouraged by free food
aid drink, responded and elected him with a plurality of
:ome 150,000 out of 153,000 votes that were cast. The
arly years of his administration were probably as good as
aiti had ever had, but in 1956 a general strike, rumors
f excessive graft and corruption, and increasingly gloomy
oonomic forecasts resulted in his overthrow by the army.
b escaped into exile in New York, and took with him the
arefully hoarded cash reserves of the Haitian treasury -
allegedly nearly $? million.
In September, 1957, a country physician, poet and
hilosopher was elected President of the Republic. This
Is Francois Duvaller, the beloved "Papa Doc" of the Haitian
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peasant. In 1961 a new National Assembly hand picked by
him was elected, and by virtue of that election he announced
that he himself had been elected to a second term, even
though his first term was not due to expire until 1963.
In 1964 a plebiscite declared him "President for Life."
The regime of terror he instituted thereafter was probably
unmatched by any in Haiti's long and colorful history.
When he died, in 19?1, his son and heir succeeded him in
the office of President of the Republic.
Thus, 36 years after the end of the American Occupation,
Haiti was quite possibly the least democratic and the least





It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore and to
see ships tossed upon the sea; a pleasure to stand
in the window of a castle and to see a battle and
the adventures thereof below: but no pleasure is
comparable to the standing upon the vantage ground
of truth and to see the errors and wanderings and
mists and tempests in the vale below.
- Lucretius.
"What is truth?" said jesting Pilate; and would
not stay for an answer.
- Francis Bacon.
Some years ago, while serving as Commanding Officer of
a small U.S. Navy ship, I entered the harbor at Cape Haitian
on Haiti's northern coast. There is an excitement attached
to entering any strange port for the first time, and that
sxcitement was heightened by a night of coastal piloting
imong Hispaniola's rocky and mountainous headlands. During
mch of the night the island was illuminated by a huge
laribbean moon. The raw smell of the land hung heavy in
;he air, and, recalling Seabrook's Magic Island , my ears
lmost strained for the sound of voodoo drums.
The sea detail for Cape Haitian is a short one, and
he morning was perfect, with unlimited visibility, flat
aim seas, and just the slightest onshore breeze. In spite
f this, the approaches to the harbor were almost utterly
•2V0id of the throngs of fishermen and coastal sailors who
flutter the mariner's way in almost every port in the world.
-
our ship steamed past Fort Picolet, close aboard its
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sheer stone walls, the only navigational aid marking the
narrow ship channel was seen to be the broken mast of an
old steamer, jutting ominously from the green water on our
port hand. The buoys which had once marked the way to the
one usable deep water berth had either sunk or been carried
away in years of neglect.
Once moored, we were boarded by the Chief of Police
and the only "official" American in Cape Haitian at the
time - the director of a small USIA library in the center
of the town. The American Consul had recently been ordered
out of the country by President Duvalier. After the usual
exchange of pleasantries and social invitations, warnings
about the local water and venereal disease, and scheduling
of tours, etc., there were a few free hours before paying
the first calls on local Haitian officials. I decided to
take advantage of that time and briefly explore the city.
Everything worthwhile seeing seemed to be within easy walk-
ing distance of the ship.
It being then "siesta hour," the hordes of beggars and
peddlers who greeted our arrival were asleep on the pier,
stretched out on their drums and wood carvings. Only a few
sinister-looking individuals at the pier head seemed alert
Dehind expensive sunglasses. These were members of Dr.
Duvalier* s secret police - the ton ton macoute.
Cape Haitian, the erstwhile "Paris of the Antilles,"
lad the appearance of a dying slum. The nearest approach
-o urban renewal that was visible was a lean-to shack built
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against the one standing wall of a ruined stone building.
The town's narrow, dirt streets were pot-holed to the ex-
tent that wheeled traffic, where possible, must have been
extremely hazardous. Sanitation was deplorable. Garbage
and worse littered the streets and sidewalks. The one
observable sign of civic pride was the plethora of tiny
Haitian flags and banners inscribed "Doc a" Vie'. " flutter-
ing pathetically from the fronts of mean little houses.
President Hyppolite's Iron Market presented scenes that
wrenched the heart. The market women, the marchandes who
carried their pitiable produce to town over miles of stony
trails on swollen feet, lay sleeping amidst their stunted,
half-spoiled vegetables and graying meats, oblivious to
the flies, and the stench, and the noonday heat. A naked
child nursed at his sleeping mother's breast. Older child-
ren, for the most part clad only in ragged shirts, threw
stones at gaunt, starving dogs to keep them away from the
narket floor.
This view of Cape Haitian is perhaps not an altogether
Tair one. I later discovered that the green hills surround-
ing the town's center were dotted with many charming and
lodern homes. The newest, I was told, were built with Ameri-
can AID funds before the excesses of the Duvalier regime
aused an end of most United States assistance programs in
he Republic. There was no attempt to conceal the fact, and
o obvious embarrassment, that most if not all of that assist-
ive in Cape Haitian had gone to benefit government officials.
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This was, and always had been, I gathered, the natural
course of things in Haiti. The American Occupation was
remote in time and all but forgotten. Most Haitians then
living never knew it had ever occurred.
What, then, did it all mean? What special significance
does the fact that the United States once occupied the
Republic of Haiti for a period of almost twenty years have
for Americans, or Haitians, today?
The roads, the bridges, the schools and the hospitals
of the Occupation have, by and large, gone the way of the
French sugar houses and plantations, devoured by drenching
rains and encroaching wilderness. The institutions meant
to be lasting did not take in the hearts of the people.
The material benefits conveyed by the Americans proved
fleeting, as ephemeral as the Haitian Governments in the
fears just prior to the intervention. One generation of
iaitians grew up in conditions of relative order and stabll-
.ty, but in the long viexv even that seems to have had no
.asting effect.
American capital investment in Haiti during and after
he Occupation was not significantly greater than what it
ad been before, and what investment there was remained
elatively unprofitable. The oft-repeated charge that "Wall
treet" fomented the intervention in order to facilitate
ts "exploitation" of Haiti is myth, created almost entirely
it of whole cloth by those antagonistic to the American
jonomic system and propagated and believed by those un-
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willing or unable to discover the truth. Likewise, the
story that the Americans seized Haiti for the purpose of
establishing military bases is belied by the fact that no
such bases were ever built there, and by the written record
Ln the files of the General Board which shows that senior
American naval officers consistently rejected the idea of
Haitian bases once Guantanamo was secured in the Spanish
American War. The third of the "selfish" American reasons
isually given for the intervention, defense of the Monroe
Doctrine, has more merit than either of the other two, and
*as in fact cited by one oT the architects of the inter-
vention - Robert Lansing - in a 1921 letter to the McCormick
lommittee. It too, however, fails the test of logic, for
n 1915 there was not the remotest threat of intervention
n Haiti by any power other than the United States. The
ionroe Doctrine was, in effect, a smoke screen to conceal
he fact that there was no narrowly defined American national
nterest at stake in Haiti which required military inter-
ention
.
Why, then, did the United States intervene? There
eems to be, from the record, little question but that
he intervention was motivated by the broadest humanitarian
esires to rescue the Haitian people from the seemingly
Dpeless anarchy into which they had fallen. Such an ln-
erpretation is perfectly in keeping with the known idealism
id instincts of woodrow Wilson.
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In a democracy such as the American, humanitarian
reasons are seldom, if ever, adequate to marshal public
support of domestic policy, much less an active foreign
one. The best that can ordinarily be hoped for in such
circumstances is acquiescence, and when the policy bogs
down and the going gets tough, acquiescence is not enough.
The hard fact is that the "humanitarianism" of demos is
something quite different from the humanitarianism of the
individual. Intervention in Haiti on the humanitarian
grounds that it was necessary to keep negroes from chopping
up other negroes could not possibly have been supported
democratically in the United States of 1915f nor for that
matter of 1971. In that the intervention was a mistake,
and not supported by any reasons of compelling national
interest, the natural instincts of demos in this instance
may be seen to have been superior to the more tender in-
stincts of the President and his advisers. The failure of
the intervention to accomplish anything worthwhile and
lasting reinforces such a contention. Had there been no
intervention it is at least possible a better Haitian society
might have evolved after the chaos of 1915. A worse one
than that actually surviving the intervention can scarcely
be imagined.
The moral for future Presidents contemplating military
interventions should be clear. Where such intervention is
deemed necessary, its motivation and justification, openly
and frankly acknowledged, should be furtherance of the

national interest . It needs no other.
Though the American intervention in Haiti failed
utterly to satisfy its raison d'etre , from one limited
aspect it was almost incredibly successful. There were
never more than about 2,000 American Marines in Haiti,
and during most of the Occupation there were less than
half that many. Casualty figures show that in all the
years of the Occupation, including the landing at Bizoton
and the Caco War, only 7 Americans were killed in action
and only 26 were wounded (3 of whom died from their wounds).
It is instructive to consider how such a "cheap 1 ' operation
in terms of American lives was carried out. It is also
instructive to consider, in the light of later American
experience in Vietnam, how it was not carried out.
It was not carried out by leveling every port city in
the country by naval gunfire, though this was well within
the capability of the naval forces deployed there. It was
lot carried out by destroying known or •'suspected" Caco
villages and positions by artillery fire or by burning,
though this too was within the American capability. It was
lot, in general, with the notable exception of Washington's
31ue Jacket Battalion in the first days of the intervention,
iarried out by "green" troops, and never by men who could
Look forward to returning home before the job was done.
:t was not carried out with civilian direction or inter-
'erence at the tactical level. It was not carried out in
;he face of infiltration of men and arms from areas beyond
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the reach of American forces operating in Haiti. Finally,
it was not carried out in conjunction with a massive relief
and rehabilitation program designed to win "the hearts and
minds" of the people. Because it was not, supplies and
equipment, and particularly food, were kept out of the
hands of the enemy, for the civilian population had none
to give him or to be stolen by him. This research has un-
covered no evidence to indicate that the American relief
program in Haiti ever went much beyond the level of dis-
tributing garbage from American ships, and that was only
a short term measure
.
It may be argued that measures taken by the Americans
in Haiti were callous and brutal, particularly in regard
to the treatment afforded, or rather not afforded, the
sivilian population while the fighting continued. This
argument does not hold up well under examination, however,
and the fact is that the disorders were ended sooner and
ooth American and Haitian lives were saved by not pouring
rood and relief into the country. As noted, many hungry
jacos sold their weapons to the Americans, and hunger, as
fell as American force of arms, played a major role in
lisarming the country. The Haitian experience merely re-
iffirmed a truism known by military conquerors for ages -
mngry people would rather eat than fight.
The military operation in Haiti was carried out by
larine and Naval officers and men of uncommon valor who
new their profession well. It is Impossible to read the
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accounts of the military action there and not feel both
admiration and awe at the accomplishments of these men.
Equally impressive are the leadership qualities these
.Americans displayed in welding together, in such a short
time, an "effective and reliable constabulary" in the
Gendarmerie. They made their Haitian recruits excellent
fighting men also. One must wonder, in this time of re-
laxed discipline and growing egalitarian! srn in the American
armed forces, whether such a thing is ever possible again.
Certainly, there is little that is encouraging in the per-
formance thus far of American- trained Vietnamese forces.
But, though the military operation in Haiti was a
success, "the patient died." why?
A lament often expressed by Occupation officials was
that in Haiti the United States did not, as it had in the
Dominican Republic and in the Philippines, establish a
ailitary government from the very start. In Haiti, perhaps
because of domestic political considerations in the United
States, it was decided to clothe the fact of military occu-
pation in the legitimacy of a treaty which established
shared responsibility and authority between American and
laitian officials. Just how legitimate the treaty was,
:iven the circumstances in which it was negotiated, is at
east debatable, what is scarcely debatable, however, is
he hypocrisy attached to the American attitude thereafter.
o men can ride a horse, but one must ride up front. There
as never any question who was up front under the Occupation.
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It seems quite probable that the immensity of the
task undertaken by the Americans in Haiti was vastly
underestimated. The country's finances could be straight-
ened out in reasonable time, but the social and political
problems had no short-term solution. Trying to establish
stable, efficient, and democratic government in a country
where 90 percent of the population was illiterate and
poverty-stricken, was trying to square the circle.
A point often overlooked is the fact that the costs
of the Occupation were not funded by the United States,
with the very narrow exception of pay for the military
personnel assigned there. General Russell estimated, in
1930, that the Occupation had cost the United States $26
million to that time. In the final years of the American
presence in Haiti the costs were not over $500,000 a year.
Thus, the very poor Haitian economy was called upon to
finance virtually all the expense of the treaty services,
in addition to the rapid retirement of the public debt.
Under those circumstances, the wonder is that so much, and
not so little, was done.
Finally, the Occupation in Haiti was confronted from
the very start with the problem created by a strong polit-
ical constituency in the United States which pretended to
see in the Haitian intervention another example of the
white man's oppression of the black man. This •'cause"
attracted a wide spectrum of support, and beginning par-
ticularly vrith the national elections in 1920, it became
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a prime political issue. The elite "out-politician" found
in American public opinion the weapon needed to win back
place and to force the Americans out. It was this, not
a sudden and remarkable progress in "Haitianization, " not
reasonable expectation of political stability, and not
faith in Haiti's ability to work things out on her own,
that ended the Occupation in 1934.
To summarize: the decision to Intervene in Haiti in
1915 was, from the point of view of the national interest,
a bad decision j the decision to withdraw in 1934 was, from
the same point of view, a good decision. It is an irony
that the first decision, condemned as "brutal trampling
on a helpless neighbor," was taken primarily for humanit-
arian reasons, and that the second, praised as a benevolent
act restoring liberty and freedom to the Haitian people,
was taken with the almost certain knowledge of portending
disaster to the mass of the Haitian people.
Things are seldom what they seem.
December, 1968, Winchester, Mass.







. S . Government
Correspondence File of First Provisional Brigade ofMarines in Haiti, Marine Corps Headquarters, HistorySection, Washington, D ,C .
Department of state Numerical File, 1906-1910. n sNational Archives.
Despatches From U.S. Ministers to Haiti, 1862-1906,U.S. National Archives, Micro Copy M-82.
Naval Records Collection, Subject File, Haiti, 1911-
1927, U.S. National Archives, Record Group k$.
Records of the Department of state Relating to In-
ternal Affairs of Haiti, 1910-1929, U.S. National
Archives, Micro Copy 610.
Records of the Department of State Relating to Pol-itical Relations Between the United States and Haiti,
1910-1929, U.S. National Archives, Micro Copy 611.
Records of the Naval General Board, Office of theChief of Naval Operations, Naval History Division,
Washington, D ,C
.
Records of the President's Commission for Study andReview of Conditions in Haiti (Forbes Commission;,U.S. National Archives, Record Group 220.
Report o f the Senate Sel ec t Committee on Haiti andSanto Domlngo^JTedDj^Mc Cormrcic, Chairman
. ( washing-
ton, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1921, 1922).
State Department Decimal File, 838. 00, 1930-1939U.S. National Archives.





Beach, Captain Edward L., Papers, (in Dossession
of the Captain's family).
Caperton, .Admiral William B., Papers, Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division.




Beach, Edward L., The Wreck of th e Memphis, (Holt.
Rinehart and Winston, New York, l^EFJT
Cave, Hugh B., Haiti, Highroad to Adven ture. (HenrvHolt & Co., New York, 1952). y
Davis, H.P., Black





The Diplomatic Relations of the U S
with Haiti, (University of North Carolina Press.'*Chapel Hill, 1941).
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Influence of Sea Power





,Twelfth Edition, Boston, 1942).







Haiti and the United States .
±Y14-1x3 », (Russell and Russeli, New York, 1966).
Rodman, Selden, Haiti: The Black Republic (Devin-Adalr Co., New York, 1954]"
Vandercook, J.w., Black Majesty, the Life of Chris-
^ophe, King of Haiti. IHaro^ * p.rno













Naval Institut e Proceeding^
. May
,
Boyden, Captain H.D., "The Curse of Santo Domingo,"
U.. S. Naval Institute Proceedings . January, 1937.
Coffey, Commander R.B., "A Brief History of theIntervention in Haiti," U^s,.Naval Institute Pro-ceedings
. June, 1922. ~~ -
^TZf 1 Cap^ain Charles, "A Year in Haiti's Customsand Fiscal Service," U, S. Naval insti tute p™*™?!ings
, April, 1923. — eea







QU0 VadiS Halti? " foreign Affair.. .
Gruening, Ernest H., "Conquest of Haiti and <3«n*-nD°*ingo," Ngjqork, Times Current mTtntr**ooT t0










The con<iuest °f Haiti
-- s>e
Reports
renorr S11^ GJf 6? e ' ed " "^cupied Haiti, being thep t of six disinterested Americans representingorganizations exclusively American, IhZ^htvtnl per-sonally studied conditions in Haiti in 1926! favor
P^if^t0ra^ 0n °f the ne^° republic?" The WrUersublishing Co., New York, 192?
.
w iter
Bausman F. & others, "The Seizure of Haiti by theU.S., The Foreign Policy Association, 1922.





'"BINDERY
S34s'
S
Schreadley -32583
Intervention
- the
Africans in Ham,
Thesi s
S345 Schreadley
Intervention - the
Americans in Hatit,
1915-1934.
.. od\)L \j

